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The Civil War career of Major-General Edward Massey (1642-1647).

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THE
CIVIL WAR CAREER
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL EDWARD MASSEY.
(1642-1647)
BY
DAVID SIDNEY EVANS.
(PhD Thesis King's College London).





Edward Massey
By Sir Peter Lely

DEDICATION.

To Mr Steve Wright whose invaluable assistance allowed me to present this thesis for examination.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Add Ms	Additional Manuscripts, British Library
A&O	C. F. Firth and F. Rait, ed. <u>Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum</u> , 2 vols. (1911)
BG	J. Washbourne, ed. <u>Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis: A Collection of Scarce and Curious Tracts Relating to the County and City of Gloucester</u> (1825)
BIHR	<u>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</u>
BL	British Library
Bodl	Bodleian Library
CCAM	M. A. Everett Green, ed. <u>Calendar of the Committee for Advance of Money</u> , 3 vols. (1888)
CCC	M. A. Everett Green, ed. <u>Calendar of the Committee for Compounding</u> , 5 vols. (1890)
CCSP	O. Ogle Etc, ed. <u>Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers</u> , 5 vols. (1869)
CJ	<u>Journals of the House of Commons</u>
CLRO	City of London Record Office
Corbet	John Corbet, An Historical Relation of the Military Government of Gloucester From the Beginning of the Civil War Between King and Parliament to the Removal of Colonel Massey From the Government to the Command of the Western Forces, in J. Washbourne's ed. <u>Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis</u>
CP	C. H. Firth, ed. <u>The Clarke Papers</u> , 4 vols. Camden Society (1891-1901)
CSPD	W. D. Hamilton, ed. <u>Calendars of State Papers Domestic</u> (1887)
CSPI	R. P. Mahaffy, ed. <u>Calendar of State Papers, Irish Series</u> (1905)
CSPV	A. B. Hinds, ed. <u>Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives of Venice</u> (1912-32)
DNB	<u>Dictionary of National Biography</u>
DrWL	Doctor William's Library

E	British Library Thomason Tract Collection
EHR	<u>English History Review</u>
GNQ	<u>Gloucestershire Notes and Queries</u> , 10 vols. (1881-1902)
GRO	Gloucestershire Record Office
HJ	<u>Historical Journal</u>
HMC	<u>Historical Manuscripts Commission</u>
HPMF	Harvester Press Microfilm
HSP	Harleian Society Publication
JSAHR	<u>Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research</u>
LCCJB	London Common Council Journal Book, (40) 1640-49
LJ	<u>Journals of the House of Lords</u>
Loan	Manuscripts permanently or temporarily on loan at the British Library
MF	Microfilm
Ms	Manuscript
NP	G. F. Warner, ed. <u>Nicholas Papers</u> , Camden Society, 4 vols. (1890's)
OPH	<u>The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England</u> , 24 vols. (1751-62)
ORN	R. Jeffs, gen ed. Oxford Royalist Newsbooks, <u>The English Revolution 3, Newsbooks, Oxford Royalist</u> , 3 vols. (1971)
P&P	<u>Past & Present</u>
SP	State Papers in the Public Record Office
TBGAS	<u>Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archeological Society</u>
TRHS	<u>Transactions of the Royal Historical Society</u>
VCH	<u>Victoria County History, Gloucestershire</u> vols. 2, 6, 7, 8, 10 (miscellaneous dates of publication)
W&S	B. Bond and I. Roy ed. <u>War and Society: An Annual Year Book on Military History</u> vol. 1 (1977)
Washbourne	J. Washbourne, Historical Introduction by J. Washbourne in his <u>Bibliotheca Gloucestresis</u> (1825)
Whitelocke	Bulstrode Whitelocke, <u>Memorials of English Affairs</u> , 4 vols. (1853)

INTRODUCTION.

'A Soldier of Fortune'.

Clarendon, iii.130.

The outbreak of armed hostilities against Scotland prompted hundreds of English soldiers to return from the Thirty Years War and to enlist in the King's cause.¹ Amongst them was Edward Massey, who, like many of his comrades, had chosen to become a professional soldier. The political instability of his times was to enable him to rise far above his socially modest origins as the fourth son of a minor Cheshire gentleman.

It has often been asserted that Edward Massey was born in 1619.² This is clearly mistaken. Edward was the fourth of eighteen children, of which the eldest, John, was born in 1601³, and the youngest not later than 1618, when their mother is known to have died. This confirms the accuracy of the earlier birthdate, between 1604 and 1606, suggested by F.A.Hyett in 1891.⁴

In a portrait of Edward Massey painted by Sir Peter Lely in 1647 a mature man stares from the canvas with solemn, penetrating eyes.⁵ Massey is tall and lean, his demeanor of a man no longer young: he was described in that year as 'of a middle age',⁶ and may be assumed to have reached his late thirties at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642.

(1) I.Roy, 'England Turned Germany', TRHS (1978), pp.130-1.

(2) DNB, xiii.2.

(3) G.Ormerod, ed., Ormerod's Cheshire (1819), ii.399.

(4) F.A.Hyett, Gloucester and Her Governor During the Civil War (1891), p.37.

(5) See frontispiece.

(6) E 401(20): A Speedy Hue and Cry..., Aug 10 1647.

Edward Massey was not born great, and it is small wonder that his early life is but sketchily recorded. John Massey of Coddington, his father, belonged to the minor gentry community of Cheshire. A man of very little influence outside his own manor, John Massey did succeed in marrying into a longer established and more powerful county family, the Grosvenors of Eaton. Anne Grosvenor had been born in 1582, and must have been eighteen years of age at her marriage around the turn of the century.¹

As the fourth son, Edward Massey stood little chance of inheriting the Coddington estate. The ever increasing size of the family must have been a factor in his early departure from the parental home. He was a man of little depth or sophistication and had no academic ability or inclination. Oxbridge and the Inns of Court, traditionally the routes along which gentlemen might escape from provincial obscurity, were thus closed to him.

Massey was apprenticed, probably when still in his early teens, to a London leatherseller, Mr Edward Ford.² In 1647, when Massey was at the height of his prestige, John Vicars penned a brief life, in which he confirmed that Massey had 'heretofore been an apprentice of London'.³ A hostile propaganda tract written later that year, when Massey's circumstances had changed for the worse, claimed that he was 'sometime an apprentice of London bridge, but gave his master the bag, and took [to] Holland'.⁴

- (1) BL, Harleian Mss.1,535, f.208b; Sir G.J.Armytage and J.P.Rylands ed. Pedigrees Made at the Visitation of Cheshire 1613, The Records For the Publication of Original Documents Relating to Lancashire and Cheshire v.lviii(1909), p.179.
- (2) Gentleman's Magazine, v.ciii Pt.2 (1833), p.304.
- (3) J.Vicars, England's Worthies (1845), p.60.
- (4) E 401(20).

It was common for less academically gifted younger sons of gentlemen to take up apprenticeships in London.¹ Several future Parliamentary commanders, including Massey's political and military ally Major General Richard Browne, were also apprenticed in the capital.² Massey's experience in the leather selling trade does not seem to have been happy. Perhaps Mr Ford was a harsh or uninspiring master, or perhaps Massey's willful nature manifested itself in impatience, or disillusionment with his prospects. The charge may be true that he absconded from his indentured obligations by fleeing to Holland. Certainly it was here that he began his military apprenticeship.³

The Dutch Republic was still engaged in its Eighty Years War of Independence against Spain. Little is known about the details of this part of Massey's early career, but it seems that it was in Holland that he came to acquire specialist knowledge in the complexities of military engineering and ordnance. John Vicars wrote that thanks to his 'studious dexterity' Massey became 'a most expert engineer and valient soldier and commander in foreign parts'.⁴ Many years later, in 1661, Samuel Pepys, a shrewd judge of character and ability, met Massey in London, finding him to be 'a very ingenious man, and among other things a great master in the secrecys of powder and fireworks'.⁵ Massey may not have had the inclination or aptitude to have become a good leatherseller or scholar but in the Dutch Republic

(1) P.Laslet, The World We Have Lost (1979), p.50;

C.V.Wedgwood, The King's Peace (1971), p.49.

(2) Vicars, pp.60-1.

(3) E 401(20); Vicars, pp.60-1.

(4) Vicars, p.61.

(5) R.C.Latham, ed. The Diary of Samuel Pepys (1970-6), ii.219.

of the 1620's and 1630's he discovered in the military art a vocation which fitted his abilities, and resolved to become proficient in it.

Lack of professional soldiers had been one of the major weaknesses of Charles I's army in the summer of 1639. By 1640, with war against the Scots looming again, the Royal cause once more offered generous opportunities to skilled English soldiers serving abroad.¹ Edward Massey was certainly one of the more obscure English professional officers who returned in 1640 in response to the urgent needs of the crown. In 1648, a hostile commentator recalled some details about his return. 'For after he came from the voyage against the Scots (when the Scots first invaded England...) in which expedition the said Massey was made Captain of pioneers by Nicholas Davenant, poet Davenants brother; I say after which voyage he had not 12d some time in his pocket to pay for his dinner'.²

Massey may well have arrived impoverished from Holland but he soon found employment for his talents. Clarendon recorded that he was an officer in the northern expedition against the Scots under the command of Colonel William Legge.³ Colonel Legge had been trained in the Swedish and Dutch schools of war. He had returned to England before Massey in 1638 and soon undertook special military engineering responsibilities. In that year Legge was appointed to supervise the fortification of Newcastle and Hull.⁴ By 1640 he had been made Master of the Armoury and Lieutenant of the Ordnance.⁵

- (1) I.Roy, TRHS (1978), pp.130-1; Wedgewood, The King's Peace, p.280.
- (2) CP, ii.159.
- (3) W.D.Macray, ed. The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England by Edward, Earl of Clarendon (1888), iii.130.
- (4) CSPD, 1637-38, p.590.
- (5) Ibid, 1639-40, pp.134,167; DNB, xxxii.414.

It is not surprising that it was as a Captain of pioneers that Massey was enrolled under Colonel Legge: his grounding in the arts of engineering and ordnance could best be utilised in such a position. Promotion to what was probably his first commissioned rank was certainly a major advance for the aspiring professional soldier. In 1647, a news-sheet speculated that Massey thought 'himself highly advanced in being Captain of pioneers for 5's per diem'.² His rise was not based solely on talent. The Davenants were crucial, though it is not known whether their contribution to Massey's advancement was directly the work of Nicholas, or whether his brother was also involved. William Davenant was a poet, playwright and military engineer of much distinction, who, during the Civil War, became General of the Ordnance in the Royalist army of the North under the Duke of Newcastle.¹ Perhaps William played a role in introducing or recommending the relatively unknown Massey to Legge.

But there is another factor which may have contributed to his advance. As a Captain of pioneers, Massey would have been in command of locally impressed civilians, a position demanding diplomatic skill. Men had to be persuaded to carry out menial work, such as the construction of earthworks, fortifications and gun emplacements, tasks often considered by soldiers to be extremely degrading.³ Infantrymen were often punished by being compelled to be a pioneer.⁴ Dislike of the work might have created a dearth of qualified officers prepared to take on the responsibility of commanding a pioneer company. Considerations of military status may well help to explain Massey's valuable

- (1) M.Edmond, Rare Sir William Davenant (1987), p.91; O.Dick, ed. Aubrey's Brief Lives (1982), p.178; DNB, xiv.104.
- (2) E unnumbered tract after E 1947(16), entitled Micro-Chronicon, March 1647, reference under 6 July 1646.
- (3) C.Duffy, Siege Warfare (1979), p.147.
- (4) C.Firth, Cromwell's Army (1967), p.176.

promotion at what proved to be a decisive moment.

Men like Edward Massey were the means by which the latest continental developments in military engineering were introduced in to Britain. The innovations of the Dutch school of fortification, more than any other, were adopted during the Civil War. This reflected the popularity amongst Englishmen of the Republic's political cause, as well as its place as a major innovator in the field of military technique.¹

The campaign of 1640 culminated in the rout at Newburn, and spelled political disaster for King Charles.² Under his leadership, England appeared totally incapable of organizing and sustaining a campaign to subdue her backward northern neighbour.³ As the focus of events shifted southwards to the newly assembled Parliament at Westminster, the sad remnants of the English army were left to fend for themselves while the Scots came to dominate the northern counties.

Many amongst Massey's fellow soldiers must have regretted their decision to abandon regular employment in Europe for a short lived and demoralising campaign on the northern frontier of their native land. Throughout the spring and summer of 1641 the army's morale was eroded further by a chronic shortage of pay.⁴ But these soldiers were soon to gain employment in circumstances impossible to predict in the summer of 1641.

- (1) Lt.Col.W.Ross, Military Engineering During the Great Civil War (1984), pp.9-10,16.
- (2) S.Gardiner, The Fall of the Monarchy (1882), ii.43.
- (3) I.Roy, 'The English Civil War and English Society' W&S (1975), p.27.
- (4) Gardiner, Fall of the Monarchy, ii.43.

CHAPTER 1.
STAMFORD'S LIEUTENANT COLONEL 1641-42.

Massey had been associated with certain Royal officers who had plotted to use the army to overawe the increasingly refractory Parliament at Westminster. When the plot was discovered by Pym many of these conspirators managed to escape abroad but one of Massey's powerful acquaintances, William Davenant, was arrested.¹ In June 1641, however, there was a second army plot in which Massey's other patron, Colonel William Legge, attempted to collect officers' signatures in support of an advance on London.² Both Davenant and Legge, therefore, were among the most active members of the emerging Royalist faction.

Many English officers travelled south to London in the hope of securing their arrears of pay. Some hoped to gain employment in the new expedition planned to subdue the rebellion in Ireland which had broken out in October 1641.³ But many of these unemployed reformados soon became involved in pro-Royalist demonstrations in the capital, and a large number helped Charles in his attempt to arrest the five members.⁴ Massey's role in all this, if any, is not known.

The King's removal to York in March 1642 brought about the physical separation of the two opposing factions which made the Civil War a practical possibility.⁵ It offered, to professional soldiers such as Massey, an unexpected opportunity for further employment in England. His choice of sides seemed obvious because his patrons and friends were among the crown's most loyal supporters. Legge certainly attended upon the King at York

(1) Edmond, p.87; Gardiner, ii.164,167.

(2) Gardiner, ii.211-13; DNB, xxxii.414.

(3) A.Fletcher, The Outbreak of the English Civil War (1981), p.85; Gardiner, ii.268.

(4) C.V.Wedgwood, The King's War (1971), pp.48-9; Fletcher, pp.178-9.

(5) R.Hutton, The Royalist War Effort (1982), p.3.

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and was soon engaged in Royalist operations around Hull.¹ Massey could well have been in attendance.

Charles experienced great difficulty in raising troops, especially infantry forces, in the North.² What little military strength he possessed seemed to consist almost entirely of horse.³ Some began to doubt whether the King could ever engage in an offensive war against his Parliament.⁴ Still, throughout the spring and summer of 1642 a steady stream of prominent gentry and nobles converged upon York to enlist in the service of their troubled monarch. The capital of the North soon became crowded, almost to overflowing, with the King's richest and most influential supporters.⁵ But, not for the first or last time, the Royalists had too many officers and too few troops for them to command.⁶

In such a situation, Massey's professional prospects looked bleak, especially since there was no shortage of aspiring Royal officers far better connected than himself. Massey lacked the social pedigree and field experience to become an officer of horse; and the Royal infantry, which might have offered better openings for a man of his talents, was almost non-existent.⁷ Is it therefore possible to conclude that Massey's impending desertion of the Royalist cause was the cynical act of a career soldier on the make?

In 1649, in an effort to explain his escape from army

- (1) Clarendon, ii.3; LJ, v.27.
- (2) J.L.Malcolm, 'A King in Search of Soldiers' HJ (1978), pp.254-9; Fletcher, pp.228-9,231-3,315-6; Hutton, pp.3-4; SP. 16/490, f.131.
- (3) SP.16/490, ff.13,171.
- (4) SP.16/491, f.59; Clarendon, ii.313.
- (5) Bodl., Tanner Mss. 63, ff.30,35; SP.16/491, f.77; Clarendon, ii.86; W.Scott, ed. Somers Tracts (1810-11), iv.463.
- (6) J.L.Malcolm, Caesar's Due: Loyalty and King Charles I 1642-46 (1983) pp.96-98.
- (7) Fletcher, p.324.

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custody, Massey tried to justify his conduct during these early months of the war. He related how in 1642 he had carefully studied the declarations of King and Parliament, and found himself, like so many others, equally contented with both.¹ In 1660 he claimed to have taken at face value the Parliament's stated intention only to maintain the Protestant religion, the King's just prerogatives and the laws of the land.² He claimed to have believed that the King had listened to those 'about him (who only aimed at their own advantage and design) [and allowed himself] to be misled, and drawn aside, to the danger of the Kingdom and his own prejudice'.³

Such claims may well have reflected Massey's need in both 1649 and 1660 to project his motives in terms which the Royalists to whom he was explaining them might regard as honourable, or at least excusable. His 1649 version of his earlier standpoint contained beliefs commonplace in mid-1642, whether or not Massey was sincere in reporting that he had held them then. Many agreed with the notion, assiduously circulated by Pym and his supporters in the Commons, that there existed a conspiracy amongst the King's advisers to pursue their own interests at the expense of those of the state. This is certainly consistent with Massey's view that Parliament was the King's 'greatest council, the collective body and trustees of the people, and by his majesty's own free act confirmed to be a Parliament proper', and that Pym and his followers were men of integrity 'supposing none of them could have any thought or aim beyond the public good'.⁴ The acquisition of such views makes his transfer of allegiance to the Parliament perfectly logical.

There is abundant evidence however that Massey's behaviour in the summer of 1642 was guided by considerations more

(1) E 541(7); A Short Declaration by Colonel Edward Massey, p.3.

(2) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Ms.f.30.

(3) E 541(7), pp.3-4.

(4) Ibid, p.4.

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pragmatic than a sudden conversion to the ideological merits of the Parliamentary cause. His desertion of the King, and later prominence in the enemy camp, make it especially understandable that the leading Royalists with whom he had been closely connected should have hated him, as a traitor to their cause.¹ Nevertheless, their accounts of Massey and his motives ring true.

Clarendon believed that in 1642 Massey was nothing more than a soldier of fortune.² Certainly, Massey's past conduct had been that of a professional soldier seeking to make the most of his chosen career. And, as Clarendon observed, Massey 'in the beginning of these troubles had been at York with inclination to serve the King; but finding himself not enough known there, and that there would be little gotten but the comfort of a good conscience, he went to London, where there was more money and fewer officers'.³ In 1643, another Royalist said that Massey had initially decided to serve the King 'but that he was refused the employment he desired'.⁴

Massey's tendency to inflate the value of his own services was important in shaping his destiny, in 1642 and later. Had he been offered a commissioned rank of sufficient prestige, there can be little doubt that he would have stayed loyal to the King's cause. But there were few opportunities in the Royalist camp for those such as himself who were not well connected. Parliament, by contrast, offered more scope to obscure but ambitious men. There was an acute shortage of skilled professional officers in London, and Scottish veteran officers were often employed to fill the gaps in Parliament's ranks.⁵

- (1) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, ff.281-2.
- (2) Clarendon, iii.130.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.104.
- (5) SP.16/492, f.92; Clarendon, iii.130.

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From the very outset, therefore, Massey's allegiance to the Parliament arose not out of conviction, as he declared, but out of personal ambition. He was not alone in choosing the side which seemed to offer the best prospect of advancement.¹ The invaluable experience offered by professional soldiers such as himself was sought and welcomed by both sides, though the loyalties of such men could prove to be very fickle.²

Henry Grey, Earl of Stamford, became one of the Parliament's most eminent active supporters. His estates lay predominantly in the counties of Leicester and Rutland. The outbreak of the Civil War in Leicestershire largely revolved around the traditional county rivalry of the Hastings and Grey families each of which supported opposing sides.³ Stamford was the first to oppose the King's Commissioners of Array in Leicestershire, and so became an early hero of the Parliamentary cause.⁴

Although Massey tried to show in 1649 that he had remained loyal to Charles until the raising of the Royal standard in August 1642 there is firm evidence that he had deserted the Royal headquarters at York by late May.⁵ In early June Parliament discussed a plan to send a force of 5,000 foot and 500 horse to the relief of Ireland. This projected army, to be deployed under the command of Lord Wharton as Colonel General,⁶ was never sent, since Parliament was soon to have need of all the troops it could muster. In a list of officers, dated 11 June, Edward Massey was mentioned as a Captain in command of Wharton's own foot company.⁷

- (1) H.Dirkes, The Life, Times and Scientific Labours of the Second Marquis of Worcester (1865), p.330.
- (2) I.Roy, TRHS (1978), pp.132-3.
- (3) HMC, Hastings Mss.(1930), ii.84-5; Fletcher, p.351.
- (4) BL, Add.Ms.37,343, f.250b.
- (5) E 541(7) A Short Declaration..., p.3.
- (6) G.B.Cockayne, ed. The Complete Peerage (1910), xii(2).603; Clarendon, ii.70.
- (7) E.Peacock, ed. The Army Lists of the Roundheads and the Cavaliers (1874), p.68.

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Clearly Massey had arrived in London from the North by early June, and must have made impressed Lord Wharton to be offered such a command. Indeed, Massey seems to have gained immediate access to the social and political elite which dominated circles the Parliamentary high command, in sharp contrast to his lack of similar success at York.

By mid-July, as Massey must have appreciated, it became clear that the proposed Irish expedition would come to nothing. The Parliament now began, as a matter of priority, to set about raising an army for its own defence in England.¹ On 10 July, the Earl of Essex was named as Lord General of an army for which 10,000 infantry were to be recruited.² As one door closed for Massey, another opened. The new and ambitious plans must have raised the hopes of many aspiring professional officers in the capital at that time. Massey, like so many others, was not to be disappointed.

In late July Stamford was back in London after his series of reverses in Leicestershire. Both he and Essex visited the new artillery garden to review those who had volunteered to fight for the Parliament.³ It seems probable that Stamford had already committed himself to the raising of an infantry regiment, and that he was on the look out for able officer recruits while in the capital. Anyway, on 30 July Massey was commissioned as the Lieutenant Colonel of foot under the Earl of Stamford.⁴ Years later he recalled that the commission was 'under the hand and seal of his Excellency the Lord General, the Earl of Essex, in the name of King and Parliament'.⁵ Stamford was a novice in military affairs and must have consulted Essex about the most important officer appointments to his own regiment.

- (1) CJ, ii.667; Fletcher, pp.338-9.
- (2) V.F.Snow, Essex the Rebel (1970), pp.307-8.
- (3) E 202(26): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 7, July 25-Aug 3, p.4.
- (4) GRO, MF 285; Barwick Ms. f.2.
- (5) Ibid.

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Already, Massey had impressed Davenant, Legge and Lord Wharton. It may have been Wharton, a religious and political confidant of Stamford, who introduced Massey to him. The ex-Captain of pioneers had been schooled in the Dutch service, where Essex had acquired his own limited military experience, and this may have helped to convince both Essex and Stamford of his suitability as an officer. Massey had too few connections in the Parliamentary camp to rise far by means of patronage or nepotism. The fact that he was awarded a Lieutenant Colonel's commission testifies to his ability to impress senior commanders with his military expertise and leadership qualities. When hostilities commenced both Stamford and Essex were to reaffirm their confidence in Massey's martial abilities.

By 14 September, Massey was Lieutenant Colonel of Stamford's regiment.¹ By this date, even Lord Wharton's regiment had been diverted from the Irish service to serve in Essex's main field army.² It is unclear when Stamford's regiment was actually recruited, but its officers were all named by September 14, so the process was then nearing completion. It is likely that the regiment was raised predominantly on the Earl's estates in Leicestershire and Rutland. The Royalists had effectively withdrawn from these areas by late August and were now concentrating their recruitment campaign in the Welsh marches.

Thomas May related that Parliamentary infantry regiments, like their Royalist counterparts, were usually raised in areas where their Colonel, who was usually a peer or a prominent landowner, had local influence.³ Each Parliamentary Colonel was granted levy money to recruit his regiment, and passed on

(1) E 117(3); Peacock, p.29.

(2) P.Young, Edgehill 1642, pp.248-9.

(3) T.May, The History of the Parliament of England (1812), p.139.

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a proportion to his Captain, who was expected to raise his company individually.¹ The system clearly offered the opportunity for profits, and Massey, a man of limited means, may well have benefited considerably as a result.

The house of Commons ordered that all regiments, including Stamford's, should be equipped with 'coats, shoes, shirts and caps, in all to the value of 17 shillings for every man'.² The Earl had previously armed some of his tenants and servants to defend his mansion at Brodgate.³ Such men must now have formed the backbone of his regiment. By late September Stamford and his forces were at Lutterworth in Leicestershire 'to secure that part of the country'.³ Finally, also in late September, at a general rendezvous of the Parliamentary forces at Dunsmore Heath near Coventry, Stamford marched his regiment into Essex's main field army.⁴

Like all other foot regiments of the Lord General's army Stamford's possessed particular strengths and weaknesses. Firstly the Earl was himself relatively inexperienced. His only involvement with military affairs before 1642 was during the Bishops Wars of 1638-40, in which he seems to have been entirely passive, displaying great sympathy and understanding towards the Scots at Berwick.⁵ This hardly amounted to a grounding in the arts of war. Massey's appointment as Stamford's second in command was thus very important: he was, in effect, to assume the role of military adviser to the Earl and to oversee the day to day

- (1) G.Davies, 'The Parliamentary Army Under the Earl of Essex' EHR (1934), p.33.
- (2) SP, 16/491, f.233.
- (3) E 154(4): Execution of the Militia in ... Leicester.
- (4) SP, 16/492, f.68.
- (5) G.B.Cockayne, ed. The Complete Peerage xii(1), pp.217-8; DNB, xxiii.187.

running of the regiment. The influence in the Civil War of professional soldiers, with foreign experience, was not always reflected in promotion to the highest rank. But they often played a more important role in the practical administration of forces raised and commanded by their wealthier and more prestigious superior officers.¹

The vital importance of such experience, especially when the commander was a novice in military matters, helped to ensure that the appointment of a Lieutenant Colonel was not determined on the basis of social eminence or nepotism. Such considerations did not apply to all commissioned ranks however. Stamford could and did exert personnel preferences in his choice of officers. Edward Grey, a close relative of his, was appointed a Captain of foot in the regiment.²

There is evidence that Massey was eager to recruit other officers with experience of military operations. The Sergeant Major of his regiment, Constance Ferrer,³ was another veteran of the 1640 campaign against the Scots.⁴ Ferrer's commission became effective from 4 August 1642, a mere five days after Massey had been granted his.⁵ A man of obvious ability, he was to become Massey's acting deputy at Gloucester. Another of Stamford's foot Captains was Peter Chrisp, who may have accompanied the Cadiz expedition of 1625. Two Lieutenants, John Clifton and Robert Hampson, were reformados.⁶

But by far the greatest number of officers and certainly

- (1) I.Roy, TRHS (1978), p.131.
- (2) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.98b.
- (3) E 117(3); Peacock, p.29.
- (4) Rushworth, iii.1249.
- (5) SP, 28/33, pt.3, f.351.
- (6) Young, Edgehill 1642, p.247.

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the rank and file were, like Stamford and his kin, enthusiastic amateurs. The Earl's raw and inexperienced foot regiment, with its sprinkling of professional military advisors, was typical of Essex's army. The testimony of Robert Kyrle shows that there were other common features.

Kyrle, a native of Herefordshire, had also fought with Stamford's regiment in 1642.¹ He had raised a troop of horse and was assigned to occupy Hereford along with the Earl's foot regiment in October of that year.² By spring 1643, however, Kyrle had changed sides, and wrote a pamphlet justifying his abandonment of the Parliamentary cause. Although this was clearly designed for Royalist consumption, Kyrle's observations on Stamford's men were probably correct. He was especially appalled by the puritan chaplain of the regiment, John Sedgwick, who spoke out against the Bishops and advocated religious Independency. Kyrle considered Stamford's regiment 'a perfect model of the whole army; and most certain I am, that all the officers of one company were all of the same opinion what religion they fought for ... some liked the chapline of the regiment, another thought his corporal preached better ... and one would think that every company had been raised out of the several congregations of Amsterdam, who wanted not scripture for every mutiny, who plunder and call it God's providence'.³ Religious commitment and gross indiscipline did co-exist in Essex's army: Kyrle's evidence suggests that this was no less true of Stamford's regiment.

In the Welsh marches, the King had begun to succeed in recruiting dramatically increased numbers to his army at Shrewsbury.⁴ Essex received intelligence that Sir John Byron

- (1) Rev.J.Webb, Memorials of the Civil War in Herefordshire (1879), i.157,161-2.
- (2) SP, 28/261, pt.2, ff.76-7,80,82; Webb, i.157.
- (3) E 246(35): A Copy of a Letter Writ From Sergeant Major Kyrle, pp.2-3.
- (4) SP, 16/492, f.52; Hutton, pp.24-5; Clarendon, ii.310-1,344,346.

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had occupied Worcester for the King, and resolved to draw his army towards that city and deny it to the Royalists.¹ This manoeuvre was disastrous for the King's supporters, in both Worcestershire and Herefordshire.² It also strengthened the security of the strategically vital county of Gloucestershire, which commanded the Severn estuary, and was surrounded by no less than eight other counties.

Gloucestershire had been tentatively secured for the Parliament through the efforts of the Gloucester corporation and dissenting families such as the Stephensens.³ The central location of Gloucester, the cohesion of the Parliamentary activists, and widespread indifference to the Royalist party among the ordinary inhabitants, had largely frustrated the King's attempts to establish a presence in the county.⁴ By early September, the Parliamentarians had managed to implement the militia ordinance and mobilise the county's trained bands.⁵ Soon after Essex's arrival at Worcester, prominent Gloucester aldermen, Thomas Pury and Lawrance Singleton, visited the Lord General at his new headquarters.⁶ The Earl's arrival must have greatly reassured them, given the exposure of their shire to attack from the strong Royalist forces in the West.⁷

- (1) SP, 16/492, ff.68-8b; Hutton, p.27.
- (2) Bodl., Tanner Mss.303, f.113b; Hutton, p.27.
- (3) GRO, D 2510, ff.15,20-1; HMC 5 Report, p.346; GRO, B 3/2, ff.220-2; HMC 12 Report, p.462; CJ, ii.719,727-8; LJ, v.219; Corbet, pp.7-9; E 116(15): Sixteen Propositions.
- (4) E 113(6): A Letter Sent ... Concerning the Lord Chandos; B.Manning, The English People and the English Revolution (1978), p.188; Rushworth, v.130; LJ, v.214,306; CJ, ii.673; GRO, B 3/2, ff.220-2; HMC 12 Report, p.462; Corbet, pp.6-10.
- (5) Bodl., Nalson Mss.2(72), f.138; HMC 13 Report, p.61.
- (6) GRO, B 3/2, f.226; F 4/5, f.189.
- (7) CJ, ii.766-7; Bodl., Nalson Ms.2(77), f.148; HMC 13 Report, p.62; E 240(5): A Perfect Diurnall no.14, Sept 12-19, p.6.

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Since his entry into Worcester, Essex had become acutely aware of the importance of Hereford. The town lay along the most direct route between Glamorgan, where, as he knew, the Royalists were raising large numbers of foot-soldiers,¹ and the King at Shrewsbury.² Possession of Hereford offered to the Parliamentary command the prospect of a useful satellite garrison to the West of Essex's headquarters that could warn of a surprise attack. On 30 September a group of Herefordshire gentlemen visited the Lord General at Worcester and asked for a detachment of his army to be dispatched to their county capital.³ The advance guard was to consist of '15 men out of every company', amounting to some 900 infantry. This motley collection of foot was to be supported by '3 troops of horse and two pieces of ordnance'.⁴

There can be no doubt that Massey was chosen by both Essex and Stamford to lead the initial expedition against Hereford. Nehemiah Wharton, a Sergeant attached to this 'forlorn hope', stated that it was commanded by 'the Earl of Stamford's Lieutenant Colonel'.⁵ A news-sheet later claimed that Hereford was first seized for the Parliament by a 'Captain Massey'.⁶ That Essex and Stamford should entrust a relatively unknown soldier like Massey with an expedition into enemy territory told of their confidence in his abilities.

Clearly not all of the inhabitants of Hereford were ardent Royalists.⁷ But Massey could not be sure what degree of

- (1) J.R.Philips, The Civil War in Wales and the Marches (1874), i.121-3; ii.23-4.
- (2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.257; Webb, i.155.
- (3) HMC 14 Report, p.99.
- (4) SP, 16/492, f.87. The CSPD, 1641-43, p.398, gives the misleading impression that the Earl of Stamford commanded the force as its Lieutenant Colonel.
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) E 121(34): Weekly Intelligencer, no.1, Oct 7, p.2.
- (7) E 202(45): A Perfect Diurnall, no.17, Sept 26-Oct 3, Sept 26; Fletcher, p.395.

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cooperation or opposition he could expect to find when he appeared before the gates of the city, and there was a real danger of running into Welsh detachments bound for the Royal headquarters at Shrewsbury. Massey's first independent command was clearly fraught with danger and uncertainty. Wharton has left a vivid account of its advance into Herefordshire. 'After we marched 10 miles we came to Bromyard, the weather wet, and the way very foul, here we got a little refreshment and from hence marched 10 miles further to Hereford. But very late before we got thither, and by reason of the rain and snow and extremity of cold one of our soldiers died by the way'.¹

The city's medieval defences were not to be underestimated especially with the small force at Massey's disposal.² Massey was initially refused entry, but the mayor allowed himself to become convinced that Essex's entire army was close by, and finally admitted Massey's bedraggled troops.³ The mayor's panic was quite unjustified: Hereford was capable of prolonged resistance, and large Royalist contingents were rumoured to be in the area. Massey posted guards on Hereford's walls throughout a wet and blustery night.⁴ He had performed a difficult task successfully. Perhaps his one cause for regret was the escape of all the local Royalist leaders before his entry into the city.⁵

It had probably been decided already, before Massey's expeditionary force had left Worcester, that Stamford's foot regiment should act as the permanent Parliamentary garrison at

(1) SP, 16/492, f.87.

(2) Webb, i.158-9.

(3) SP, 16/492, f.87.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Bodl., Tanner Mss.303, f.113b; Webb, i.163.

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Hereford. Essex did not not consider it an integral part of his army, since it was only a few days earlier that Stamford's troops had joined his London and South eastern regiments at Dunsmore Heath. Having been one of the last regiments to join the Lord General's army, it was now one of the first to be detached from it. A few days after Massey's entry, Wharton, who was still at Hereford, noted 'the Earl of Stamford (who is made Governor) of Hereford entered the city, with a regiment of foot, and some troops of horse: and took up the Bishop's palace for his quarter, and is resolved there to abide'.¹

The Earl of Stamford's regiment now replaced the scratch forces with which Massey had initially occupied the city, and which now returned to their quarters in Worcestershire. With the arrival of the Earl himself, Massey's brief period in control in Hereford came to an end, and he reverted to the role of Stamford's trusted second in command. Presumably he took up residence with the Earl in the Bishop's palace, which lay just South of the cathedral close, by the river Wye. Essex provided Stamford with cavalry support, in the form of his 68th troop under Captain Robert Kyrle, a veteran of the wars in Germany. Kyrle's father's estates lay at Walford Court near Ross, and his local knowledge would clearly be invaluable to both Stamford and Massey. The Earl was also allowed to retain his own troop of cavalry,² since strong cavalry support was seen as essential to such an exposed frontier garrison.

As well as garrisoning Hereford, Stamford had to try and pacify the surrounding countryside. Here, popular Royalism was strong, and it is small wonder that the Earl and his forces began to treat the county like conquered territory.³ By early October Stamford's foraging parties were making their presence felt to the West of Hereford. One house at Garnons was

(1) SP, 16/492, ff.87-7b.

(2) Webb, i.157.

(3) R.E.Sherwood, Civil Strife in the Midlands 1642-51 (1974), p.44; Webb, ii.354.

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thoroughly ransacked by a detachment of Parliamentary troops.¹ Sometimes Stamford's men became violent during such operations, and once a man was killed.² It seems that Catholics especially were objects of the Earl's displeasure. He sincerely shared the common belief that there existed a papist conspiracy to subvert the state and overturn England's Protestant Church.³ But it seems that Stamford did exercise some control over his men because Hereford cathedral, unlike Worcester's, did not suffer at the hands of Parliamentary troops during their short occupation in 1642.⁴

Much detailed information about Stamford's Governorship of Hereford survives in regular dispatches which he sent to the Speaker of the house of Lords. By 21 October, when the first of these was written, Essex himself was already racing towards London, which resulted in his collision with the King's forces at Edgehill.⁵ The Lord General had left Worcester in the hands of two regiments of foot under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Essex.⁶ Meanwhile, also on 21 October, the first regular Parliamentary troops entered Gloucester.⁷ By 1 November Thomas Essex and his 1,500 foot had also arrived. This must reassured Gloucester's civic leaders, who had earlier reported that 'many dangers are threatened unto us upon the West part by the Welsh and also upon the East part by the cavalier'.⁸

- (1) J.Webb, ed. 'Mrs Joyce Jefferies Account Book', Archaeologia xxxvii(1) (1857), p.206.
- (2) Ibid, p.207.
- (3) E 154(25): The Earl of Stamford's Resolution; LJ, v.415.
- (4) Webb, i.163.
- (5) Young, Edgehill 1642, p.73.
- (6) E 124(32): Eight Speeches Spoken in Guild Hall, Oct 29; SP, 16/492, f.80b.
- (7) Bodl., Nalson Mss.2(91), f.175.
- (8) Ibid.


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Thomas Essex's evacuation of Worcester reflected his belief that, standing as it did in a strongly Royalist region, the city could not be consolidated as a Parliamentary stronghold. On 10 November, Sir William Russell entered Worcester with a commission from the King to become its Governor.¹ In Gloucester, Thomas Essex, who had been promoted to Colonel, became temporary Governor, 'but as yet the deputy lieutenants had the sole command of the county'.² Despite the ominous withdrawal of the Parliamentary garrison at Worcester, Stamford and his forces at Hereford continued their operations. In late October the Earl's scouts informed him of a meeting of Royalist commissioners for Radnorshire at Presteigne.³ A body of horse under a Welshman, Mr Fleming, was dispatched from Hereford. Mistaken for a Royalist cavalry troop, this force succeeded in capturing all of the commissioners.⁴

In order to contain the Royalists of South Wales, Stamford established a satellite garrison at Goodrich castle in early October. This thirteenth century stronghold stood high on a cliff a mere four miles from Monmouth and commanded a crossing over the Wye.⁵ The installation of a new garrison here might have been expected to discourage the Marquess of Hertford and Lord Herbert, with their 900 foot and a troop of horse at Monmouth, from offensive action against Hereford. The Earl chose Kyrle to be his Governor at Goodrich. His father's estates lay just across the river at Walford Court near Ross.⁶ Hertford may have launched some half hearted attacks against the castle in mid-October but

- (1) J.W.W.Bund, The Civil War in Worcestershire 1642-51 (1979), pp.60-1; P.Styles, 'The City of Worcester During the Civil War', pp.223-4, in P.Styles, ed., Studies in Seventeenth Century West Midlands History (1978).
- (2) Corbet, p.14.
- (3) LJ, v.425.
- (4) Ibid, 425-6; E 242(6): Englands Memorable Accidents, Nov 1, p.68.
- (5) LJ, v.426.
- (6) Webb, i.157,176.

STAMFORD'S OCCUPATION OF HEREFORD, OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1642.



KEY

Major roads

Castle

Scene of fighting

Parliamentary garrison

Royalist garrison

Massey's initial advance

Parliamentary operations

Royalist incursions

without success.¹ Like his commander at Hereford Kyrle soon began to intimidate and punish known Royalist sympathisers living in the immediate vicinity of his garrison.² The presence of Stamford's garrisons at Hereford and Goodrich must have diverted the South Wales Royalists attention away from the Forest of Dean and Gloucester.

Slowly however, Stamford began to lose the initiative in Herefordshire, reporting on 11 November that he felt 'much threatened since I brought away those men of power'.³ Cut off from the main field army, Stamford's regiment had probably received no wages since it left Worcester in late September. He was constrained to submit a request that his men be paid as regularly as before, and also asked for 'powder, match and other materials of war, from Bristol'.⁴ But resupplying the garrison at Hereford was difficult now that Worcester had been abandoned and the Royalists had established control over all the South Wales ports.

Massey's name does not feature prominently in the operations conducted under Stamford's command at Hereford; raids were often entrusted to local men with knowledge of the area, such as Kyrle and Fleming. For the most part, Massey seems to have remained in the city and supervised the day to day running of the garrison there. During his Governorship of Hereford, the Earl moved from the Bishop's palace to the (probably more comfortable) home of a Mrs Wardin, which lay close by.⁵ It is possible that Massey was entrusted with military administrative functions which

- (1) E 202(46): A Perfect Diurnall, Oct 10-17, p.6; E 121(43): A Continuation, no.14, Oct 8-12, p.4.
- (2) ORN, iv.183-5; Mercurius Rusticus, July 8; Webb, i.176; Sherwood, pp.27-8.
- (3) LJ, v.440.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) J.Webb, ed. Archaeologia xxxvii(1), p.209.

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required him to remain in the palace.

Two fraudulent pamphlets appeared, which attributed to Stamford spectacular victories over the Marquess of Hertford at Tewkesbury and Hereford in October and November 1642.¹ These never took place: the truth was less dramatic. On 4 November, Hertford's newly raised forces left Cardiff, with drums beating and colours flying.² During the first fortnight of November his troops pushed up the valley of the Worm through Kilpeck towards Hereford, finally establishing an advance post at Aconbury four miles South of the city.³ On 12 November, Stamford held a Council of War at Hereford, where it was decided that his garrison should issue out with some foot to try and drive the Royalists off. When the Parliamentarians reached Aconbury however, they discovered that the King's forces had withdrawn to Ewyas Harold, a further six miles to the South West.⁴ In a skirmish at that village a small detachment of Hertford's men were defeated, though it seems that both forces then broke off hostilities,⁵ and that the Royalists withdrew southward towards Abergavenny and Raglan.

Before this inconclusive encounter, a local Royalist had feared that Stamford would launch an offensive from Hereford against Abergavenny.⁶ His forces may have appeared too formidable for the King's ill-equipped Welsh conscripts. Equally, however, Hertford and Herbert were too firmly entrenched in Monmouthshire

- (1) E 124(4): Exceeding Joyful News From the Earl of Stamford, Oct 22; E 127(28): True News Out of Herefordshire, Nov 19.
- (2) Philips, i.132.
- (3) LJ, v.444; Webb, i.194.
- (4) Ibid, v.453.
- (5) Ibid; E 124(33): Special News From the Army, Oct 29.
- (6) HMC 7 Report, p.689.

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for Stamford even to attempt to dislodge them.¹ By mid-November the situation was largely one of strategic stalemate.

Stamford did what he could to win local gentry opinion for the Parliamentary cause.² He must have valued especially the efforts of Sir Robert Harley, the most prominent of Herefordshire's small Parliamentarian community, who had accompanied him to Hereford. Sir Robert's advice and local knowledge and influence must have been invaluable to Stamford and Massey, both strangers in the area. The Earl described Harley as a 'mighty operator in any good'.³ But by late November, Stamford was finding his position at Hereford increasingly untenable. He complained that his men had not been paid for two months, which clearly indicates that his earlier requests for supplies and munitions had not been met.⁴ Meanwhile, Royalist strength and organisation in South Wales, under the Marquess of Hertford, was giving rise to concern. The Harleys feared that Hertford intended 'to force a passage towards Prince Rupert's army'.⁵

The growing confidence of the surrounding Royalists was reflected in their attempts to persuade Stamford's Sergeant Major, Constance Ferrer, to change sides.⁶ Stamford himself was becoming increasingly pessimistic about his position. His regiment did not lack courage, he reported, 'but we have neither monies nor credit for bread, our hay and provender being very scant; yet so long

(1) Hutton, p.34.

(2) LJ, v.444.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid, v.475.

(5) BL, Loan 29/174, f.334.

(6) SP, 16/493, f.1; E 244(4): A Continuation, no.22, Dec 3-8, p.4.

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as I can find any means of subsistence, I shall remain here'.¹ But increasingly, the Earl began to despair of the city and the shire, which were both, he complained 'so base and malignant' that they preferred to be abused by the Royalists 'than to be rescued and relieved' by his troops.²

It is clear that the King's supporters had regained the initiative after the minor reverses inflicted upon them in November. Stamford complained that they had recently re-established a garrison within five miles of Hereford. Reminding the house of Lords of his urgent need of ready money to pay his men, the Earl ended pessimistically: 'an honourable retreat will not be dispised; how soon I know not'.³

The Parliamentary abandonment of Worcester must have left Stamford feeling more isolated than ever. The final decision to evacuate Hereford, however, was taken by Lord General Essex himself. In late November Colonel Thomas Essex and his two regiments were ordered to leave Gloucester to secure Bristol for the Parliament.⁴ This left a military vacuum at Gloucester which Stamford's regiment was well positioned to fill. The Earl's force was relatively close, and was anyway coming under growing pressure in its isolated redoubt of Hereford, especially after 3 December, when Kyrle's garrison was withdrawn from Goodrich castle. On 13 December, the Earl of Essex granted Stamford a commission to the command of four Welsh Marcher counties.⁵ But it was too late. The very next day, ironically, Stamford brought to a close his ten week occupation of Hereford, and set off for Gloucester.⁶

(1) LJ, v.475.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Corbet, p.14.

(5) LJ, v.488.

(6) Webb, i.203-5.

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Immediately after Stamford's appointment as commander for the Welsh marches, the Lord General ordered him to take up command of a new Parliamentary Western Association. This decision signalled the sacrifice of Hereford and Worcester in order to secure the Parliament's strategic hold over Gloucester and Bristol which commanded the approaches to Parliamentary Somerset and Devon.

In mid-December, probably on the 15th, the day after his evacuation of Hereford, Stamford wrote from Mordiford to Sir Robert Harley, who was then at Gloucester, complaining of a 'slow and tedious march, and even there' (ie Mordiford) 'I received his Excellency's command to march away to my Goverance of Gloucester and Bristol'.¹ Stamford assured Harley that his evacuation was most necessary. 'I marched out I thank God in an honourable way my drums beating alarm all night, my colours flying and trumpets sounding'.² The Earl thought his march to Gloucester would take three days because of the impediment of his baggage train. But the evacuation was not as orderly as Stamford portrayed it. Several wounded soldiers had to be left behind and quickly became prisoners of the Royalists.³

So ended Stamford's occupation of Hereford.⁴ The Earl's failure to win the local community over to his cause had rendered his position untenable.⁵ Herefordshire's spontaneous Royalism and Stamford's rigid Parliamentaryism were not compatible. His soldiers behaviour was unlikely to recommend to many the benefits of Parliamentary rule. Rumours of a full scale Royalist assault on the city by a hostile county community was probably the final

(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.38.

(2) Ibid.

(3) SP, 28/228, pt.4, f.686.

(4) BL, Add.Mss.18,777, f.96.

(5) E 244(26): Englands Memorable Accidents, Dec 19-26, pp.123-4.

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spur which convinced Stamford and Essex, of the prudence of an immediate evacuation.¹

Stamford's reputation for competently handling a difficult command depended largely upon able subordinates such as Kyrle, Fleming and Massey. Massey's career at Hereford, after his initial seizure of the city, was unspectacular, but he is likely to have played a central role in running the garrison. Ultimately, Stamford owed his elevation to the position of Parliamentary commander in the West to the efforts of such men. His inflated opinion of his own military prowess was no substitute for their good advice, as disasters in Cornwall and Devon were soon to prove.²

The Royalists wasted little time in profiting from his departure. On 16 December, a mere two days after Stamford's evacuation Fitz-William Coningsby was informed that he had been chosen by Hertford and Herbert to be the new Royalist Governor of Hereford.³ By 20 December, Hertford himself was at Hereford and there he granted Coningsby his commission as Governor.⁴ Herefordshire had returned to its natural allegiance.

On 5 December, before the arrival of Stamford and Massey in Gloucestershire, Royalist troops stormed Marlborough in neighbouring Wiltshire, and plundered the town, the war violently intruding upon the borders of Gloucestershire for the first time.⁵ Marlborough was one of the first garrisons to be assaulted by either side, and its loss reverberated around the entire West.⁶ In Gloucestershire, panic gripped the Parliamentary deputy lieutenants, and they frantically set about fortifying

- (1) E 244(11): A Continuation, no. 23, Dec 12-15, p.5.
- (2) Webb, i.216; Clarendon, iii.71.
- (3) Bodl., Tanner Mss.303, f.113b.
- (4) BL, Harleian Mss.6851, f.243.
- (5) J.Waylen, A History ... of Marlborough (1854), pp.161-4, Rushworth, v.82-3.
- (6) BL, Harleian Mss.164, f.248b.

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Cirencester.1

From their frontier garrison, the Gloucestershire deputy lieutenants had been able to launch raids into Royalist-held Oxfordshire. Two attacks on Burford and Witney were especially successful.² During the first months of the war Gloucester had been 'open to a free commerce with the world'.³ But the Royalists were now astride the Cotswolds, and the county's direct line of communications with London cut. The disruption of trade by war was quickly understood by the city's ruling elite, which learned as early as November that Rupert, on his advance towards London, had 'seized upon whole cart loads and waggons full of cloth coming to the city out of Gloucestershire'.⁴ Other similar reports soon followed.⁵

On 16 or 17 December, Stamford and his regiment entered Gloucester. The city had survived for several days without a garrison. To its inhabitants, mindful of Marlborough's recent shocking ordeal, the Earl's blue coats must have been a very welcome sight as they marched through the city's gates.⁶ Gloucester was now also vulnerable to attack from the South Wales Royalists, there being no garrisons at Hereford, Worcester or Goodrich to divert them.⁷ 'The city of Gloucester was again left naked' recalled Corbet, 'till the Earl of Stamford marched thither with his regiment of foot, and two troops of horse from Hereford'.⁸ But Massey's commanding officer stayed only two days

- (1) GRO, D 2510, f.11; G.A.Harrison, 'Royalist Organization in Wiltshire 1642-46', unpublished London PhD thesis (1963), p.132.
- (2) J.Warburton, ed. Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers (1849), ii.70; E 244(9): Englands Memorable Accidents, Dec 5-12, p.107.
- (3) Corbet, p.12.
- (4) E 127(4): The Last News From the Kings Army, Nov 11, p.3.
- (5) E 127(6): An Extract of Several Letters, Nov 12, p.2.
- (6) Webb, i.206.
- (7) E 244(10): A Continuation, no. 23, Dec 8-15, p.2.
- (8) Corbet, p.15.

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at most in the city. It was immediately upon his arrival that Stamford received the news of his promotion to the command of Parliament's forces in the West, where the counties were to be linked by a Western Association, created at Westminster on 23 December.¹

Stamford was required to leave for Bristol, but before his departure from Gloucester, it seems that his troops sacked Bishop Goodman's palace, the Vineyard at Over, just outside the city.² Goodman's Catholic sympathies would have made him particularly obnoxious to Stamford, and his property inside Gloucester was also plundered soon after, by one of Stamford's Captains.³ By 19 December, Stamford was at Bristol settling the garrison there under Colonel Thomas Essex.⁴ The initial reluctance of the Bristol corporation to admit Parliamentary regulars stood in sharp contrast to that of Gloucester, which had, apparently, admitted Colonel Essex and Stamford without incident.⁵ Parliament's possession of Bristol had important implications for the security of Gloucester. The city's South western approaches were now secured by a garrison in the Kingdom's second largest city and sea port.

Stamford's new commission involved leaving his own foot regiment at Gloucester.⁶ This ad hoc arrangement was no doubt seen as temporary. Most peers preferred to keep troops raised from their own estates, as were most of Stamford's, under their

(1) CJ, ii.900.

(2) G.Soden, Godfrey Goodman, Bishop of Gloucester (1953), p.383; Webb, i.206.

(3) Ibid.

(4) LJ, v.511.

(5) P.McGrath, Bristol and the Civil War (1981), pp.12-3; J.Latimer, The Annals of Bristol in the Seventeenth Century (1900), pp.164-6; Corbet, pp.14-5; CJ, ii.869; LJ, v.511; BL, Add.Mss. 31,116, ff.14-5; Harleian Mss.164, f.248b; BL, Add.Mss. 18,777, f.93.

(6) Corbet, p.15.

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immediate command, or at least close to hand.

The Earl's absence made Massey the effective commander of his regiment and the most high ranking regular Parliamentary officer at Gloucester. But, by simply making Massey 'deputy Governor' under himself, Stamford showed that he thought this situation was only temporary.¹ Massey and the Earl's regiment were to remain at Gloucester for the greater part of the war. Both were to earn fame and great distinction there. The ambitious career soldier had by chance been given the independent command that he so much desired. As a result, he was to play a central role in England's destiny on more than one occasion.

(1) Corbet, p.15.

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THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR, DECEMBER 1642 TO JUNE 1643.

Massey's background and reputation were not such as to inspire automatic recognition of his authority at Gloucester. Unlike Stamford, he lacked the social pedigree and high status to impress the city's corporation. Gloucester's leading citizens knew only that he was the fourth son of a minor Cheshire gentleman, with no previous connection with either the county or its capital. The lack of principle which had governed his choice of sides was also recognised. The citizens looked upon him 'as the professed servant of fortune'.¹

Neither the deputy lieutenants nor the corporation would find it easy to relate to or trust an outsider who, they suspected, had little interest in, or responsibility for, the city or the shire. The possibility that Massey, like Colonel Thomas Essex, might at any time be ordered away on more pressing Parliamentary business must also have weighed against him. A further problem for the new military chief was the confused tangle of the command structures and jurisdictions of regular and local forces.² What, for example, was the proper relationship between the professional officers of a regular Parliamentary foot regiment, cut off from the main field army, and locally raised forces under the command of amateur civilian deputy lieutenants? The Parliament had not sought to clarify such matters because in the summer of 1642 it had envisaged a short campaign. The prolongation of the war made it essential to reconcile potentially conflicting sources of local authority.

Massey and his forces were not indispensable. Naturally, his regiment was important to the security of Gloucester, but the seizure of Bristol and the garrisoning of Cirencester

(1) Corbet, p.25.

(2) J.S.Morrill, The Revolt of the Provinces (1976), p.55; Snow, p.349.

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removed the immediate threat to the city. Massey's authority was also weakened by his status as a deputy Governor: in theory, Stamford might at any time return to resume command of his regiment. These factors worked against any sudden transfer of military decision making away from the civilian deputy lieutenants to the Parliamentary regular army.

But the deputy Governor's mind must have been preoccupied with the sad state of the city's defences. The old medieval walls were intact only in the East and, partly, in the South, though those sections of the walls that did remain still presented a formidable obstacle. They were about two stories high and had battlements and walk ways on the top.¹ The Norman castle, however, was largely a ruin.² To the West the city was shielded by the fast flowing Severn. But in the North, North-East, and South, Gloucester's pre-war prosperity had led to the growth of unprotected suburbs along the main roads which converged on the city's high cross. Shanty dwellings, farms, orchards, ribbon developments and substantial houses jostled beyond the medieval walls which had once marked the limit of the corporation's jurisdiction.³

Massey must have appreciated that Gloucester would not be easy to defend against attack or siege. But there were reasons to postpone the construction of earthworks to close the gaps in the city's defences: the task was time consuming, labour intensive, and above all, very expensive.⁴ Massey's arrival no doubt gave impetus to the implementation of such a comprehensive scheme. In February 1643 Corbet described the works as not being half completed.⁵ But this does seem to suggest that a good start had been made on them during the winter of 1642-3. The storming of

(1) Washbourne, pp.58-9; BG, p.373; Corbet, p.42.

(2) W.B.Willcox, Gloucestershire 1590-1640 (1940), p.5.

(3) GNQ, iii.366; Corbet, p.11; Willcox, p.5.

(4) J.K.G.Taylor, 'The Civil Government of Gloucester 1640-46'
TBGAS, (1946-48) p.74.

(5) Corbet, p.25.

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Marlborough and the various threats posed from South Wales, Worcester, Hereford and Oxford probably propelled the civic authorities towards undertaking the task.

While Massey consolidated his position at Gloucester the civilian deputy lieutenants were still responsible for the strategic defence of the county. All their efforts were concentrated on the fortification of Cirencester, a town which lacked those medieval fortifications which, in the case of other centres such as Gloucester, provided a ready made skeleton around which further defensive works might be constructed. Such difficulties were outweighed, in the minds of deputy lieutenants Sir Robert Cooke, Nathaniel Stephens and Thomas Hodges, by Cirencester's importance as a frontier town. All county men, they instinctively thought in terms of county defence, even when it conflicted with considerations of practicality or overall strategic purpose.

John Fettiplace, a Parliamentary moderate of no previous military experience, was chosen to command the garrison at Cirencester. He had estates at Coln St Andrews, about eight miles North West of the town, near the Oxfordshire border. Fettiplace must have been chosen because of his standing among the local gentry community.² It was doubtless hoped that he could better secure the cooperation of the local communities in the supply of the garrison. The Royalists regarded the garrison at Cirencester in the same way as they had that of Marlborough - as a threat to their domination of the region around Oxford.³ Hertford, who had finally reached the Royal capital with a few thousand men from South Wales, told Charles that he could not adequately supply his

(1) Corbet, pp.16,20.

(2) M.F.Keeler, The Long Parliament (1954), p.176; VCH, vii.47; Fletcher, p.341; Corbet, p.16.

(3) Clarendon, ii.447.

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forces so long as Cirencester remained in enemy hands.¹

On 7 January, Rupert and Hertford launched an attempt to seize the garrison, which was unsuccessful.² This alerted the deputy lieutenants to the threat to their position on the frontiers of Gloucestershire, especially from Sudeley castle, home of the Chandos family, twenty miles North of Cirencester. The occupation of this fortified mansion by a small Royalist garrison might encourage further demonstrations of support for the King throughout the region.³ Sudeley also posed a threat to Gloucester, and to a small satellite garrison that Massey had placed in Tewkesbury. Corbet related 'Lieutenant Colonel Massey was intrusted with the manage of this action, who drew from Gloucester a party of 300 musketeers, with two sakers assisted with four score horse and four companies of dragoons from Cirencester by order of a Counsel of War held there, and the consent of the deputy lieutenants'.⁴

This shows that Massey and his regulars needed the sanction of the deputy lieutenants to undertake operations of significance in the overall defence of the county. It also makes clear that the civilian authorities recognised the practical capacities of Massey and his forces to command and staff the expedition. Massey was able to capture Sudeley castle with little difficulty,⁵ placing it under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Forbes and then withdrawing to Gloucester.⁶

(1) BG, p.178.

(2) Ibid, p.179; Clarendon, ii.447; ORN, i.28, Mercurius Aulicus 2 1643.

(3) BG, p.180.

(4) Corbet, p.19.

(5) BG, p.180; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.264; Corbet, p.19.

(6) Corbet, pp.19-20.

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The fall of Sudeley drew Royalist attention back to Cirencester,¹ at a time when Kyrle, who chose this moment to change sides, was divulging secrets of the town's defences.² If they knew of this betrayal, the local Parliamentarians can not have been wholly surprised when Prince Rupert arrived to turn it to good account.³ At any rate, most of the deputy lieutenants were warned in time to absent themselves discreetly from the town: very few of them were seized when it was stormed. On 2 February, Rupert's forces fought their way into the capital of the mid-wolds.⁴ The war had finally entered Gloucestershire. Fettiplace, and all his officers were captured, with 2,000 arms 'which the county had there laid up as a secure magazine'.⁵ Around 1,100 common soldiers were also taken prisoner.

The fall of Cirencester had profound consequences for the course of the war in Gloucestershire. It resulted in the collapse of the deputy lieutenants authority in military affairs. For it made clear that the decision of these civilian amateurs to concentrate all of the county's resources at Cirencester had been a disaster for the Parliamentarians.⁶

On 3 February, Rupert appeared before Gloucester. Probably calculating that the blow he had dealt the day before had demoralised the inhabitants, he requested the surrender of the city. The Prince, however, underestimated the resolve of Massey and the corporation. Both refused, though it is interesting that Governor and mayor felt obliged to send separate answers

- (1) E 246(1): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 34, Jan 30-Feb 6, Feb 3; BG, p.162; Warburton, ii.104-7; BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.17.
- (2) Bodl., Firth Mss.C6, f.3.
- (3) Corbet, p.20; E 89(17): Special Passages, no. 27, Feb 7-10, p.220; ORN, i.83, Mercurius Aulicus 5 1643.
- (4) BG, pp.164-73, 181-4; Clarendon, ii.447-8.
- (5) Corbet, p.21.
- (6) Ibid, pp.20-2.

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because 'the martial command was not fully settled'.¹

To the Gloucester corporation's chagrin Massey now assumed total control over the perilous military situation. He moved quickly to tighten the security of the city and to abandon those of its satellite garrisons which he could no longer protect or support.² Forbes abandoned Sudeley immediately on hearing of the fate of Cirencester, though whether upon his own initiative or in response to Massey's order is not known. A small garrison at Berkeley castle was also evacuated.³ The Tewkesbury garrison was a problem. 'Hitherto' Corbet observed 'the city had been lodged in the midst of many outgarrisons, as the heart in the body, but now it hath enough to do in its own safety, and the remote parts must be pared off that a liberal nourishment might preserve and foster that place which was the set and fountain of life unto these parts of the Kingdom'.⁴ Tewkesbury was abandoned, though Massey was able to retrieve, probably via the Severn, all the ordnance, arms, and stores that he had sent to it from Gloucester.⁵

Although Royalist hopes for the complete conquest of Gloucestershire had been frustrated by Massey's refusal to surrender its capital, a new offensive, probably spearheaded by 'Lord Herbert's forces in Monmouthshire, was extremely likely. The nearby Forest of Dean had abundant supplies of coal, iron and manufacturing facilities which the South Wales Royalists eyed greedily.⁶ And Gloucester was an obvious target in that it blocked their communications with the Royalist capital at Oxford.⁷

(1) Corbet, p.22.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.264b.


(3) ORN, i.91, Mercurius Aulicus 6 1643; BG, p.174.

(4) Corbet, p.23.

(5) E 90(3): Certain Informations, no 5, Feb 13-20, p.34

(6) BL, Harleian Mss.6804, ff.160-1.

(7) Dirkes, p.328.



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On 8 February, Herbert wrote to Rupert from Raglan assuring him that his forces had already entered the Forest of Dean and hoping for the cooperation of the Prince's regiments in eastern Gloucestershire.¹ This new Royalist offensive from the West helps explain Massey's failure to attempt the relief of Cirencester. His strategic withdrawal from other positions naturally caused problems at Gloucester. The city became crowded with troops and free quarter had to be introduced.² Massey's ability to raise money and supplies was curtailed by Rupert's operations in the East of the county, and the unpaid soldiers became sullen and mutinous.³

In London, the importance of Massey's small force was already clear. It stood between the Royalist armies, preventing their merger, blocking the strategically important corridor between South Wales and Oxford.⁴ A highly mobile force of cavalry was therefore detached from Essex's army near Windsor, and ordered to advance immediately into the West under the command of Nathaniel Fiennes.⁵

Massey wrote to Fiennes on 11 February. He was relieved but pessimistic, reporting that all the local Royalist commanders were expecting Rupert to advance from Cirencester to block Gloucester up completely. 'For my part', he added, 'I fear not to secure this city with this small force we have here; yet our business should be to purge the country about us from the enemy that the country be not destroyed and our provision straightened which already is in great measure'.⁶

(1) Bodl., Firth Mss.C6, f.9.

(2) GRO, B 3/2, ff.248-9.

(3) Corbet, pp.25-6.

(4) Bodl., Eng.Hist.Mss.C58, f.7.

(5) E 246(13): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 35, Feb 6-13, Feb 7.

(6) BL, Add.Mss.18,979, f.133.

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Lieutenant Colonel Forbes was dispatched to regarrison Berkeley, thus securing Gloucester's communications with Bristol.¹ Once in possession of the castle, Forbes, who was aware of the crypto-Royalism of many in the locality, began to take revenge against upon them, enriching himself from the estates of the Royalist Lord Berkeley which lay at his mercy.² Some of his rampaging troops even looted the homes of local Parliamentary gentry, while pretending to be detachments of Prince Rupert's horse!³

Before Herbert's forces could attempt to besiege Gloucester they had to clear from the Forest of Dean Colonel Berrow's regiment, newly raised there, and quartered in the mining community of Coleford. This force was obstructing further Royalist progress towards Gloucester from Monmouth.⁴ Coleford, however, like Cirencester, was unfortified, and the Royalist soldiers numerical preponderance soon began to tell. Berrow's Lieutenant Colonel and forty of his men were captured.⁵ The rest fled into the depths of the forest, and the regiment was never again reformed.

The South Wales Royalists could now advance to the western approaches of Gloucester without further impediment,⁶ and took possession of Sir Robert Cooke's house at Highnam a mere two miles from the city of Gloucester.⁷ There they hoped to achieve, in

- (1) Corbet, p.26; HMC 5 Report, p.356.
- (2) LJ, vi.69.
- (3) C.H.Firth, ed. Raymond and Guise Memoirs 1622-1737, Camden Society (1917), pp.172-4.
- (4) Corbet, p.26.
- (5) F.A.Hyett, 'The Civil War in the Forest of Dean 1643-45' TBGAS (1893-4), p.95; Corbet, p.26; Webb, i.228-9.
- (6) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.264b; Clarendon, ii.482.
- (7) Corbet, pp.26-7; Clarendon, ii.482, is mistaken when he says that the Royal forces occupied the Vineyard. This was garrisoned by Vavasour during the siege of Gloucester in August 1643.

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conjunction with Rupert's forces from Cirencester, an effective blockade of Massey's principal garrison from East and West.¹ The sudden proximity of this large Royalist force compelled Massey to occupy the Vineyard, a moated medieval mansion, offering an excellent defensive position from which to hold the Welsh in check, and to guard Over bridge and the approaches to Gloucester.² Sir Jerome Brett, who was commanding Herbert's army in his absence, summoned the city but this was contemptuously refused.³

In the meantime, Fiennes and his cavalry had reached Bristol,⁴ and arrested the dissolute Governor Thomas Essex on suspicion of pro-Royalist sympathies.⁵ Although the security of that great seaport was thus dramatically reinforced, Bristol was still believed to include a large Royalist element among its population. At Gloucester, by contrast, it was reported 'they are all for the Parliament and at unity among themselves, and both soldiers and townsmen united'.⁶

The Parliament had dispatched Colonel Fiennes's mounted detachment as a stop-gap support for its forces in the West. On 11 February, the Commons decided to send Sir William Waller with a more sizeable force to try and bolster the Parliamentary cause in the wider region.⁷ The Lord General granted Waller a commission as Sergeant Major General of all the forces, both in existence and yet to be raised, within the counties of Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Somerset, Worcestershire, and Shropshire.⁸ This clearly implied the supersession of Massey's brief independent

- (1) ORN, i.119-20, Mercurius Aulicus 8 1643; Corbet, p.27.
- (2) Corbet, p.27.
- (3) Ibid; Webb, i.235.
- (4) E 90(11): The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, no. 8, Feb 14-15, p.62.
- (5) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, ff.13,15b-16; Latimer, p.168.
- (6) Ibid, f.13.
- (7) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.25.
- (8) Bodl., Tanner Mss.66, f.167; CJ, ii.960; LJ, v.602.

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command at Gloucester. Soon Massey was being assured of Waller's impending march for his relief.¹ Even so, Sir William's force was more of a marching brigade than an army, only numbering 2,500 men, of which most were horse and dragoons.²

In the meantime Massey did all he could to entertain Brett's Welsh troops who were busily building earthworks around Highnam house to protect themselves from sorties from Gloucester. The earthen sconces and trench lines which soon surrounded Sir Robert Cooke's mansion also commanded the Ross and Newent roads from the city to the West. From these defensive positions the Welsh pillaged the surrounding area, and travellers bound for Gloucester.³

The close confinement of Massey's forces imposed the need to finance them out of loans from both private individuals and the city corporation.⁴ On 1 March, Gloucester's civic records relate that 'whereas this city is in imminent danger of a sudden siege and many soldiers residing therein for the defence thereof who are ready to mutiny for want of pay for the prevention thereof of sudden mischief upon us it is most requisite that every burgess should be resident and according to his oath to support the burden thereof'.⁵ Free quarter had to be introduced in the city.⁶

Fortunately for Massey, Rupert's forces were distracted by an ill conceived attempt to surprise Fiennes's garrison at

- (1) E 89(17): Special Passages, no. 27, Feb 7-14, p.220.
- (2) BL, Harleian Mss.164, f.305b; E 91(8) The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, no. 9, Feb 21-8, p.67.
- (3) Corbet, p.27; Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, f.20b.
- (4) GRO, B 3/2, f.240-1,243; SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.52.
- (5) Ibid, f.245.
- (6) Ibid, ff.248-9.

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Bristol.¹ This plan was thwarted at the last moment.² Rupert's cavalry regiments returned to their quarters in eastern Gloucestershire, where they remained curiously inactive as dramatic events unfolded elsewhere.³

Brett's small army had now been at Highnam for five weeks, vainly awaiting cooperation from the King's forces at Cirencester and Oxford.⁴ The deadlock between his own and Massey's forces could only be broken by the arrival of reinforcements for one side or the other. On 22 March, Waller stormed into Malmesbury.⁵ He contemplated an attack upon Cirencester, but at Tetbury a dispatch arrived from Massey and Sir Robert Cooke urging him to come to their assistance against the Welsh at Highnam.⁶ Sir William immediately altered his line of march, making for the Vale of Berkeley and Framilode passage, an ancient ferrying point on the Severn, five miles below Gloucester.⁷

Waller's plan was a sound one. He ordered Massey to float some pontoons, which had arrived in Gloucester in November, down to Framilode, where his small army might use them to cross the Severn, bypassing Over bridge.⁸ This was unexpected - Brett thought that he would be unable to do it - and enabled Waller to cut the Royalists communications with their rear in South Wales. To maximise the element of surprise, Sir William ordered

- (1) Warburton, ii.140.
- (2) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, ff.32-3; CJ, ii.1002-3; P.McGrath, pp.17-9.
- (3) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, f.18b.
- (4) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.264b; Corbet, p.27.
- (5) E 94(12): Letter From Waller to Essex; BL, Harleian Mss. 164, f.343b.
- (6) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, ff.26b,30.
- (7) ORN, i.182, Mercurius Aulicus 13 1643; VCH, x.157.
- (8) E 94(30): The Copy of a Letter Sent From Bristol; May, p.203; Clarendon, ii.483.

Main roads

Wood land

Royalist troops

Parliamentary troops


Waller's and Massey's
pincer movement

Earthworks around Highnam
house (conjectural)

Royalist movements

Parliamentary movements

MAP 3. THE BATTLE OF HIGHNAM, 24 March 1643.



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Massey to attack the earthworks around Highnam the following morning so that the unsuspecting Welsh would be fully preoccupied.¹ This pincer movement succeeded spectacularly: the Royalists were taken completely by surprise. The battle of Highnam (24 March) consisted of a confused series of skirmishes, but its outcome was a decisive defeat for the Royalists, who were nearly all compelled to surrender.²

Massey had played his part well; not only had the Gloucester garrison distracted Brett, giving Waller the advantage of complete surprise, but it was also Massey's men who, when the Royalist position collapsed, stormed one of the earthen sconces around Highnam house, fatally breaching the mansion's defensive perimeter.³ The spoils of victory were great. The Monmouthshire and Herefordshire Royalists lost many prominent men and extensive material.⁴ The weapons, munitions and armour captured must have compensated handsomely for the loss of the county's magazine at Cirencester the month before. Five hundred horses alone were seized.⁵ The Marquess of Worcester and Sir John Winter fled deep into South Wales after Highnam: the Royalists had been forced on the defensive again.⁶

Gloucester's military isolation was over, and Massey's command now became part of a large association of Parliamentary forces and territories, which spread untidily from the Severn

(1) Corbet, p.28.

(2) Ibid, pp.28-9; Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, ff.27b-8b; Clarendon, ii.483.

(3) Corbet, pp.28-9.

(4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.303, ff.115,120b; E 94(30); Dirkes, p.67; E 247(19): A Continuation, no. 39, March 30-April 6, p.3.

(5) E 97(2): The Victorious and Fortunate Proceedings of Sir William Waller; E 94(30); May, p.203.

(6) E 96(4): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no. 15, April 4-11, p.119; Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C 53, f.30b; Hutton, p.55.

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valley through northern Wiltshire to Somerset and Dorset. Massey became, in effect, one of Waller's leading staff officers. The victory at Highnam transformed his responsibilities and functions within the region as a whole, and initiated a brief but fruitful partnership with Waller.¹

February had been a month of spectacular success for the Royalists in Gloucestershire, but March had been one of increasing frustration. Bad coordination between the King's forces in the West and East of the county had made the Parliamentary victory at Highnam possible. But the Royalist high command also proved unable to distribute its forces such that that the area in which they were billeted could support them without undue hardship.²

Waller spent a week in Gloucester, familiarising himself with Massey, the forces at his disposal and the general strategic situation.³ The city was overcrowded with troops and prisoners; Waller and Sir Arthur Heselrige found it necessary to share the same house.⁴ Immediately upon his arrival Sir William began to order payments from the city's military treasury without any apparent consultation with Gloucester's deputy Governor.⁵

Stamford's blue coats were now being recruited locally from the citizens and country folk. Sickness, casualties and desertion must have steadily thinned the regiment's ranks from October 1642 onwards, reducing the proportion of veterans from its days at Hereford. This shift in composition may have helped to ensure that the billeting of the troops upon the city people aroused less resentment than it would had they consisted entirely of 'foreigners'.⁶ On 8 April, Massey made small payments to the

- (1) J.Adair, Roundhead General: A Military Biography of Sir William Waller (1969), pp.60-9.
- (2) BL, Harleian Mss.6804, f.128.
- (3) Corbet, p.31; Adair, pp.62-63.
- (4) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C 53, f.29.
- (5) SP, 28/129, pt.5 f.3b.
- (6) GRO, B 3/2, f.250.

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company commanders of the 'new men', doubtless to encourage recruitment.¹ Slowly but surely the regiment was losing its Leicestershire character, and becoming predominantly a local force.

Meanwhile, Prince Maurice, in an attempt to reverse the tide of Royal fortunes in the region, arrived at Tewkesbury.² This disrupted the progress of the Parliamentary forces. Waller had advanced into Monmouthshire, but had failed to accomplish much in the staunchly pro-Royalist counties of South East Wales.³ Now he received intelligence from Massey at Gloucester that Maurice was deploying horse regiments in a wide arc between Ross and Newnham,⁴ and threatened to cut off his retreat. Waller quickly decided to double back and force his way through these lines.⁵ Driving one of the Royalist outposts from Newnham with his horse and dragoons, Waller skirmished heavily with the Prince's troops at Little Dean on the fringes of the forest.⁶ Hearing that his commander was heavily engaged, Massey drew some troops out of Gloucester to help him. But he soon met Waller, who had extracted himself safely, only two miles from his would-be rescuer.

It was on the roadside, close to Highnam, that Massey suggested to Waller a plan to surprise Tewkesbury with a force of soldiers transported up the Severn by boat. The idea was very timely. Maurice had drawn many men out of the town to take the field against Waller, and the small garrison remaining at Tewkesbury might well be under the illusion that the Prince's

(1) GRO, B 3/2, f.250.

(2) BL, Harleian Mss.6802, f.48; Harleian Ms.6851, f.131; E 247(21): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 43, April 3-10, April 7; Corbet, p.32.


(3) LJ, vi.4-5; Warburton, ii.161.

(4) E 97(2); LJ, vi.5; BL, Harleian Mss.164, f.368; Webb, i.250-1.

(5) Corbet, p.32; E 97(2); LJ, vi.5.

(6) P.Young, ed. Military Memoirs: The Civil War, Richard Atkyns (1967), pp.9-10; Corbet, p.32.

THE BATTLE OF LITTLE DEAN AND MASSEY'S SEIZURE OF TEWKESBURY, 10 and 11 of April 1643.



Chapter 2


Forest operations had successfully snuffed out any danger.¹

Waller agreed to Massey's plan and the amphibious expedition was sent up the Severn forthwith. The Tewkesbury garrison under Sir Mathew Carew was as careless as Massey could have hoped.² On 11 April, the town, a strategically important crossing point at the confluence of the rivers Severn and Avon, was seized by the Gloucester forces.³ The following day, Waller wrote informing the Commons that 'the taking of Tewkesbury is of great consequence to these parts: Prince Maurice's design of taking us in the forest is now spoiled, and so have we the bridge he passed over'.⁴

Northern Gloucestershire had now been secured for the Parliament and the Worcester Royalists placed on the defensive.⁵ But Maurice was unlikely to suffer the loss of his principal base of operations without an attempt to retake it. Both Waller and Massey feared he would try and cross the Severn further up river, and assault Tewkesbury from the North.⁶ These fears proved well founded. Maurice marched North from Ross to Upton bridge, the only permanent crossing point between Worcester and Tewkesbury.⁷ Both Waller's and Massey's forces tried to bar his southward advance on Tewkesbury, but suffered a sharp reverse at Ripple Field on the morning of 13 April.⁸ The arrival of Parliamentary reinforcements, however, and the converging and confining 'V' formed by the rivers Severn and Avon, prevented

- (1) P.Young, ed. Atykns Memoirs, pp.9-10; Corbet, p.32.
- (2) LJ, vi.5; ORN, i.210, Mercurius Aulicus 15 1643.
- (3) Corbet, pp.32-3; BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.40; Warburton, ii.163; E 247(25): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 44, April 10-17, April 17.
- (4) LJ, vi.5; E 97(2).
- (5) Bodl., Rawlinson Mss.D 924, ff.150-50b.
- (6) LJ, vi.5; E 97(2).
- (7) E 99(15): Certain Informations, no. 14, April 17-24, p.109
- (8) Corbet, pp.33-5; ORN, i.212-3, Mercurius Aulicus 15 1643.

THE BATTLE OF RIPPLE FIELD, 13 April 1643:



KEY

Main roads

Slope of hill

Hedgerows (conjectural)

Royalist troops

Parliamentary troops

Royalist movements

Parliamentary movements

Maurice from recapturing Tewkesbury.¹

Ripple Field was a tactical, but not a strategic, defeat for Waller and Massey. For Maurice was prevented from pressing his advantage in the Severn valley. He was recalled to Oxford to help repulse the Lord General's main field army, which had advanced up the Thames valley and now posed a threat to both Reading and Oxford itself.² In the face of this danger, the key Royalist garrisons at Cirencester and Malmesbury were also withdrawn.³

Accordingly, the threat to Gloucester from the East, which had existed since the storming of Cirencester, was suddenly removed. Waller and Massey now had undisputed military control in the region. They had destroyed Herbert's army and checked Prince Maurice, until he was called away on more pressing Royalist business. They were now in a position to exploit to the full the consequences of their victory at Highnam, and of the Prince's withdrawal. Recruitment became much easier. Since before the campaign against Maurice, Massey and Waller had sought to augment with fresh regiments the meagre forces at their disposal. Now that Waller's horse and dragoons were in unopposed control, he 'protected the gentlemen of the county whilst they were raising forces for the Parliament'.⁴

Sir William's original commission of 10 February envisaged that the bulk of his forces, especially his foot, would be raised in the jurisdictional area of his new command. As early as 1 April, Sir Robert Cooke, a former deputy lieutenant, and the MP for Tewkesbury, was engaged in raising a regiment of foot, and

(1) ORN, i.212-3; Corbet, p.35.

(2) LJ, vi.17; Hutton, p.56.

(3) ORN, i.225,231-2, Mercurius Aulicus 16 1643; J.Bamfield, Colonel Joseph Bamfield's Apology (1685), p.5; I.Roy, ed. Royalist Ordnance Papers, Oxford Record Society (1963-64), i.77,93.

(4) C.H.Firth, ed. Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow (1894), i.52.

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had already marshalled two hundred men.¹ Recruitment of this force continued rapidly throughout the early part of the month.² Cooke had received his Colonel's commission from Waller, with whom he had worked closely in the crucial stages before the battle of Highnam.³

Cooke's regiment must have been intended as a replacement for that of Colonel Berrow, shattered at Coleford. Certainly the 'country people come daily in to Sir William Waller in great abundance especially out of the forest',⁴ where Berrow's regiment had largely been raised. But immediately after Ripple, Waller appointed Sir Robert Governor of Tewkesbury. Cooke and his newly formed regiment soon took up residence, guarding Gloucester's northern approaches and acting as a check on the Royalists at Worcester.⁵

On 15 April, the Common Council of Gloucester decided that another foot regiment should be recruited, from 'within this city and county for the defence thereof'.⁶ Now that its professional garrison was venturing further afield, Gloucester began to look to its own security: the new city regiment's initial purpose 'was to defend the city within the walls, according to the infancy of war'.⁷ The corporation decided to nominate for the position of Colonel, Henry Stephens, the eldest son of Nathaniel Stephens of Eastington, a knight of the shire.⁸ This local emphasis seems to

(1) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.27.

(2) Ibid, f.30b.

(3) Corbet, p.35.

(4) Bodl. Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.30b.

(5) Corbet, p.35.

(6) GRO, B 3/2, f.254.

(7) Corbet, p.37.

(8) GRO, B 3/2, f.254; T.Fitz-Roy Fenwick & W.C.Metcalf ed. The Visitation of the County of Gloucestershire 1682-83 (1884), p.175.

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indicate anxiety, amongst Parliamentary supporters in the city and the shire, that the new force should be more responsive to local needs than the professional detachments sent into the region by Parliament. But Henry Stephens, like Robert Cooke, obtained his Colonel's commission from Waller himself.¹

All the officers of Stephens's regiment were prominent city or county Parliamentarians. Thomas Pury and his son became Captains of two of its companies, as did the then mayor of Gloucester, Luke Nurse.² These new officers soon became 'Captains of the watch for the city'; taking over from the ordinary members of the Common Council.³ Perhaps the civic authorities were relieved to be able to dispose their own military force, which might relieve them of the need to rely on regular soldiers responsible only to Parliament, in the many duties relating to Gloucester's defence. Stephens had obtained his commission from Waller, but there was still a danger that friction might arise between the officers of the city regiment and Parliament's professional military men. It is clear that Massey and Waller saw Gloucester as a base for operations into neighbouring shires.⁴ For city and county Parliamentarians, the defence of Gloucestershire was the first priority.

At Berkeley, Colonel Forbes also started to recruit a regiment but little trace of it survives.⁵ Perhaps the local area could not find the resources to equip yet another regiment. The two thousand arms which Waller and Massey had captured at

(1) Corbet, p.37.

(2) BG, p.229; E 67(31): A Brief and Exact Relation...

(3) GRO B 3/2, f.258.

(4) Adair, pp.63-9.

(5) Bodl. Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.30b.

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Highnam were certainly available for Cooke's and Stephen's regiments.¹

Since February, the military Government of Gloucestershire had been transformed. In many other counties the deputy lieutenancy of 1642 was gradually superseded in military affairs by county committees.² But in Gloucestershire, the authority of the deputy lieutenants collapsed abruptly after the debacle of Cirencester.³ The influence of the local Parliamentary gentry also diminished dramatically, since their power and prestige depended upon landed estates in the eastern hundreds of the shire, now largely occupied by the Royalists. Gloucester's new status, as a major garrison and the temporary headquarters of Waller's command, also helped to ensure that national concerns tended to outweigh the local interests represented in its corporation.

The Severn Vale was strategically vital to the Parliament, because its occupation prevented the Royalists from completing their conquest of a vast block of territory comprising Wales and the South Midlands.⁴ Should it fall to him, the King would reap not only the military advantage of free communications between South Wales and Oxford, via Gloucester, but the economic benefits of a region rich in natural resources.⁵

The integration of Massey's Gloucester command into Waller's broader association was important for financial, as well as purely military considerations. Gloucestershire's wealth was

- (1) E 247(19): A Continuation, no. 39, March 30-April 6, p.3; Bodl. Eng.Hist.Mss. C53, f.29.
- (2) Morrill, pp.66-7.
- (3) Corbet, p.25.
- (4) Adair, p.55; Hutton, p.54; Corbet, pp.5-6.
- (5) I.Roy, TRHS (1978), p.134; BL, Harleian Mss.6804, ff.160-1; BL, Harleian Mss.6851, f.145; I.Roy, ed. Royalist Ordnance Papers, i.8,36.

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still partly in Royalist hands, but enough remained for the county to be seen as a financial cornerstone of Waller's association.¹ After Highnam, Waller had begun to sanction the payment of grants for a wide variety of purposes at Gloucester.² In May and June he was authorising payments to Stamford's regiment, and to many other Gloucester based units and individuals.³ Yet the financial situation had not improved to the extent that Stamford's men could be removed from free quarter. They remained the enforced guests of the citizens of Gloucester throughout April and May.⁴ The county was still a frontier zone between the opposing sides, and rough treatment was inflicted upon those who failed to cooperate willingly. Both Waller and Massey must have breached accepted conventions in their collections of fines and contributions: surrounding Royalists, who no doubt used similar methods themselves, certainly made much of such infringements.⁵

In eastern Gloucestershire, both sides attempted to levy contributions, and by May, parish constables were in receipt of contradictory orders in regard to collections. At Cirencester, the Royalist Colonel Crawford heard of Waller's orders for the collection of contributions from the parishes around the town. Crawford in turn threatened the civilian officials with 'fire and sword if they paid him a penny'.⁶ This also suggests that Sir William had effectively taken over the administration and finance of the Gloucester command. Only the administration of the Earl of Stamford's regiment itself remained to Massey, and even this was

(1) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.72; Warburton, ii.194.

(2) SP, 28/129, Pt.5, ff.3b,4-4b.

(3) Ibid, ff.19b,20-20b,21; SP, 28/228, Pt.1, ff.39.190; Pt.2, ff.218-22,388.

(4) GRO, B 3/2, ff.251,259.

(5) E 101(25): A Letter From an Officer in His Majesty's Army.

(6) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.72; Warburton, ii.316.

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
subjected to spasmodic interference from Waller.¹ Sir William even tried to bring Colonel Nathaniel Fiennes, the Governor of Bristol, under his jurisdiction.² But Massey's command remained the most integrated of Waller's association because of its commander-in-chief's continuing residence at Gloucester.

The strategic situation having been reversed, Gloucester now became a base for offensive operations against surrounding Royalist garrisons. Immediately after Maurice's removal towards Oxford, Waller and Massey resolved upon the seizure of Hereford. Sir William had received several letters assuring him that the city was his should he appear before it.³ There was no Royalist field force in a position to impede such an advance. As Corbet rightly observed, 'the Parliament forces had a large and free game in this county'.⁴

Massey's recent experience in Hereford, and his knowledge of the town and its defences made it desirable for him to accompany Waller.⁵ Such was the shortage of foot that Colonel Stephen's city regiment was also pressed into service - far from the city of Gloucester, which it had been intended to protect.⁶ Proceeding via Fownhope, from the South East, Waller and Massey appeared before Hereford at dawn on 24 April. The bulk of their forces swung around to the North of the city, probably at Massey's suggestion, which was the side where his cannon could most effectively be deployed.⁷ In fact, Massey was able to deploy his two saker field

- (1) SP, 28/129, Pt.5, ff.3b,4b,5.
- (2) Bodl., Clarendon SP.22(1673), f.25.
- (3) Bodl., Tanner Mss.303, ff.124b-25.
- (4) Corbet, p.35.
- (5) Webb, i.256.
- (6) Corbet, p.37.
- (7) Ibid, p.35.

WALLER'S AND MASSEY'S SEIZURE OF HEREFORD, April 24 1643.



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guns so expertly that their shots smashed through one of the city's gates and caused considerable carnage beyond.¹ Here his engineering and pioneering experience must have played a part in selecting what was evidently a well chosen gun position. Very soon the Royalist Governor called for a parley,² and on 25 April, the Parliamentary commanders gained entry into the city.³ Those Royalist leaders of Herefordshire who had escaped from Highnam now fell into the hands of their opponents.⁴ Urged to escape, they decided to stay, hoping that 'the yielding of their persons ... might save the city'.⁵

Both Waller and Massey had learnt from Stamford's mistaken decision to leave a permanent garrison isolated at Hereford.⁶ They endeavoured instead to round up as many Royalist sympathisers, and extracting from them as much money, as possible.⁷ Sir William also persuaded the city and country folk to swear an oath of loyalty to the Parliament.⁸ By mid-May, having caused as much trouble as they could, both Waller and Massey withdrew to Gloucester. Soon, Hereford was regarrisoned for the King by Barnabus Scudamore.⁹

- (1) E 101(2): Certain Informations, no. 16, May 1-8, p.125; Corbet, p.36.
- (2) Bodl., Tanner Mss.303, f.123b; J.Duncumb, ed. History of the County of Hereford (1804), i.255-6; Corbet, p.36.
- (3) Duncumb, i.259.
- (4) BL, Loan 29/173, f.247, misplaced in the 1642 volume; E 100(7): The Forth Intelligence From Reading, p.6; Philips, ii.69-70.
- (5) Duncumb, i.253; ORN, i.246, Mercurius Aulicus 18 1643.
- (6) Corbet, p.36; E 101(2), p.125.
- (7) SP, 16/497, f.144; BL, Loan 29/173, f.247.
- (8) J.W.W. Bund ed. Henry Townsend's Diary, Worcestershire Historical Society (1915-20), ii.120-1.
- (9) Duncumb, i.265; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.104.

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Upon his return to Gloucester, Waller was reminded of his wider responsibilities to the West. On 16 May, Stamford was decisively defeated by Hopton at Stratton in Cornwall.¹ Parliamentary Devon and Somerset now lay wide open to a Cornish Royalist invasion, and required heavy reinforcement. But before Waller could leave Gloucester he had to ensure that that key garrison was reasonably secure. Gloucester was most seriously threatened by the Royalist presence at Worcester, which tied down a large garrison of foot at Tewkesbury under Sir Robert Cooke. Waller tried to free this force by taking the city of Worcester itself,² but was forced to abandon the siege after a day because of the increasingly difficult situation in which the western Parliamentarians were finding themselves.³

As he passed through Tewkesbury towards a planned rendezvous with the western forces at Bath, Waller ordered Sir Robert Cooke to abandon the town.⁴ Its substantial garrison of 1,000 horse and foot was to be drafted into Waller's marching force.⁵ By 2 June, Cooke was slighting the works around Tewkesbury. He noted that 'the country is much troubled at his [Waller's] departure'.⁶ Gloucestershire, therefore, was deprived of a great many troops, and the local Parliamentarians were thrust back on the defensive once more. By 11 July, Sir Robert Cooke was dead (from natural

- (1) Bodl., Clarendon SP.23, ff.31b-2; Clarendon, ii.70-3; Adair, p.67.
- (2) Bodl., Nalson Mss.11(269), f.189.
- (3) Ibid; Townsend, i.124; Clarendon, iii.18; Bund, pp.93-4.
- (4) Bodl., Nalson Mss.11(269), f.189.
- (5) Corbet, p.37.
- (6) Bodl., Nalson Mss.11(269), f.189.

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causes) at the age of forty-five.¹ His loss was important, because he more than anyone had established close links between the local Parliamentary gentry and the professional military.

The survival of the Royalist presence at Worcester and the abandonment of Tewkesbury meant that Gloucester was once more vulnerable to enemy incursions from the North, and that Massey's presence was still essential. Money continued to be very short at Gloucester. A group of the garrison's officers, including Massey, articulated several grievances to the Parliament on 3 June. They agreed that Waller should march into the West but complained that there were in narrowly confined Gloucester too many soldiers to support. Moreover, the 'want of money hath bred such mutinous dispositions in the soldiers that no arguments will make them stir'.²

Sir Robert Cooke, Massey and the others told of their difficulty in adequately completing the recruitment and equipment of newly raised regiments. 'You may perhaps hear a noise of new regiments raising, and so over value the strength of these parts, but the truth is, for want of money neither the new can be completed nor the old encouraged; if we can obtain no supply, we must wait upon God, and petition him to list our preservation amongst his wonders'.³

After Waller's departure Massey began to authorise payments on his own authority again.⁴ Thanks to his commander's wider strategic responsibilities, he had regained de facto command of Gloucester, though Waller, who was at Bath by 23 June,

(1) SP, 28/129, Pt.5, f.24; Keeler, p.141.

(2) Bodl., Nalson Ms.11(272), f.192.

(3) Ibid.

(4) SP, 28/129, Pt.5, f.22.

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demanded money from Gloucester and gave himself priority over all local payments.¹ Massey's personal position had been transformed since his days as Stamford's deputy Governor in December 1642. Stamford's own military authority and career now lay in ruins on Stratton Hill and his return to Gloucester was no longer expected.² Waller's prolonged absence now called for a resolution of the problem of Gloucester's military Government.³ Naturally, the corporation wanted the command of its city settled and the city elders 'began to enquire after a Governor'.⁴

Initially 'they thought well of a man near home, and cast their eye upon a known patriot'.⁵ This was probably Nathaniel Stephens, who commanded respect in the city and county alike. But 'more intelligent men upon serious review of the city's continual hazard, found that the necessity of this place did require a tried soldier, and that such a one might possibly be found faithful; but a timorous or unskillful man must needs ruin all'.⁶ And so, the corporation 'reflected on Massey, whose good services gave them also a complete assurance of his fidelity; that by the happy choice of the citizens and the Lord General's commission, he was appointed Governor'.⁷ No doubt Waller had sent to the Earl of Essex a glowing testimonial to the qualities of his subordinate. Massey's loyalty, the importance to Gloucester of his military skills, and his successful partnership with Sir William, must all

(1) SP, 28/228, pt.4, f.725.

(2) Corbet, p.37; May, p.215.

(3) T.T.Lewis, ed. Letters of Lady Brilliana Harley, Camden Society (1853), p.202.

(4) Corbet, p.37.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

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have weighed in favour of his selection by the city authorities as their favoured candidate for the post of Governor.

On 26 May, the Common Council 'ordered that Lieutenant Colonel Massey in respect of the love that this house beareth him shall have £10 given him out of the chamber'.¹ It is clear that Massey had won a degree of respect from the corporation, and even its affection. He was no longer seen as a mere mercenary and a 'professed servant of fortune'.²

Massey had risen swiftly, in only three years, from his humble rank as a Captain of pioneers. Through chance, circumstances and ability, he had made the most of the opportunities offered by the war. But Gloucester's security depended less upon Massey than on Waller's ability to keep the field against Maurice and Hopton. June 1643 was not, as it turned out, an auspicious time to inherit the Governorship of Gloucester.

(1) GRO, B 3/2, f.262.

(2) Corbet, p.25.

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GLOUCESTER: A CIVIL WAR GARRISON BESIEGED, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1643.

The Gloucester corporation, like many other provincial urban governing bodies, had to come to terms during the Civil War with the intrusion of external sources of authority.¹ But perhaps the most significant feature of Gloucester's civil government between 1642-46 was the extent to which the corporation held on to its administrative independence, despite the military presence in the city.² Massey and his garrison rarely feature in the corporation's records.³

At the outbreak of war the corporation had pretensions to military independence. Its measures were defensive and isolationist.⁴ On the eclipse of the deputy lieutenants after the fall of Cirencester, a Council of War was established at Gloucester.⁵ The bi-partite response, from Massey and the mayor, to Rupert's summons of the city, suggests that the Council comprised both civil and military representatives. Its swift evolution seems to bear this out. By March 1643 the Council of War had its own clerk, a city man named Foster Pleasance, who was also 'clerk to the Governor'.⁶ This dual role enabled Pleasance to liaise between Massey and the corporation. Liaison was also in the hands of John Dorney, the city's recorder, who became 'advocate to the Council of War'.⁷ The Council's small administrative staff must have been primarily concerned with ensuring good relations between the officers of the garrison and the civic bureaucracy.

(1) Morrill, pp.70-2.

(2) Taylor, p.110.

(3) GRO, B 3/2, ff.236-7; F 4/5, ff.178b-309; Taylor, p.110.

(4) Ibid, ff.221-35; F 4/5, ff.178b-196b.

(5) Corbet, p.23.

(6) SP, 28/129, pt.5, ff.3b,30b,37.

(7) Ibid, ff.30b,37.

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It is highly probable that the initial civic component of the Council comprised the senior officers of the trained bands.¹ By April-May 1643 however the officers of Colonel Henry Stephen's regiment, many of whom were selected as prominent members of the city corporation, must have come to represent the city on the Council.² Such individuals would wear two hats: they would attend Massey's Council of War as officers of a force under his command, but report their deliberations to the Common Council as members of that Council. Upon his retirement from office, Dennis Wise was described as 'a Captain as well as mayor, a sword man as well as a gown man and how well he performed both places civil and martial for the public good ... his works will praise him'.³

Stephens's officers were called upon to play this double role in order to ensure the exclusion of the professional military outsiders from meetings of the city's Common Council.⁴ Throughout the course of the war, even during the direst emergencies, no officer on Massey's staff ever sat on the corporation's governing body.⁵ Even in the crisis days of early August 1643, officers from the garrison were invited to a meeting of the Common Council only to observe, and not to participate in, its proceedings.⁶

The permanence of the Council of War is demonstrated by the many references to its workings which have survived from the years 1643-5. It regularly met in an 'under chamber' (probably

- (1) Taylor, p.67.
- (2) BG, p.229; E 67(31).
- (3) J.Dorney, Certain Speeches Made Upon the Day of the Yearly Election of Officers in the City of Gloucester (1653), p.4.
- (4) Taylor, p.67.
- (5) GRO, B 3/2, ff.236-54; Taylor, p.67.
- (6) Corbet, p.41.

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for reasons of security), which apparently adjoined Massey's own lodgings,¹ a location highly convenient for Massey which testifies to the informality of the Council's proceedings.² Its discussions must have centred around the strategic aspects of local operations, including the strengths and deployment of Gloucester's ring of out garrisons, when the city was fortunate enough to possess them.³ The Council was quickly empowered to sanction payments to particular forces, such as Lieutenant Allerdine's train of bridge boats.⁴

The extent of civilian participation in the local war effort was determined, in the last resort, by the strategic situation. The closer the Royalist threat, the more the local Parliamentary civilian establishment depended upon military forces to undertake what were essentially civilian functions, even in the more secure areas. The professional military's success in securing the shire was a basic condition for the reassertion of civilian participation, and even control.

Alderman Nicholas Webb, mayor in 1643-44, saw the civil and military components of the city Government as a partnership of equals working in unison towards a common end. In 1646 he declared 'let us account it a happiness to live under a government but more especially to be under good governors, and having a particular relation to this city and garrison, let us bless him that hath blest us this year last past with such Governors in civil and martial affairs, as have in some good measure taken care for

(1) E 334(5): A Relation of that Great and Public Consternation had in Gloucester, p.3.

(2) Bodl., Tanner Mss.61, f.106; SP, 21/16, ff.148-9.

(3) Corbet, p.23.

(4) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.3.

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our souls comfort, and our outward safety and support'.¹

The citizens of Gloucester could not avoid the consequent discomforts of living in a major garrison city. Its inhabitants only numbered some 4,500 by 1642.² The arrival of Stamford's regiment would have had a considerable impact upon such a community.³ Initially many troops would have been billeted in out garrisons. But during times of crisis all were drawn into the city for their own and Gloucester's protection.⁴

But if the military presence at Gloucester brought the inconveniences of free quarter, it also brought economic opportunities. The city's industries, trades and manufacturers had to be mobilised and coordinated to supply the needs of the Parliamentary garrison, and to develop the city into a viable military base from which Massey could operate. On the whole this was achieved; in the process much of the slack in the local economy, attributable to the pre-war depression and the effects of the Royalist blockade, must have been taken up.

Massey took special trouble to develop a gunpowder manufacturing capacity at Gloucester, clearly deeming this industry vital to his garrison's security; and the output of Gloucester's two powder mills was indeed crucial to the city's success in withstanding the siege.⁵ When finally relieved by Essex, Massey had left in his magazine only two or three barrels of gunpowder.⁶ Without the town's manufacturing capacity of three barrels a week, he would have run out of the vital powder during the siege, with disastrous results for his garrison.⁷ It was only after a sustained effort and heavy expenditure that locally milled powder was ready to be delivered to Massey for the

(1) Dorney, p.7.

(2) Taylor, p.59.

(3) Ibid, p.84.

(4) Corbet, pp.23-5.

(5) BG, pp.226-7; E 67(31); Washbourne, p.62.

(6) OPH, xi.393.

(7) BG, pp.226-7; E 67(31); Washbourne, p.62.

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use of his garrison in June 1643.¹ By 1644 several magazines had been established in Gloucester for security's sake and to prevent the danger of a massive accidental explosion.² During the siege the crypt of Christ Church, the most secure magazine possible, was used. In early 1644 when the city was no longer exposed to direct fire from the enemy, private dwellings were used as stores.³

Far more money was probably spent in and around Gloucester on industrial and manufacturing activity during the war than in the pre-war slump. Many an unemployed clothing worker must have found new opportunities through enlistment in the military forces or by working in one of the many emerging industries that sustained them.

Massey was closely involved in the basic administration of his garrison, which, in a professional soldier with a strong streak of opportunism is evidence of a commendable sense of duty. His signature appears on warrants relating to a wide range of matters such as the issuing of equipment, munitions and supplies.⁴ The Gloucester command was usually confined enough for Massey to retain control over the more mundane aspects of garrison life. No detail seemed beneath his attention. He was even instrumental in obtaining a shroud for a dead soldier.⁵ Massey was both assertive and curious, and actively participated in the day to day finance, administration and organisation of his garrison.

On 21 June Massey led an expedition against the Royalist quarters in Slaughter hundred around Stow.⁶ He was

(1) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.21b.

(2) Ibid, ff.40b,43b.

(3) Washbourne, p.62; SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.40b.

(4) SP, 28/228, pts.1,2,3,4,5.

(5) Ibid, pt.1, f.26.

(6) Corbet, p.38; ORN, i.353, Mercurius Aulicus 25 1643.

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accompanied by Colonel Henry Stephens, though none of the city's foot regiment formed part of their force.¹ Initially the raid was a success, especially at Oddington, but Massey's small contingent was caught in the open on the high wold country close to Andoversford, by superior numbers of the enemy. There the Parliamentarians were routed and Colonel Stephens was captured, a fate that Massey himself was lucky to avoid.²

Nathaniel Stephens was quick to send one of his servants to Oxford to attend to the welfare of his eldest son.³ But Henry did not long survive the horrendous conditions of Oxford castle and its 'poisonous air'.⁴ His own impetuosity had led to his capture and subsequent sad fate, but Nathaniel Stephens may well have held Massey responsible. It is possible that the resentment of this prominent local figure played a part in the estrangement between civil and military forces in the months, and even years, to come.

On 13 July, a day of thanksgiving was held at Gloucester in celebration of Waller's supposed victory at Lansdown.⁵ That very day however, Sir William's army, the last Parliamentary field force in the West, was totally destroyed on Roundway Down.⁶ Suddenly the King seemed to be in a position to pick off the remaining rebel garrisons at will.⁷ Some thought Waller's comprehensive defeat paved the way for a total Royalist victory.⁸ Prince Rupert left Oxford capital on the 18th with fourteen regiments of foot and two brigades of horse, determined to reduce

(1) Corbet, p.38.

(2) ORN, i.353,359; Corbet, pp.38-9.

(3) CJ, iii.148.

(4) Corbet, p.39.

(5) Washbourne, p.43 .


(6) BL, Loan 24/174, f.38; Clarendon, iii.101; ORN, i.395, Mercurius Aulicus 28 1643.

(7) May, p.213; Corbet, p.39.

(8) P.Young, ed. Richard Atkyns Memoirs, pp.28-9.

MAP 7.

THE ODDINGTON RAID AND THE BATTLE OF ANDOVERSFORD, June 21 and 22 1643.



Royalist billets

Scene of fighting

Main roads

KEY

The pursuit of
Royalist forces

The rout of Massey's
forces after Andoversford

the remaining pockets of resistance in the region.¹ It seems that his first objective was Gloucester.² The Royalists doubtless regarded Massey's garrison as little more than an outpost of Bristol. They were dissuaded from attacking it by the arrival of Waller with 2,000 horse on 19 July.³ Rupert abandoned his plan to seize Gloucester before besieging Bristol.⁴ Instead the Royalist forces blocked Waller's retreat to, and reinforcement of the Bristol garrison under Fiennes.⁵ Waller had no intention of being bottled up in Gloucester and soon left with the remnants of his army for Warwick.⁶ For the moment, Royalist operations against Bristol postponed Gloucester's ordeal.⁷ But on 26 July the King's armies stormed into the second city of the realm.⁸ Waller's defeat at Roundway down had led quickly to the loss of Gloucester's principal supply base and trading partner.⁹

There was a predictable sense of despondency and defeatism in Massey's now isolated garrison.¹⁰ The sudden sharp reversal

- (1) Warburton, ii.236-7; Clarendon, iii.107; Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.57-8.
- (2) C.Firth ed., 'The Journal of Prince Rupert's Marches', EHR xiii (1898), p.734; Warburton, ii.237,266; Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.57; BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.85.
- (3) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.86; Warburton, ii.238; Bodl., Firth Mss. C6, f.196.
- (4) Ibid; C.Firth ed., EHR (1898), p.734.
- (5) Warburton, ii.238.
- (6) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.86; Bodl. Firth Mss.C6, f.198; Adair, p.96.
- (7) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.57-60; Clarendon, iii.107; Latimer, pp.178-80.
- (8) Warburton, ii.265; BG, p.58; Clarendon, iii.113-4.
- (9) Bodl., Tanner Mss.62(1), ff.197,199.
- (10) May, p.215.

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of military advantage during the previous fortnight 'made most men question all things'.¹ One Royalist reported that the citizens and soldiers were 'all in great fear and distraction'.²

Massey too doubted his ability to defend Gloucester against a major Royalist assault.³ On 29 July, he revealed to the Parliament that, ever since the fall of Bristol the country people had failed to obey his warrants.⁴ Massey was confident that Alderman Pury and a few other Parliamentary die-hards 'are still cordial to us but I fear 10 for 1 do incline the other way'.⁵ Reinforcements, in the form of a regiment of foot with plenty of ammunition and money, were deemed essential if he was to have any chance of effectively defending Gloucester.⁶

But Massey may well have deliberately exaggerated the problems that confronted his garrison. He was contemplating an act of treachery.⁷ Whilst carefully maintaining a facade of loyalty, Massey was conspiring to surrender Gloucester on terms highly unfavourable to the Parliament. Local Parliamentarians such as Corbet or Pury were unaware of this duplicity, and believed in his continuing commitment to the city's defence, in spite of the very unpromising circumstances.⁸ But it is certain that by early August Massey was in contact with the Royalist Colonel William Legge, his old comrade in arms from the Scots wars.⁹

Clarendon knew that the Royalists entertained great hopes

(1) Corbet, p.40.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.100.

(3) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.67.

(4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.62(1), f.197.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

(7) S.R.Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War (1987), i.198.

(8) Corbet, pp.40-1.

(9) Bodl. Firth Mss.C8, f.281; Warburton, ii.276.

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of some 'secret agitation' involving the Governor of Gloucester.¹ His former superiors were well aware of Massey's mercenary motives in deserting the Royal camp in 1642. No more was he now, so Clarendon was informed, 'intoxicated with any of those fumes which made men rave and fanatic in the cause': he could be 'wrought upon'.² William Legge, who knew Massey well, certainly believed this. With Prince Rupert's blessing, he sent to Gloucester a letter phrased 'as was proper ... from one friend to another'.³

Massey reproached Legge's messenger in public, probably in the presence of some of his staff, or at a Council of War, but arranged that the messenger be brought unobtrusively back to him. At this private meeting, the Governor made clear his real intentions. He assured the messenger that he was still Legge's servant. If the King appeared in person before Gloucester, Massey would offer no resistance. 'For it would not stand with his conscience to fight against the person of the King'.⁴

Massey also thought the Royal presence would enable him to win over Parliamentary stalwarts, 'which otherwise he could not do'.⁵ He wrote to Legge that, should the King appear personally, 'he would bring him in with a 1,000 men'. This gravely underestimated his officers' loyalty to the cause they served.⁶ Perhaps his own opportunism rendered Massey incapable of understanding the deep and principled attachment of most to the Parliamentary cause, which they would not abandon lightly.

Gloucester might have been spared the effects of his contemplated treachery, since some of the King's advisors at Bristol were keen to advance on London immediately.⁷ But on 3

(1) Clarendon, i.130.

(2) Ibid, i.131.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Warburton, ii.280.

(7) Clarendon, i.130; Corbet, p.56; P.Young, ed. Atkyns, p.29.

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August, the Royal Council of War, with the King presiding, decided after all to concentrate his forces against Gloucester.¹ Its Governor's expected return to his former allegiance was probably decisive in securing a majority against an immediate march on London and for a mobilisation against Massey's embattled command.² Massey's renegacy, therefore, had momentous repercussions. It altered the course of the war, and may even have affected its outcome.

Leaving Massey's own role aside, the Royalists were well aware of the advantages of taking the last Parliamentary stronghold on the Severn.³ Success in this would complete their domination of a large block of territory and obviate the need to tie down their forces in the region.⁴ The Royalist seizure of Bristol added even greater point to the conquest of Gloucester, since Massey's garrison continued to act as a barrier to trade on the Severn, stifling the activities of Bristol as a major port and as a supply base for other Royalist garrisons further up river.⁵

Many professional soldiers, most notably Monck and Goring, derived great personal advantage by changing sides during the war. Massey could have expected a handsome reward as the instrument of the bloodless surrender of such a major garrison at this crucial point. He could have expected, at the least, to have retained his rank, and could even have hoped for promotion to a higher command in the Royalist army, an eminence denied to him at York in 1642. And the position of the Gloucester garrison looked very bleak. Many local people believed that their interests would best be served by the city's surrender to the King's forces.⁶ Even should the city succeed in holding out, it seemed destined to be

(1) Warburton, ii.272; GRO, D 115, f.3.

(2) Clarendon, iii.131-2.

(3) Ibid, iii.129-30.

(4) Warburton, ii.263-4; Hutton, p.113; Washbourne, pp.46-9.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Corbet, p.41; May, p.215; Morrill, p.90.

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trapped in a confined and fiercely contested war zone, 'enforced to stoop perpetually under two burdens'.¹ Some of the most ardent local Parliamentarians must have paled at the prospect of a prolonged siege, even if it were resisted successfully.

Throughout the last days of July and during early August, the Royalists mobilised formidable forces before Gloucester.² Such a show of strength, they believed, together with the presence of the King, would suffice to convince the city to submit. Even Parliamentary commentators conceded that, in the face of such a powerful concentration of Royalist manpower and resources, the fate of Gloucester was sealed.³

Meanwhile, the city authorities procrastinated, unable to decide whether to comply with Royalist calls for immediate surrender.⁴ There was panic amongst some of them; some were allowed to leave the city.⁵ Other citizens contacted Royalist friends and relations, pledging their loyalty and asking to be preserved from 'plunder and violence'.⁶ The Royalists drew up a list of their supporters, to be spared from reprisals in the event of the sack of the city, in each of the city's wards. It totalled 104 inhabitants and included one alderman.⁷ These represented a potential fifth column, arousing great hopes amongst some of the King's commanders.⁸

- (1) May, p.215; Corbet, p.41; Morrill, p.90.
- (2) BG, p.207; E 67(31); GRO, D 115, f.3; Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.60b-61; BL, Add.Mss.18,980,ff.95,97,99,101,103; Bodl., Firth Mss.C6, f.212; I.Roy, ed. Royalist Ordnance Papers (1971-73), ii.263-4; Hutton, pp.113-4.
- (3) E 63(13): The Parliament's Scout, no.6, July 27-Aug 2 p.46.
- (4) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.100; Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.11.
- (5) Corbet, p.41.
- (6) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.100; Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.11.
- (7) BL, Harleian Mss.6804, f.118.
- (8) Clarendon, iii.133-4.

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By the end of the first week of August, Massey had begun to doubt his ability to convince his officers that the city should be surrendered immediately. By 7 August, Legge had informed Aston that any formal summons of Gloucester 'will be to little purpose ... until we can put him to some distress'.¹ Massey had given Legge the impression that he had 'little intention to surrender up the town upon fair terms'.²

What was the reason for the Governor's apparent change of heart? In the desperate circumstances in which the city found itself, Massey and his officers had been invited to attend the Common Council.³ During this meeting the recently sworn Solemn Covenant was discussed.⁴ This had bound the citizens and soldiers to defend the Parliamentary cause and to refuse all dealings with the 'popish' Royal army which sought to undermine 'the true Protestant religion'.⁵ The oath had been taken in church, with due religious ceremony. Its inference that Parliament stood between England and full blown Catholicism probably united the corporation around a policy of resistance.⁶ The role of puritan Parliamentary die-hards such as Thomas Pury and Dennis Wise must have been crucial in this decision.⁷

Nevertheless, it seems that only after long and earnest debate did the garrison and corporation jointly resolve to refuse the Royalist 'tender of peace'.⁸ The unanimity of the decision suggests that the majority of Massey's officer corps, as well as civilians, were also prepared to resist, despite the unfavourable odds confronting them.⁹

(1) Warburton, ii.276.

(2) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.281.

(3) Corbet, p.41.

(4) May, pp.215-6; Washbourne, p.51.

(5) A&O, i.175-6.

(6) May, pp.215-6; Washbourne, p.51.

(7) Hyett, pp.12,18; Washbourne, p.51.

(8) Corbet, p.42; May, p.216.

(9) Ibid, p.40.

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Against such a determined coalition, Massey could do little. He could have swayed the debate only in the event of divisions between officers and the city elders. To have persisted with an isolated stand in favour of surrender would have served only to arouse suspicion and undermine his own authority. This was still intact. Even at the height of his duplicity Massey had been careful to maintain the demeanor of a loyal servant to the Parliament.¹

By 4 August, a Royalist collector of intelligence on the Gloucester garrison was prepared to identify Massey with the Parliamentary hardliners in his desire to defend the city.² On 7 August, having received pessimistic reports from Legge, Aston labelled the Governor a 'traitor'.³ On 8 August, however, a Royalist Captain, Mollineaux, who had been recommended to the King by his secretary, Edward Nicholas, tried to revive hopes for the viability of a conspiracy involving Massey.⁴ But Mollineaux, by the time of his arrival, encountered only cynicism amongst the Royalist high command, whose hopes of Massey had by now collapsed.

The decision to defend Gloucester was a courageous one in the circumstances. Few supplies could be collected, and the city's markets were already empty.⁵ Its meagre garrison consisted of Stamford's regiment, then numbering only some 500 to 600 men, and the city regiment, with some 500 more.⁶ Several troops of horse and dragoons completed a total of perhaps 1,500 men at Massey's disposal.⁷

(1) Washbourne, pp.51-2; Corbet, pp.40-1.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.100; Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.11.

(3) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.281.

(4) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.104; Warburton, ii.278.

(5) Bodl., Tanner Mss.62(1), f.199.

(6) Ibid, f.197.

(7) Ibid; Corbet, p.42; Warburton, ii.263,279; May, p.215; ORN, i.432, Mercurius Aulicus 31 1643.

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Yet Gloucester's position did possess certain compensatory strengths, noted by the experienced Royalist Colonel Aston. The numerical inferiority of its garrison, compared with that of Bristol, was balanced by its possession of a tighter, and therefore more easily held, circuit of defence. Aston warned Rupert on 7 August 'I doubt we shall find a hard business of it, being it is fully as strong and better watered than Bristol as also it is a far lesser circuit and a much better soldier (although an ill a traitor as Fiennes was) for the Governor, for certain the water is round about the town'.¹

On 10 August the Royal army formally laid its siege. It seems that an estimated 1,000 musketeers accompanied the two Royal heralds to one of the city's gates.² This force matched in strength that which Massey had boasted he could bring into his garrison several days before.³ On the 10th 'some whisperers gave a malignant intimation that the King's presence would sway the people', as Massey had claimed that it would.⁴ But the show of force did not have this effect. The corporation and Massey's officer corps replied that they would 'obey the commands of his Majesty signified by both houses of Parliament'.⁵ Two delegates were dispatched from the city to convey this defiant response to the the King's quarters.

Immediately upon their return, Gloucester's suburbs were fired from end to end.⁶ A third of the city's housing stock had to be destroyed. The 241 houses outside Gloucester's defensive ring of fortifications must have been abandoned several days

(1) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, ff.281-2.

(2) Clarendon, iii.132-3; BG, pp.209-10; E 67(31); Warburton, ii.281; Rushworth, v.286; Washbourne, pp.52-3; I.Roy, ed. Royalist Ordnance Papers (1971-73), ii.267, 484, note 191.

(3) Warburton, ii.280.

(4) Corbet, p.43.

(5) Ibid, p.44; GNQ, iii.464.

(6) Clarendon, iii.132-3; Corbet, p.45; Warburton, ii.281; May, p.217; BG, p.211; E 67(31).

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previously to create time for incendiaries to be prepared.¹

Parliamentary commentators were full of admiration for Gloucester's stubborn stand. The city seemed to 'stand forlorn, and without hope of rescue in the midst of a large country, possessed by their victorious enemies'.² Charles was not alone in judging that the Parliamentarians were in no position to send relief: 'Waller is extinct and Essex cannot come' he replied to Gloucester's defiant answer.³ Apparently, Massey's embattled command did 'stand alone without help and hope'.⁴

The Royalists, having sustained heavy casualties during the assault on Bristol, decided to take the city 'by approach' rather than by storm.⁵ Charles was assured by most of his military advisors that his objective could be attained within ten days by means of trenchworks, mines and batteries.⁶ Massey was experienced enough to realise quickly what his opponents had decided, as he watched the Royalist pioneers toiling along their lengthening lines of trenches and earthworks. His 1,500 men constituted only a thin line of defence, without reserves or seconds.⁷ The garrison could have been overrun by a well coordinated encircling rush towards the city's defences, as at Bristol. Now, however, the Royalists, engaged in entrenching themselves, were vulnerable to sorties from the city, and Massey was determined to exploit this to the full.

Massey was now fully committed to the defence of Gloucester, even taking excessive risks in the hope of inflicting the

- (1) S.Rudder, Rudder's New History of Gloucestershire (1779), p.111. The total cost of the property destroyed on August 10 was assessed at over £26,000.
- (2) May, p.215.
- (3) Corbet, p.45; May, p.217.
- (4) Ibid, p.39.
- (5) Clarendon, iii.113,134; Warburton, ii.275-6; Washbourne, p.55.
- (6) Clarendon, iii.134.
- (7) Corbet, p.49; May, p.219; Washbourne, p.62.

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maximum damage upon the enemy. With the inhabitants, garrison and corporation united in their resolve to defend the city from the consequences of a Royalist sack, and the King's troops showing extreme caution in their preparations, Massey must have come to consider prolonged defence possible. His earlier doubts and duplicity were forgotten: once the siege was underway and its defiance known, Gloucester fought for its own preservation rather than for the Parliament, and so, in his own way, did Massey.

But Gloucester's continuing resistance could not prevent the convergence upon it of greater Royalist forces. By the end of August, Charles had probably massed close to 30,000 men around the city, by far the largest force he ever commanded in the field.¹ Parliament began to attribute to Gloucester 'no small importance ... to the safety of the whole Kingdom'.² Optimistic promises were made at Westminster that a relief force would be sent, though these were significant only in so far as they may have persuaded Massey and his garrison that they were not about to be left to their fate.³

But the concerns voiced in London were real enough. It was widely believed that, were Gloucester captured, the capital's own security would shortly be menaced by a formidable Royalist advance eastward.⁴ Such fears were openly voiced in the press.⁵ From Pury in Gloucester, correspondence arrived which further heightened the sense of urgency in the Commons.⁶ It was soon resolved to attempt the relief of Massey's garrison, and Essex agreed to

(1) Hutton, p.113; Washbourne, p.62.

(2) Bodl., Tanner Mss.62(1), f.209.


(3) Ibid.

(4) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.274b; R.R.Sharpe, London and the Kingdom (1894), ii.193.

(5) E 65(17): The Parliament's Scout, no.8 Aug 10-17, p.57.

(6) BL, Harleian Mss.165, f.149b.

Main roads and streets



The city walls



The city's earthworks




The city moat



Royalist siege lines



Suburbs fired by Massey



Royalist troops



Parliamentary troops




Royalist batteries




Marshland



Earthen sconces abandoned by Massey



August 10 to September 4 1643.



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undertake the hazardous operation if his forces were adequately recruited and their arrears paid.¹

By the 26th Essex had made a tentative advance towards Aylesbury, but had halted to await supplies and reinforcements, especially from the London trained bands.² On the same day the Lord General promised to begin his march on the morrow, pledging either to relieve Gloucester 'or leave his bones before it'.³ But perhaps Gloucester had already rendered its most valuable service to the Parliamentary cause, by providing through its defiance of the King's overwhelmingly superior forces, a source of inspiration and a rallying point in Parliament's darkest hour.⁴ Massey persisted with offensive tactics wherever and whenever he could, though on 21 August a significant number of his men were killed in a sortie. The Royalists were by now more firmly entrenched: such aggressive tactics were clearly becoming more dangerous.⁵

Clarendon and his colleagues had nothing but admiration for the way that Massey left 'nothing unperformed that became a vigilant commander'.⁶ His conduct throughout the siege consistently aimed to maintain the morale of his troops and the civilian population. Massey never failed to hold out 'rational hopes of success'.⁷ He could also point to the dangers of capitulation, pointing out that the Royalists had violated all their agreements with the garrison and citizens of Bristol.⁸

(1) BL, Harleian Mss.165, f.149b.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.74.

(3) BL, Harleian Mss.165, f.158.

(4) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.274b; Corbet, pp.54,56; Clarendon, iii.134.

(5) ORN, i.487, Mercurius Aulicus 34 1643; Washbourne, p.64; Warburton, ii.283.

(6) Clarendon, iii.167; May, p.218.

(7) Corbet, p.50; May, p.219.

(8) E 65(24): Certain Informations, no.31, Aug 14-21, p.238.

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As time went on, Massey was constrained to reduce the number of his sorties, probably because the consolidation of the King's siege lines and the growing numbers of Royalist troops deployed in forward positions now rendered aggressive tactics too dangerous. Powder for such ventures was also running short. Anyway, Massey was certainly very much on the defensive, and began to concentrate the efforts of his pioneers and civilian volunteers on constructing works within the city, at and between the various gates, to minimize the consequences of any isolated enemy breakthrough.¹ Massey also expertly organised the few cannon he possessed to strafe the Royalist trenches to the maximum effect.²

Towards the end of the siege, with the promised relief nowhere in sight, the continued exertions demanded of the garrison began to take their toll. A deserting cannoneer informed the Royalists that Massey's men were so 'tired with continual duties, that they were not able to stand out long'.³ Dorney recorded, probably years later, that on 29 August 'there was a speech amongst the common soldiers they should have orders to march away'.⁴ Loyal troops surrounded the discontented elements and some men were arrested. [Corbet's account, published shortly after the siege, ignored both this incident and the earlier debate over resistance or surrender.⁵]

By early September, therefore Gloucester's defences were battered and its garrison hard pressed and exhausted; spirits flagged. The city was in imminent danger of falling, or of being forced to surrender, should help not arrive promptly, as

(1) Corbet, p.52; BG, p.217; E 67(31).

(2) Ibid; BG, p.222.

(3) ORN, i.480, Mercurius Aulicus 34 1643.

(4) GNQ, iii.466.

(5) Corbet, p.50.

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informed Royalists were well aware.¹ Parliamentary accounts downplayed the deteriorating situation inside the city walls.

It was at this critical juncture that Essex entered Gloucestershire at Stow on 3 September.² There he brushed aside the tentative resistance of Rupert's cavalry, forcing them westward to the Cotswold escarpment.³ The Royalist forces, strong in cavalry, were better deployed on the open wold than in the Severn Vale, which was divided by hedgerows. Anxious to avoid being caught between Massey's garrison and Essex's army, and acutely short of supplies in the ravaged country, Charles decided to abandon the siege at Gloucester.⁴

On the 5th Essex advanced unimpeded over the high wold country to Prestbury hill, above the small market town of Cheltenham.⁵ There he ordered four of his biggest cannon to be fired, as a signal to Gloucester that its relief was imminent, though an adverse wind prevented the discharge being heard there.⁶ On 4 September, Massey noticed unusual activity in the enemy's various leaguers and camps constructed over the previous four weeks.⁷ Next day the besiegers withdrew their ordnance and foot. Finally, when 'the men were drawn out of the trenches and the rear guard fired their huts', those inside Gloucester could be sure that relief was at hand.⁸

The Royal high command were extremely unwilling to abandon carefully prepared positions, and had good reason to hope, till the last minute that the reduction of the city was imminent.⁹

(1) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.70; Washbourne, p.64.

(2) BG, p.238; E 70(10): A True Relation...Oct 7; BL, Harleian Mss.165, f.169b.

(3) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.70-70b; Clarendon, iii.170.

(4) C.Firth ed., EHR (1898), p.734; Clarendon, iii.170.

(5) BG, p.258; E 69(15).

(6) Corbet, p.55; BG, p.258; E 69(15); BG, p.239; E 70(10).

(7) BG, p.224; E 67(31).

(8) Corbet, p.55; BG, p.226.

(9) N.Tucker ed. Memoirs of John Gwyn, pp.51-2; Corbet, p.55.

MAP 9.

THE RAISING OF THE SIEGE OF GLOUCESTER, September 5 and 6 1643.



KEY.	Main roads	Scene of fighting	Essex's advance	The route taken by Rupert's and Wilmot's cavalry
	Position of Essex's guns when they fired to warn Gloucester	Royalist withdrawal to Painswick		

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Some confusion accompanied their much delayed and therefore hasty withdrawal.¹ Doubtless the Royalist Generals were highly frustrated at the eventual result of the siege. Many men, great quantities of materials and above all, a lot of time, had been expended for nothing.²

Despite the relief and jubilation in the city Massey and his garrison remained on their guard, fearing that the Royalist withdrawal was simply a ruse to draw them out into the field.³ But next morning country people informed the city about Rupert's reverse at Stow and the proximity of Essex: the scarce hoped for relief had finally arrived.⁴

The Lord General expressed great admiration for the way in which Massey had conducted the defence of the city. Although he had expended all but '2 or 3 barrels of powder', the Governor, the Earl related, had 'managed his business with so much judgement and courage that the enemy not knowing of such want, had but small hopes of attaining their desires'.⁵ Such high praise soon reached the ears of Parliament.⁶ Essex also related that the garrison had hopes that its loyalty and prolonged hard service might be substantially rewarded. He believed that Gloucester required numerous reinforcements or 'the enemy will be master to the very gates'.⁷ Essex therefore urged that the Parliament now dispatch immediately the £8,000 to £10,000, and the 1,000 foot, which, he reminded, it had already promised.⁸

- (1) Clarendon, iii.170; BG, pp.227-8; E 67(31); BG, p.231; E 70(10).
- (2) Corbet, p.56.
- (3) Ibid, p.55.
- (4) May, p.220; BG, p.236; E 70(10).
- (5) LJ, vi.218; OPH, xi.393; May, p.222.
- (6) BL, Harleian Mss.165, ff.192-2b.
- (7) LJ, vi.219; OPH, xi.394.
- (8) BL, Harleian Mss.165, f.192b; LJ, vi.219.

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Essex had brought three culverin cannons into Gloucester along with forty barrels of powder,¹ but now withdrew the bulk of his forces to Tewkesbury. The combined effect was to relieve the city of the burden of his troops but to provide a protective umbrella under which Massey could replenish his diminished stores.² This task involved Massey in foraging as far as Herefordshire, since the Gloucester region had been 'ransacked by the enemy'.³ But both Essex and Massey were able to levy contributions from those local Royalist estates left relatively unscathed by the King's army.⁴ By such means 'great' and 'plentiful markets' were held in Gloucester shortly after the siege.⁵ 'The granery was quickly filled', noted Corbet.⁶

Essex was in no position to reinforce Massey with troops.⁷ He was already preoccupied with the march back to London. But there was the problem of the Royal army, now lay astride his path at Sudeley and Winchcombe.⁸ The Royalist high command was anxious to exploit their superiority in cavalry by engaging the Parliamentarians on the open wold country.⁹ When Essex moved North to Tewkesbury the bulk of the Royal army followed, reaching Evesham, with a view to blocking any intended

- (1) BG, p.240; E 70(10); BG, p.261; E 69(15); May, pp.222-3; Corbet, p.57.
- (2) BG, p.261; E 69(15); BG, p.240; E 70(10); E 67(30), p.131; J.Rushworth, ed. Historical Collections.(1721), v.292.
- (3) BG, p.240; E 70(10).
- (4) E 67(14): The Parliament Scout, no.12, Sept 7-12, p.90.
- (5) E 67(8): Mercurius Britanicus, no.3, Sept 5-12, p.24; E 67(12): Mercurius Civicus, no.16, Sept 7-14, pp.121-2.
- (6) Corbet, p.57.
- (7) Ibid, p.58.
- (8) SP, 16/498, f.7; Clarendon, iii.171; T.Carte, ed. Life of Ormonde (1851), v.465; C.Firth ed., EHR (1898), p.734.
- (9) BG, p.240; E 69(10); Clarendon, iii.171.

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Parliamentary advance upon Warwick.¹ The Royalists were keen for an engagement. If the Parliament's main field army could be engaged on ground favourable to its opponents, and destroyed, then the Royalist sacrifices during the siege would not be in vain.² But Essex's deployment to the North of Gloucester was a feint.³ After four days at Tewkesbury, he marched South to Cirencester on 15 September.⁴ The Royalists streamed across the Cotswolds in pursuit.⁵ But the inconclusive battle at Newbury was poor reward for a Royal campaign which in mid-summer had promised so much. Many of the King's party were well aware that vital opportunities had been lost. Back at Oxford recriminations began, amongst emerging Royalist factions which jostled for supremacy.⁶

The relief of Gloucester has rightly been considered the Stalingrad of the English Civil War. The retention of Gloucester as a base for Parliamentary operations prevented the consolidation of a large block of Royalist territory.⁷ Without it, the Royalists could not integrate their strongholds in the West, Wales and South Midlands into a militarily coherent force. The King's effort to establish complete control over the Severn basin and its long established trading systems was also thwarted. As a result, the Royalists were unable to develop their economic and military resources to their full potential.

- (1) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.71-1b; BG, p.240; E 70(10); Clarendon, iii.171; Carte, v.467.
- (2) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.72-2b; Clarendon, iii.134.
- (3) E 69(2), p.2; BG, pp.261-2; E 69(15); Rushworth, v.292.
- (4) BG, pp.261-2; E 69(15); BG, pp.240-1; E 70(10); May, p.223; Rushworth, v.292; ORN, ii.51, Mercurius Aulicus 37 1643.
- (5) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.74; E 69(10), pp.1-2; Clarendon, iii.171-2.
- (6) Clarendon, iii.191-2.
- (7) Corbet, p.56; Clarendon, iii.239.

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But perhaps what Charles regretted most was 'the loss of his precious time in that full tide of victory'.¹

The relief of Gloucester also appears, in retrospect, as a symbolic turning point, which broke a run of swift and spectacular Royalist victories.² Bishop Goodman, writing to the Gloucester corporation in 1649, considered the relief 'the turning of the wheel, for ever after the Parliament's forces prevailed. Which before they did not'.³ This obviously owed much to hindsight. The place of the relief in history was by no means clear in September 1643. London celebrated the safe return of Essex's army, and the city's own trained band regiments, as much as the relief of Massey's garrison. Even so many Royalists looking back on the abortive siege saw it 'as the ruin of the King's affairs'.⁴

The raising of the siege transformed Massey's prospects and his career. Almost overnight he became a national figure, credited by many with rescuing the Parliamentary cause in the hour of its supreme crisis.⁵ It is ironic that Massey was thus lionised, given his earlier attempts to betray the Parliament for profit: it had been the corporation and the officers of the garrison who had decided to resist. Massey had been carried along by events which he could little influence. The zeal and efficiency with which he subsequently conducted Gloucester's defence owed much to his dread of how the Royalists might repay his duplicity should they take the city.

Massey had to admit that the King's supporters had tried to win him over. He made light of such attempts, in order to

(1) Corbet, p.56; Clarendon, iii.239; CSPV 1643-47, p.16.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.274b; Clarendon, iii.171; May, p.220; P.Young, ed. Atkyns, p.29.

(3) Rudder, p.110.

(4) Clarendon, iii.192; P.Young, ed. Atkyns, pp.28-9.

(5) Corbet, p.56; Clarendon, iii.171.

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conceal his own contemplated treachery.¹ The Royalists supposed failure to seduce him was even celebrated in verse;

'Then him of virtue; neither could reward,
Nor battery of court honours break his guard,
Nor promises nor threats an entrance got,
But did return as fruitless as their shot'.²

From obscurity, as Governor of a provincial garrison eclipsed first by Stamford and then by Waller, Massey had suddenly achieved great eminence. He was acclaimed in the popular press as one of the Parliament's heroes. The valour of the Colonel and his garrison became a focus of Parliament's propaganda.³ John Vicars, for example, described Massey as the saviour of London for containing the King at Gloucester.⁴ Thanks to his resolve, Charles was forced to depart 'extreme hungrey and angrey; being thus, both back-beaten, to God's eternal high praise and glory be it everlastingly remembered, to this most noble and renowned Colonel's indelible fame and honour, be it mentioned and to the unutterable joy and comfort of the whole Kingdom'.⁵

Massey's professional competence was praised by persons of diverse political sympathies. Clarendon and the Lord General spoke as one in their praise of his handling of the defensive operations which thwarted the purpose of the seige. Massey naturally hoped that Parliament would reward him as well for defending Gloucester as the King would doubtless have done for surrendering it. The professional soldier had served his adopted masters well, despite himself. As a result his future was linked with theirs more securely than ever before. Time and unforeseen developments were to bring their own disappointments.

(1) May, p.215.

(2) E 316(4): Verses on the Siege of Gloucester and Colonel Massey.

(3) E 65(33): A Continuation, no.52, Aug 17-25, p.2.

(4) Vicars, pp.61-2.

(5) Ibid, pp.62-3.

CHAPTER 4
GLOUCESTER AT BAY, SEPTEMBER 1643-MAY 1644.

If the raising of the siege of Gloucester could be seen as a turning point nationally, its local significance was unclear. No-one could be confident of Gloucester's continuing survival as a Parliamentary stronghold. The city's strategic position had been transformed by the events of July and August 1643. No longer a component part of a large association, it was now an isolated bastion, surrounded on every side by Royalist territory.

The friendly garrisons nearest to Massey's truncated command were at Plymouth, Southampton and Warwick: no sizeable Parliamentary force lay close enough to divert the Royalists from eliminating Massey's garrison, the last remaining obstacle to their complete consolidation of the region.¹ Paradoxically, Gloucester's isolation actually increased its importance to the Parliamentary cause. It lay 'in the heart of the enemys country, like a forlorn hope'. But it was 'maintained not so much for its own sake, or that so much ground might lie under a Parliamentary power, but to divide the King's association, to stop his recruits, to scatter his forces and continually to distract the designs of that army'.²

Massey had attained his independent command, but in circumstances that few soldiers would have chosen. Isolation presented opportunities, making for a 'more free command, and make way for the perfect work of a soldier'.³ But it also involved daunting problems. The position of the Governor of Gloucester was perilous. No local Parliamentary army kept the field. The small garrison was incapable by itself of controlling territory sufficient to levy the contributions necessary to maintain the

(1) Corbet, p.58.

(2) Ibid, p.5.

(3) Ibid.

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command as a viable military entity. Coordinated action by the surrounding Royalist forces threatened Gloucester with slow strangulation.¹

Shortly after the relief the Parliament suggested to the Lord General that Massey should be advanced into 'some place of honour and profit'.² It seems that Massey asked to be replaced in Gloucester on several occasions.³ In November, exasperated by the non-arrival of money and men, he asked the Parliament to put 'a more able Governor into Gloucester and suffer him to go into the Lord General's army, where he might do better service'.⁴ But the Parliament seems to have had second thoughts about Massey's relocation: at one point he expected to 'embrace another command in the General's army', but was commanded by the Parliament to stay at Gloucester.⁵ Various Gloucester gentlemen petitioned Essex for Massey's retention, promising to make 'that Government ... worth his service and employment'.⁶

It is clear that many local citizens were apprehensive and even panic stricken at the prospect of Massey's departure. This was certainly the case when he finally left the city in June 1645.⁷ Anxiety was probably increased by the complete absence of leading local Parliamentarians from the city after the siege. 'All things rested upon the Governor's sole care', recorded Corbet.⁸ The Parliament, having initially raised Massey's hopes of a

(1) Corbet, pp.58-9.

(2) CJ, iii.241; LJ, vi.218.

(3) Corbet, p.62.

(4) ORN, ii.187, Mercurius Aulicus 45 1643.

(5) Corbet, p.59.

(6) CJ, iii.278; Washbourne, pp.79-80.

(7) Bodl., Nalson.Mss 4(4), f.10; CLRO, LCCJB 40, f.132.

(8) Corbet, pp.59-60.

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transfer, now found it inadvisable to remove such a capable commander from a Governorship where he had already proved his worth.¹

The Commons also decided that a Parliamentary Committee for Gloucester should be formed in London, nominating Pury, Stephens, Hodges and others with local connections and interests to serve on it.² The Committee's brief was to consider suggestions made by Massey and his Council of War 'touching the subsistence of that garrison and city'.³ There can be little doubt that Pury was the head of this new, if small, Parliamentary Committee for Gloucester.⁴

Massey had to set about financing his command as best he could from that 'small pittance of the country out of the enemies hands'.⁵ Captain Blaney, the military treasurer, later recalled that 'the garrison of Gloucester was so nearly surrounded with many garrisons of the enemy that contributions at large could not be taxed and collected for the supply thereof, but several persons in and near that city were sent unto for contribution of such sums of money as might serve for the present necessary support of that garrison'.⁶ But such ad hoc measures were insufficient to pay off arrears, especially since none of the monies voted in London had yet arrived.⁷ Rank and file soldiers grew discontented at the lack of reward for their hard service during the siege. Finally 'apprehending more misery than in the late siege' Massey 'was

(1) Corbet, p.59.

(2) CJ, iii.247; BL, Add.Ms.18,778, f.49b.

(3) Ibid.

(4) SP, 16/498, ff.54; CJ, iii.272.

(5) Corbet, p.60.

(6) SP, 24/35, Blaney V Higgs.

(7) Washbourne, p.79.

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constrained to lay some easy taxation on the country to supply the present extingency'.¹

But the Royalists now began to organize their dispositions with a view to increasing Gloucester's difficulties. After the battle of Newbury, their activities in the region were coordinated by Sir William Vavasour, who was created a baronet and granted the military authority to rebuild Lord Herbert's exhausted command.²

In an attempt to prevent Massey's forces raising supplies from the Forest of Dean the King issued a commission to Sir John Winter, former Secretary to Queen Henrietta Maria, confirming the official status of the garrison in his mansion at Lydney. It was now considered vital that Winter's house 'be secured against the attempts of the rebels from Gloucester'.³ After Newbury Lord Chandos returned to his home, at Sudeley castle with 400 foot. These troops effectively blockaded Gloucester to the North West and severely impeded the city's communications with Warwick.⁴

The Royal commissioners for Gloucestershire now sought to complete the city's encirclement without burdening excessively the already ravaged countryside. They planned to establish three key garrisons at Cheltenham, Painswick and Newent. Each would have 600 foot and two troops of horse, 80 men in each troop.⁵ These strongholds would form a tight ring around Gloucester and, it was hoped, starve it into submission. But the plan was never put into

(1) Corbet, p.60.

(2) Bodl., Dugdale Mss.19, f.20; Corbet, p.59; Hutton, p.112; Webb, i.347.

(3) Bodl., Dugdale Mss.19, f.30; GRO, D 421, A,1,8.

(4) Corbet, p.63.

(5) GRO, D 115, f.13.

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effect. The local Royalist command structure remained too decentralised for any common strategy and financial priorities to be agreed.¹

Massey, meanwhile, submitted a summary of his various intelligence reports to the Lord General. Large numbers of enemy soldiers, Essex was informed, lay at Tewkesbury, Sudeley and 'towards Evesham and their full resolutions are to lie at Stroud, Painswick and Cheltenham, on the forest side at Newnham, Mitcheldean and Newent and nearer also'.² Massey also doubted his ability to hold Gloucester without reinforcements: its citizens were weary and disillusioned by military service. He noted that the country people, well aware of the consequences of the garrison holding out, 'dare not, or will not look upon us, being also likely to loose our markets, since we are not able to defend them from the enemies seizure'.³

Massey was able to capture Tewkesbury from Vavasour's Welsh forces in a surprise attack.⁴ But he could not afford the men to garrison the town permanently, and abandoned it shortly after.⁵ Vavasour retired to the security of Hereford, from where combined operations against Gloucester might be planned.⁶ During this crucial period Massey faced a crisis of confidence in his command. Widespread complaints were heard that the new contributions he had levied to support the garrison were unfairly assessed, and that he had failed to take proper account of the ravaged

(1) BL, Harleian Mss.6804, f.121; BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.115b; GRO, D 115, f.13; Bodl. Dugdale Ms.19, f.30; Warburton, ii.357; Hutton, pp.112,115.

(2) Bodl., Nalson Mss.3(42), f.82.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Bodl., Nalson Mss.3(42), f.82; Corbet, pp.62-3.

(5) E 71(21): Mercurius Civicus, no.21, Oct 12-19, pp.164-5.

(6) Bodl., Nalson Mss.3(42), f.82; Corbet, p.63.

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state of the parishes around the city.¹

Resentment was perhaps especially concentrated on Massey because of his almost absolute dominance in local affairs, which itself had arisen mainly as a result of extreme conditions during the city's recent ordeal. Massey's ascendancy was the more glaring in the absence of most leading local Parliamentarians. 'Not one gentleman of the country durst be seen to assist us', recalled Corbet, 'no MP did reside here to encourage the business'.²

In response to such criticisms Massey held a special meeting of his Council of War. It was agreed that some citizens and officers should form a new committee to consider complaints over the assessments and to 'use that moderation which reason did require'.³ The reintroduction of civilian participation was essential, since military rule had alienated public opinion more than was desirable. But the new committee could also relieve the Governor of part of his enormous administrative burden in civil affairs: 'the petitions of the country pressed upon the Governor in such multitudes' that they distracted him from military matters.⁴

Corbet rejoiced that it was never Massey's intention 'to rule by the sword'.⁵ Massey could hardly profit from an image as a military tyrant.⁶ He seems to have seen the new committee as a temporary body, but this did not arise from hostility in principle to civilian influence. After his requests for a transfer were rejected, Massey made it a condition of his continuance as Governor that an official County Committee answerable to Parliament, such as existed elsewhere, be instituted at

(1) Corbet, pp.60-1.

(2) Ibid, pp.59-60.

(3) Ibid, p.60.

(4) Ibid, p.61.

(5) Ibid.

(6) S.S.Webb, The Governors General (1982), p.36.

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Gloucester: he urged that Parliament 'send down a committee, that might take off the former cares'.¹

The Royalists inaugurated their blockade of Gloucester with a proclamation forbidding all trade between the city and London.² The circle of Royalist garrisons was closed with their occupation of Beverstone castle. Their aim was not to 'leave one strong house unguarded, both to enlarge their own quarters and to stop' Gloucester's 'markets and contribution'.³ The whole conduct of the war in Gloucestershire was changing. In spring and summer of 1643, mobile field forces had sought the best ground to engage each other. Now the focus was upon static garrisons, and the retention of territory from which contributions could be extracted - and denied to the other side.⁴

The Parliamentarians were unwilling to engage in pitched battles with the numerically superior Royalists, but the latter's advantage was not so great that they felt able to resume the full scale siege of Gloucester.⁵ In terms of open conflict, therefore, deadlock had been reached: battle was now waged indirectly, as both sides tried by economic means to undermine the other's capacity for survival. The fortified manor house or medieval stronghold became keys to this struggle.⁶

Massey could only hope to secure a tax base for his forces in the city by establishing a ring of out garrisons to

- (1) Corbet, p.62.
- (2) J.F.Larkin, ed. Stuart Royal Proclamations (1983), ii.962-3; Rushworth, v.365.
- (3) Corbet, p.63.
- (4) I.Roy, TRHS (1978), p.134.
- (5) Webb, i.349.
- (6) Washbourne, p.81.

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protect it. Not all his men could easily be quartered in Gloucester anyway.¹ Massey sent his own foot company to occupy a fortified house at Frampton on Severn, nine miles to the South West, which helped check the Royalists at Berkeley, further down the vale.² Enemy forces at Sudeley were contained by a garrison of 150 men under Colonel Devereux at Prestbury, just East of Cheltenham.³ This new garrison also 'did a little to open the passage towards Warwick'.⁴ Finally Massey boldly established a third out-garrison at Westbury on the edge of the Forest of Dean, a full ten miles from the city.⁵ The Parliamentarians based there were soon skirmishing with Sir John Winter's men from Lydney.⁶

Massey's ceaseless exertions were reported in the London press and led to calls for his reinforcement and resupply.⁷ He had successfully established out garrisons, and demonstrated his flexibility by the adoption of hit and run tactics, essential given the unfavourable balance of forces in the region.⁸

The last months of 1643 saw the arrival at Bristol of large numbers of troops from Ireland, shipped across St Georges Channel in order to reinforce the Royalist cause.⁹ Significant numbers,

- (1) Corbet, p.63.
- (2) Ibid; VCH, x.143-4.
- (3) Corbet, p.63; Rudder, p.604.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) Ibid, pp.63-4; Webb, i.355; Hutton, p.116.
- (7) E 74(14): Mercurius Civicus, no.23, Oct 26-Nov 2, pp.271-2.
- (8) E 78(15): The Weekly Account, no.15, Dec 13, p.13; E 78(17): Mercurius Britanicus, no.16, Dec 7-16, p.127; E 78(19): The Parliament Scout, no.25, Dec 8-15, p.213.
- (9) Clarendon, iii.282-3; Carte, v.478; Warburton, ii.320.

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however, defected to Massey immediately after disembarking,¹ though the Gloucester treasury lacked sufficient funds to keep the great majority of them in the Parliament's service.²

Vavasour's growing frustration at his failure to dislodge Massey led to the long drawn out saga of the Backhouse plot.³ John Backhouse, a wealthy Gloucester lawyer, and second in command of Massey's cavalry, was approached by an old friend to betray the garrison to the King's forces.⁴ Backhouse immediately reported the attempt to Massey. The Governor persuaded him to pretend acquiescence in the proposed intrigue, hoping thus to gain access to Royalist plans.⁵ This counter-plot seems to have enjoyed considerable success. Vavasour was for months deceived as to Backhouse's real loyalties and the Gloucester garrison benefited substantially from the respite gained by such misplaced trust.⁶ Backhouse's later publication of an account of his efforts further undermined the naive Vavasour's position within the Royal camp.⁷

By early December Vavasour had moved from Hereford to Bristol to be in a better position to conduct his operations against Gloucester. Sir William expressed the hope to Rupert that he could 'this winter ... block up Gloucester round, and to prevent a handsome army to your highness by the spring'.⁸ He planned to leave Bristol, garrison Painswick and then press on to Tewkesbury. There he would be ideally placed to coordinate

(1) Corbet, p.68; Ludlow, i.80.

(2) E 75(22): The Parliament Scout, no.20, Nov 3-10, p.176; SP, 21/16, f.100.

(3) Corbet, p.75.

(4) BG, pp.287,305; E 45(12): A True Relation of a Wicked Plot...; Corbet, pp.76,84.

(5) BG, pp.288-9; E 45(12); Corbet, p.77.

(6) Ibid, pp.287-324; E 45(12); Corbet, pp.75-86.

(7) Hutton, p.115.

(8) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.155; Warburton, ii.332.

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movements with the forces of Lord Herbert and Winter in the Forest of Dean.¹

Vavasour, however, could not immediately find as many troops as he had expected, and Massey was able to raise '1,500 armed foot and 200 horse'.² Sir William also feared that the Gloucester forces would take the offensive 'to prevent being penned in since the loss of men will rather be an advantage to them'.³ In mid-December, veteran English reinforcements from Ireland, under their able commander Colonel Mynne, were assigned to Vavasour, and proved both loyal and highly professional.⁴ Their arrival made it possible to initiate the long-delayed blockade of Gloucester.⁵ The Royalists set off for Tewkesbury, suffering continual harassment by Massey's forces on the way.⁶ The scale and tenacity of these attacks convinced Vavasour to abandon his original plan of garrisoning Painswick.⁷ But the Royalist commanders were not deflected from the reoccupation of Tewkesbury.⁸

Gloucester's military difficulties were compounded by the inability of its representatives at Westminster to secure any substantial financial support. Massey's letters were referred to them but they could do little.⁹ The reasons were simple.

(1) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.155; Warburton, ii.332.

(2) Ibid, f.157.

(3) Ibid.

(4) BG, p.296; E 45(12); Rushworth, iii.1248; Hutton, p.116; Webb, i.356.

(5) Hutton, p.116.


(6) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.107b; ORN, ii.307, Mercurius Aulicus 1 1644; Corbet, p.68.

(7) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.155.

(8) Ibid, f.4.

(9) CJ, iii.300.

MAP 10.
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AROUND GLOUCESTER, October 1643 to January 1644.



Main roads

Wood land

Castle or
fortified house

Royalist
garrison

Parliamentary
garrison

Royalist garrison
captured by Massey

Scene of fighting

Vavasour's and Mynne's march from
Bristol to Tewkesbury, December 1643

Mynne's march from Tewkesbury
to Newent, January 1644

When Gloucester had been part of a broad association of forces under Waller's command, it had aroused the interest and support of a great many MP's with western interests and connections. But Massey's much diminished command lacked the offensive capacity to win back what had been lost. Western MPs tended therefore, to use their influence to secure financial support for Waller's army of the South East, a more realistic vehicle for reconquest.¹

Massey was not well versed in how such affairs were managed at Westminster, and he must have become increasingly frustrated with Pury's and the Stephens's apparent inactivity. The financial situation grew steadily worse, and by late December the Governor himself was broke.² Part of the problem was that the out garrisons at Presbury, Westbury, Eastington and Frampton naturally kept the contributions they raised for themselves.³ Sometimes they even diverted other valuable income from Blaney's central treasury at Gloucester.⁴ But it was difficult to dispense with such satellites. Massey's urban base depended upon them to 'preserve the country and keep the markets open'.⁵ The Governor himself admitted 'our out garrisons (though of good use) are of great expense thereof unto us'.⁶ Gloucester was provided with victuals and raw materials by its out garrisons, but precious little else.⁷

By early February 1644 Mynne's forces had advanced to Newent, to the North West of Gloucester.⁸ But Vavasour allowed

- (1) CJ, iii.291,300,308.
- (2) SP, 28/228, pt.1, f.67.
- (3) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.18; Corbet, p.70.
- (4) Ibid, f.31b.
- (5) Corbet, p.70.
- (6) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7.
- (7) SP, 28/129, pt.5, ff.31b,33; Hutton, p.116.
- (8) Bodl. Clarendon SP, 27/(2136), f.73; Corbet, p.72; Hutton, p.116.

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himself to be deceived by the Backhouse plot into wasting time.¹ This was lucky for Massey, since his garrison was in no condition to clear the city's immediate neighbourhood, had a concerted attempt been made to invest it.²

By early 1644 the new civilian committee was beginning to assert its control over the administration. 'The Grand Committee', as it began to call itself, issued a document laying down rules for expenditure, including that relating to the garrison. Massey inserted a clause which would allow him to control certain payments by his 'special order'.³ He did agree however that the money raised should only be paid to soldiers that were properly mustered, and that none was to be spent on making good any of the mens arrears.⁴

Within the Grand Committee there existed an inner ring of civilian members whose names appeared frequently on its papers. The leading four were William Shepard, Silvanus Wood, Thomas Lyitt and Edward Broughton.⁵ Silvanus Wood, thirty nine years old in 1644, was the eldest son of Richard Wood of Brookthorp just to the South of the city.⁶ Silvanus was no stranger to the Parliamentary administration of the city or county alike.⁷ He was typical of the active civilians who now rose to prominence in Gloucestershire's Parliamentary war effort. Of middle gentry rank, he was to inherit several manors from his father, and distinguished himself by his keen commitment to the cause when more eminent and established men faltered.⁸ Like Shepard, Lyitt and Broughton, Wood owed his

(1) BG, pp.301-2; E 45(12); Corbet, p.82.

(2) Corbet, p.66.

(3) SP, 28/228, pt.3, f.545.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid, pt.4, ff.773-81,783-4.

(6) T.Fitz-Roy, ed., HSP, (1884), p.207; W.R.Williams, The Parliamentary History of the County of Gloucester (1896), p.57.

(7) A&O, i.169,230.

(8) VCH, xi.67.

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emerging prominence to the absence of the great Gloucestershire Parliamentarians of 1642 and 1643. Sir Robert Cooke was dead; Pury, Hodges and the Stephensens were engrossed in their duties at Westminster.¹

The Royalists had lost time, but they were still strongly placed to starve Gloucester into submission, and made no secret of the fact.² They openly expressed the hope that the city could be reduced by blockade within one month.³ Richard Dowdeswell, a Worcestershire Royalist, organised meetings of country people 'to keep in the rogues at Gloucester' for then 'there would be no living for them'.⁴ The Parliamentary press in London was forced to deny that Gloucester was in any danger.⁵ But the Venetian ambassador recorded rumours that the city was 'now in dire straits, although not besieged', but it was cut off from all relief.⁶

The Royalists redoubled their efforts to establish control of local strongpoints, from which the city's supplies could be choked off; Massey's forces sought counterthrusts to frustrate them. Garrisons were moved around like chess pieces. Winter occupied Newnham in great strength, at his own cost, fortifying the church. From here he could 'run up to the gates of Gloucester, rob the country and take mens persons at pleasure'.⁷ To check his operations across the Severn via Newnham ford, Massey placed a garrison at Arlingham.⁸ This certainly disrupted Winter's communications with Berkeley castle.⁹ Meanwhile, however, Colonel Mynne advanced from Newent and took possession of Highleadon and

(1) Corbet, pp.59-60.

(2) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.112b.

(3) Ibid, f.116.

(4) CCAM, ii.858.

(5) E 31(1): The Weekly Account, no.22, Feb 1.

(6) CSPV, 1643-47, p.68.

(7) ORN, ii.377: Mercurius Aulicus 6 1644; Corbet, p.72.

(8) Ibid; Rudder, p.47; VCH, x.35.

(9) CCAM, iii.1274.

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Taynton, thus blocking access to Gloucester from the North West.¹ All Massey could do was place a garrison at Hartpury court to threaten his lines of communication, should Mynne decide upon further advance.²

In an audacious move, Massey advanced his garrison at Frampton to Slimbridge, in an effort to contain the Royalist garrison at Berkeley, which had become very active under Colonel Veale.³ Slimbridge was supported by two forces to its rear, at Frocester and Eastington.⁴ Such garrisons, to the South West of Gloucester, were established 'to perserve and enable the people to contribution'.⁵ By these means the city continued to fetch 'its livelihood out of the fire'.⁶ Skirmishes with the enemy became part of the out garrisons everyday existence.⁷

Vavasour's tentativeness in his manoeuvrings around Gloucester had already exasperated subordinates such as Mynne and Winter.⁸ Finally, on 5 February, he led a powerful party of horse and foot over the wolds to Painswick.⁹ This forced Massey into confronting his principal antagonist. The Gloucester forces were badly cut up by Vavasour's forces on Brookthorpe hill .¹⁰ But the Parliamentarians managed to preserve all their garrisons in the

(1) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 27/(2136), f.73; Corbet, p.72.

(2) Corbet, pp.72-3.

(3) Ibid, p.73.

(4) Ibid; VCH, x.127-8.

(5) Corbet, p.73.

(6) Ibid.

(7) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7.

(8) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 27/(2136), ff.73-4.

(9) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.26; Hutton, p.116.

(10) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.26; Corbet, p.74; ORN, ii.376: Mercurius Aulicus 6 1644; BG, p.307; E 45(12); E 33(13): The Parliament Scout, no.34, Feb 9-16, p.287.

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vale 'by which means all the bottom was preserved from spoil'.¹ And the immediate advantage gained through Vavasour's victory at Brookthorpe hill was lost the next day, when he abandoned Painswick and returned to Tewkesbury 'laden with plunder'.²


Soon, however, Massey lost the two key garrisons protecting the approaches to Gloucester from the Forest of Dean. Both Huntley and Westbury were betrayed to the enemy.³ To prevent Winter from seizing the Vineyard and blocking Over bridge, a new garrison had to be placed at the village of Churcham, only three miles to the West of Gloucester.⁴

It was vital to the defence of the city that its 'inshire' and Whitstone hundred were kept clear of the enemy.⁵ Contributions could still be brought in even if Massey's range only extended up to between three and seven miles around Gloucester.⁶ The revenues derived from Whitstone hundred alone were quite substantial and must have been vital in the fiscal battle to keep Massey's command afloat.⁷ Supplies could also be gleaned from Painswick and Stroud, and, when immediate circumstances were very favourable, from as far as Wootton.⁸

Vavasour was most fearful of the relief of the garrison at Gloucester, which, freed from its confined quarters, might then move onto a dangerously disruptive offensive.⁹ This was exactly

- (1) Corbet, p.75.
- (2) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.26,29; Corbet, p.75; J.Bennet, The History of Tewkesbury (1830), p.65.
- (3) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.289; Corbet, p.75; ORN, ii.377: Mercurius Aulicus 6 1644; E 34(4): The Parliament Scout, no.35, Feb 16-22, p.295.
- (4) Corbet, p.84.
- (5) BG, p.307; E 45(12); Corbet, p.87.
- (6) Corbet, p.87.
- (7) SP, 28/228, pt.4, f.769.
- (8) SP, 28/37, pt.2, f.180; SP, 28/129, pt.5, ff.31b.
- (9) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.76.

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AROUND GLOUCESTER, February to March 1644.



what Massey and others had in mind.¹ The Royalists certainly put great emphasis and effort into thwarting any attempt to reinforce Gloucester.²

The Royalists in Berkeley hundred felt Massey's presence most heavily. Here his troops committed 'great outrages from certain houses wherein they had placed garrisons'.³ Such was their influence that the Royalist monthly contribution could not be collected. Massey was also able to raid the King's horse quarters close to Berkeley castle, capturing a number of prisoners.⁴ He ordered that a fanfare of 'five trumpets' be sounded in celebration of this triumph upon his re-entry into Gloucester.⁵ His temperament was not such as pass up the opportunity of a symbolic gesture.

Such was the extent of its disillusion with Vavasour's performance, that the Royal Council of War undertook to direct operations around Gloucester itself.⁶ On 24 March, it ordered Vavasour to advance once more on Painswick. Winter was also ordered to support him on the Forest side.⁷ Sir Francis Hawley, acting Governor of Bristol, and Colonel Veale of Berkeley, were also expected to advance and drive Massey's out garrisons from Whitstone hundred and back into Gloucester from the South.⁸

Had these manoeuvres been carefully coordinated and sustained, the result would have been to subject Gloucester to a second siege: some at Oxford expected that Vavasour would soon

- (1) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7.
- (2) E 35(21): The Military Scribe, no.2, Feb 27-March 5, p.14.
- (3) BL, Harleian Mss.6852, f.57; Corbet, p.88.
- (4) E 38(14): Mercurius Civicus, no.43, March 14-21, p.438.
- (5) E 38(18): The Parliaments Scout, no.39, March 15-22, p.329
- (6) BL, Harleian Mss.6852, f.57.
- (7) Ibid.
- (8) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7; BL, Harleian Mss.6852, f.57.

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'besiege Gloucester very close'.¹ Sir William was certainly keen to 'repair his credit in the King's army'.² By 27 March he was near Painswick, vowing to 'clear all these parts of the rebels garrisons'.³

Massey was acutely aware of Vavasour's plans to occupy Painswick 'to keep us in'.⁴ The loss of Painswick would breach Gloucester's ring of out garrisons; as matters stood, no other strong-points would then stand between Vavasour and the very gates of the city.⁵ Massey would be forced to surrender.⁶ Therefore, when the Royalists stormed into Painswick and captured Massey's small garrison there,⁷ the Parliamentarians were forced to abandon their remaining garrisons on the wolds, such as Stroud, and to retreat into the vale.⁸ Massey called in volunteers to guard the roads and passes down the escarpment 'so that the enemy durst not adventure below the hills'.⁹

Vavasour was therefore confined to the wold country around Painswick and Stroud, and wasted it 'to the bear walls', while Massey secured the vale, Gloucester's fertile lifeline.¹⁰ Sir William had once more failed to confine the city closely enough to force its submission. Again the Royalist high command was disappointed by his failure to coordinate his own forces and those at Bristol or in the Forest of Dean. This was not entirely

(1) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.127b-28.

(2) Corbet, p.88.

(3) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.112; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.1.

(4) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7, in which the wrong date is given.
The correct one is 27 March.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Corbet, p.88.

(7) ORN, ii.464: Mercurius Aulicus 13 1644; Corbet, p.89; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.134; BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7; Corbet, p.89.

(8) Corbet, p.89.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid, pp.89-90.

Vavasour's fault; it reflected divisions and vested interests within the Royalist coalition. Though Massey was not aware of it, this latest failure to mount decisive action against Gloucester marked the end of the crisis. Vavasour could try to block the Parliament's relief column (delayed at Warwick since November 1643), and keep up some pressure on the city, but the Royalist high command could no longer afford to keep so many of its soldiers tied down in an indecisive blockade.¹

Massey had proved himself a master of garrison warfare. He had showed himself adept at hit and run skirmishing.² He had displayed good judgement in marshalling his small and over-stretched forces, choosing well the strong-points at which to deploy his out garrisons to greatest effect.³ Corbet thought that during the winter of 1643-44, Gloucester's garrison 'made the best of a bad game, in continual petty services and small parties, yet beyond the strength of the place; not to conquer but to live, not to destroy the King's forces, but to starve off or delude them'.⁴

The theatre of war in Gloucestershire was interrelated with others. The Royalist defeat at Cheriton in Hampshire on 29 March improved the prospects of Massey's embattled redoubt in the lower Severn valley. The King's commanders now feared a general Parliamentary advance into the West, and were forced to think defensively.⁵ To secure the West and protect Oxford, the Royal Council of War looked first to Vavasour's small army

- (1) Hutton, p.117.
- (2) E 80(6): The Weekly Account, no.18, Jan 3, p.2; Hyett, p.4.
- (3) D.Pennington, 'The War and the People', in J.Morrill ed. Reactions to the English Civil War, (1982) p.124.
- (4) Corbet, p.91.
- (5) Sir.E.Walker, Historical Discourses Upon Several Occasions (1705), p.8; Clarendon, iii.342; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.126-7; Carte, vi.85,87; Adair, p.149.

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which had been fruitlessly engaged for so long.¹ On 2 April, Vavasour was ordered to march his Gloucestershire forces to Marlborough to reinforce the King's main field army, newly arrived from Oxford, and to help secure the approaches of the West country.² Sir William was now expected to retain under his independent command only the garrisons of Tewkesbury and Sudeley, and Colonel Mynne's regiment in the Forest of Dean.³ From this point, the Royalists practically abandoned the project of a special force, led by Vavasour and designed to bring about the blockade and reduction of Gloucester.⁴

The Parliamentary relief convoy, so long been delayed at Warwick, was also freed as a result of the general rendezvous at Marlborough, since the various detachments of Oxford horse which barred its path were also summoned to attend.⁵ The road to Gloucester now lay open and the local Parliamentary commanders were quick to take it.⁶ It seems that small parties of horse from Warwick found little difficulty escorting supply-laden pack horses past the remaining Royalist garrisons.⁷ Some supplies were carried thus only as far as Prestbury, where they were transferred to the carts of local country people for the final journey into Gloucester.⁸

(1) Walker, p.8; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.27.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.6802, f.62; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.27.

(3) Ibid; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.126b; Webb, ii.9.

(4) Webb, i.380.

(5) SP, 16/501, ff.76b,98,119; Walker, p.8; W.Hamper, ed. Dugdale's-Life, Diary and Correspondence (1827), p.64; Carte, vi.89.

(6) BL, Add.Ms.18,779, ff.90-91b; Corbet, p.90; Hutton, p.117; Webb, ii.10.

(7) SP, 16/501, f.108; Corbet, p.90.

(8) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.37b; E 42(4): The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, no.49, April 2-10, p.400.

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Massey was now able to take the offensive. The withdrawal of Vavasour's forces allowed him to collect some contributions from southern Worcestershire.¹ Three troops of horse arrived with more supplies from Warwick.² For the first time in many months Massey could operate far from Gloucester and give adequate support to his infantry in the field instead of confining them to out garrisons.

This was a sudden and sharp reversal of fortunes within the county: it became clear that the King's men were now engaged in holding what they had, rather than in moving forward to conquer the whole shire.³ Oxford thought its Royal commissioners could no longer 'with security abide ... in the county (by reason of the present distractions there)'.⁴ As a result, the new sheriff Sir William Morton was vested with the formal powers formerly possessed by the civilian Royal commissioners.⁵

The King also had to consider whether to appoint a new commander for the county. As he himself noted, 'if there be any intermission of care in command all will be presently possessed by the rebels'.⁶ Three candidates soon emerged. Vavasour himself hoped to be retained, because of his friendship with Rupert, and there were two prominent local noblemen, Lord Chandos and Viscount Conway.⁷ After some delay, however, Rupert decided to reject all three, and to select instead the hardened English veteran from Ireland, Colonel Nicholas Mynne.⁸ A professional outsider like

(1) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.65b.

(2) E 43(11): The Parliament Scout, no.43, April 11-18, p.364; Corbet, p.90.

(3) BL, Harleian Mss.6802, f.69.

(4) Ibid, 6804, f.119.

(5) Ibid, ff.119-19b.

(6) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.69; C8, f.358.

(7) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.16,134; Hutton, p.118.

(8) Corbet, p.97; Webb, ii.10.

Massey, Mynne was not a choice best calculated to satisfy the local Royalist gentry establishment.¹

The Parliament at last began to consider Gloucester's affairs systematically, and to devote time towards the city's 'relief and maintenance'.² An ordinance was also brought forward 'for reducing the other parts of Gloucestershire to the obedience of the King and the Parliament'.³ This began to proceed through both houses during mid-April.⁴

Massey was very anxious that his command be reinforced by more cavalry because it was of 'such great consequence'.⁵ The authorities at Westminster soon realised that Gloucester had the potential to strike offensive blows at the heart of the Royalist domain. On 17 April the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered Colonel Purefoy to take his Warwickshire regiment of horse to reinforce Massey.⁶ The immediate purpose of Purefoy's expedition was to 'remove or take the garrisons that lay around the city'.⁷ This was an essential precondition for establishing for Gloucester an aggressive expansionist role: the garrison first needed undisputed space, in which it could recruit and levy contributions.

As soon as Purefoy arrived Massey drew his regiment out with some of his Gloucester forces to confront Mynne at Newent.⁸ Anxious to avoid being boxed in for a second time, Massey had besieged him there before, Mynne hastily withdrew to Ross. He fired one of his out garrisons at Highleadon court on the way.⁹

- (1) Hutton, pp.118-9.
- (2) CJ, iii.455.
- (3) Ibid, 453.
- (4) Ibid, 455,458; LJ, vi.517,524.
- (5) LJ, vi.525.
- (6) SP, 21/18, f.70; Webb, ii.16.
- (7) Corbet, p.91.
- (8) Ibid, p.92.
- (9) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 27/(2136), f.75.

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
At Ross, where he rushed to fortify the church, Mynne was joined by some of Winter's troops from the Forest of Dean.¹

Aware of their strategic advantage, the Parliamentarians marched confidently on, to Ledbury in Herefordshire. Mynne had to leave that county's border undefended because of his lack of numbers.² At Ledbury, Massey began to levy contributions vigorously from the surrounding communities.³ In this area of wide Royalist support, he did not scruple against plundering 'all places about him'.⁴ Such was the relative security of Massey's and Purefoy's position at Ledbury that they were able to mount a powerful show of strength in the direction of Hereford.⁵ But they lacked sufficient numbers to launch any serious attack on the city itself. Immediate withdrawal to Gloucester was in any case necessary, since Rupert had appeared at Evesham with a considerable body of horse and dragoons.⁶

Aware of the initiative presented to them by the void in the local Royalist high command, Massey and Purefoy, after four days rest at Gloucester, directed a new offensive against Winter's garrisons in Dean on 6 May.⁷ Supported by Purefoy's horse Massey's Gloucester forces stormed into Westbury, the Royalist garrison that had most immediately prevented their westward advance.⁸ Another small detachment was able, with a little luck, to

- (1) Corbet, p.92; Webb, ii.17.
- (2) Webb, ii.18.
- (3) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.94; ORN, iii.65: Mercurius Aulicus 19 1644; Rushworth, v.737; Dugdale, p.66.
- (4) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.94.
- (5) Corbet, p.92.
- (6) E 43(16): The Scottish Dove, no.27, April 12-19, p.211; Rushworth, v.737; C.Firth ed., EHR (1898), p.736.
- (7) BG, p.327; E 50(17): 'Eben-ezer'; Rushworth, v.737; Corbet, p.92-3; Webb, ii.28.
- (8) Corbet, p.93; BG, p.327; E 50(17); Rushworth, v.737; E 47(25) Chief Heads...no.1, May 8-15, p.7.

MASSEY'S AND PUREFOY'S OPERATIONS IN HEREFORDSHIRE, April to May 1644.



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capture the Royalist garrison at Little Dean just to the North.¹ The lightness of his losses on the 6th encouraged Massey to advance further the following day, along the bank of the Severn to Newnham.² Here, after a confused fight his forces seized the circular earthwork and the church around which the majority of Winter's garrison had been based.³

The London news-sheets soon proclaimed Massey's feat of capturing three enemy garrisons in two days.⁴ One reported 'many garrisons have done bravely, but Massey at Gloucester hath exceeded them all'.⁵ A further 171 Royalists were captured at Newnham, including supplies of powder, match, arms and Winter's four pieces of ordnance.⁶

The road to Winter's mansion at Lydney, the White Cross, was now open. But Massey and Purefoy found the house well fortified and received a defiant answer from Sir John's wife.⁷ Even more alarming was the intelligence that Mynne, Winter and Lord Herbert had finally been roused into coordinated action by the loss of the Dean garrisons. Advancing from Ross they had organized a rendezvous at Coleford, from where they were well placed to march to the relief of Lady Winter.⁸

- (1) Corbet, p.93; BG, p.327; E 50(17); Rushworth, v.737; E 47(25), p.7; E 47(19): The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, no.54, May 7-14, p.343.
- (2) Ibid; BG, p.328; E 50(17).
- (3) Ibid; Corbet, p.94; Rushworth, v.738; VCH, x.31.
- (4) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.298, BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.161; E 47(26): The Parliament Scout, no.47, May 10-17, p.244.
- (5) E 47(29): The Scottish Dove, no.31, May 10-17, p.244.
- (6) E 47(19), p.343; BG, p.328; E 50(17); BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.137b; CJ, iii.490; Vicars, p.64.
- (7) F.A.Hyett, TBGAS, (1893-94), pp.101-2; ORN, iii.82: Mercurius Aulicus 21 1644; BG, p.329; E 50(17); Webb ii.30.
- (8) Corbet, p.95; Rushworth, v.738; Webb, ii.30.

KEY

Main roads

Wood land

Castle or fortified house

Royalist garrison

Parliamentary garrison

Massey's and Purefoy's advance from Gloucester

Royalist garrisons seized by Massey and Purefoy

Massey's and Purefoy's advance from Newnham to Lydney and withdrawal towards Gloucester

Mynne's and Winter's advance from Ross towards Lydney

MAP 13.

MASSEY'S AND PUREFOY'S SEIZURE OF THE DEAN GARRISONS, May 6 and 7 1644.



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A withdrawal to Gloucester was prudently agreed. The Parliamentarians had to absorb three new garrisons and half the forest division, a daunting enough prospect in itself. Before their departure from Lydney, Massey and Purefoy plundered the entire neighbourhood.¹ Winter's three iron mills and furnaces 'the main strength of his estate and garrison' were also fired.²

The heartening story of Massey's exploits soon reached the Houses at Westminster.³ The Commons voted that Purefoy's regiment should remain at Gloucester.⁴ Massey still depended for his offensive capacity upon reinforcements from outside the county. The more territory and resources he could secure by such aggressive campaigning the more troops his command could sustain. Both city and county still lay in a bitterly contested and economically depressed war zone. Yet the strategic position of the Gloucester command had markedly improved. With the removal of Vavasour's forces the Royalists lacked the capacity to take the offensive. Reinforced from outside the shire Massey could begin to carry the war to the depleted, scattered and leaderless Royalist forces on the county's periphery.

For these reasons, the war was increasingly to be fought on the borders of the shire and in the Royalist held counties beyond. Gloucester's security and survival, after its long ordeal, was finally guaranteed. The Royalist position within the county now became increasingly difficult. Gloucester could at last begin to assume its function as the lynch pin of an area of Parliamentary influence at the heart of three converging Royalist territories.⁵ The battle for the city was over, that for the shire was about to begin.

(1) ORN, iii.69, Mercurius Aulicus 19 1644.

(2) Corbet, p.35; BG, p.329; E 50(17); Rushworth, v.738; Washbourne, p.87.

(3) BL, Add.Mss.18,779, ff.105-06b; BL, Harleian Ms.166, f.161

(4) CJ, iii.488.

(5) Duffy, p.151.

CHAPTER 5.
SECURING THE SHIRE, MAY-DECEMBER 1644.

By early May 1644 conditions in Gloucestershire had so improved for the Parliamentarians, that they felt able for the first time to set up a mainly civilian administration, of the type now normal in securer parts of the country. On May 10 the Commons passed an ordinance establishing a County Committee, which replaced the stop-gap 'Grand Committee', at Gloucester.¹

Appointed to this body were Sir Robert Harley, Gloucestershire's long absent MPs (including most prominently the Stephens's, Pury and Hodges), and the mayor and recorder of Gloucester. The last named would, it was hoped, help to forge a union of city and county interests on the Committee. The military was represented by Massey himself.² Members of the old Grand Committee such as Silvanus Wood, William Shepard and Edward Broughton, were also included in the new body, largely for their administrative experience. Issac Bromwich from Frampton on Severn was the most prominent newcomer.⁴

The reorganised system ended the strict division between the civilian and military aspects of the city's government. The military's success in securing the county gave rise to favourable conditions for a reassertion of civilian rule. But there were sources of tension - reasons why the military authorities could not simply be cast aside. Pragmatic Gloucestershire gentlemen found it advisable to look to Massey to 'secure themselves

(1) A&O, i.428; E47(12): Ordinance of the Lords and Commons...

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid; Williams, Parliamentary History of Gloucester, p.159.

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from spoil and the soldiers violence'.¹ By June a Parliamentary news-sheet could claim that the 'whole county of Gloucester do now generally come in to him'.²

With the approaches of the Forest cleared and Purefoy's regiment still available, Massey was well placed to unleash a new offensive. His principal aim was to further fracture the ring of Royalist garrisons created to contain him.³ Frustrated at Tewkesbury, Massey and Purefoy marched on Ross, determined to carry the war to the Royalists, in the manner of earlier forays into Herefordshire, as well as to 'raise moneys for the garrison out of the remoter parts'.⁴ The fortuitous capture of the Royalist Governor of Beverstone castle by a patrol from Gloucester led to Massey's rapid abandonment of Ross soon after his arrival there.⁵ Beverstone was more important: its capture would 'free the clothiers of Stroudwater from the bondage of that Government'.⁶ Its fall would also disrupt the vital Royalist communications between Bristol and Oxford.⁷

When, on 23 May, Massey and Purefoy appeared before Beverstone, its demoralised garrison soon surrendered.⁸ Captured Royalist officers provided valuable intelligence about the weaknesses of the King's garrison at Malmesbury, a market town just to the South East, commanding the North West corner of Wiltshire. Massey's summons of Malmesbury was defiantly

(1) Corbet, p.95.

(2) E 50(18): Mercurius Civicus, no.54, May 30-June 6, p.531.

(3) Hutton, p.147.

(4) Corbet, pp.96-7; Webb, ii.32; BG, p.329; E 50(17).

(5) BG, p.330; E 50(17); Corbet, p.97; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.67b, Rushworth, v.738.

(6) Corbet, p.97.

(7) *Ibid*, pp.97-8.

(8) *Ibid*, p.98; BG, p.331; E 50(17); BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.300; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.67b; Vicars, p.64.

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
refused, but he successfully stormed it the following day.¹

Malmesbury now commanded a wedge of Parliamentary territory, driven between the Royalist lines of communication from Bristol and the Dorset ports to Oxford.² It also compromised the Royalist control of northern Wiltshire.³ Massey's military reach, and therefore his responsibilities had dramatically widened. In just eighteen days he had taken eight Royalist garrisons and killed, wounded or captured 600 men.⁴ Massey's and Purefoy's forces raided as far South as Chippenham, Calne and Devizes, before falling back to their new garrisons at Beverstone and Malmesbury, and then, in early June, to Gloucester itself.⁵ The authorities at Westminster allowed Massey to choose the new Governor of Malmesbury, and he appointed Colonel Nicholas Devereux.⁶

In early June, Purefoy and his regiment were at last recalled, to Warwickshire,⁷ leaving Massey seriously short of cavalry. The Commons expressed the hope that Massey's own horse regiment, commissioned in late 1643, would soon be recruited.⁸ The Parliament also decided to reward Massey for his valuable services with an estate, yielding £1,000 a year, created from the

- (1) Corbet, pp.98-100; BG, pp.333-4; E 50(17); Rushworth, v.739; Vicars, p.64; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.68.
- (2) E 50(5): The Scottish Dove, no.33, May 24-31, p.263; BG, p.335; E 50(17); Corbet, p.103; Harrison, p.234.
- (3) Harrison, pp.240-1,257.
- (4) Washbourne, p.88.
- (5) BG, p.335; E 50(17); Corbet, p.100; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.141; HMC, 15 Report, p.34.
- (6) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.68; BG, pp.331,336; E 50(17); CJ, iii.511; SP, 16/502, f.79.
- (7) SP, 16/502, f.4; SP, 21/16, f.29; BG, p.336; Corbet, p.100.
- (8) SP, 21/7, f.38; SP, 21/18, f.113.

MASSEY'S INVASION OF NORTH WEST WILTSHIRE, May to June 1644.



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confiscated lands of various Royalists, including Sir John Winter in the Forest of Dean.¹

Massey's new responsibilities transformed him from a provincial garrison Governor into a regional commander. As a result he rose higher in the list of the Parliament's broader strategic priorities. The Committee of Both Kingdoms began to inform him of events in London and York.² It asked him to send to it, in return, regular dispatches concerning his own operations. This, Massey was assured, would enable the Committee to determine more accurately and promptly the needs of his command.³ Maintaining such a regular correspondence was time consuming, but Massey always tried to fulfil consistently the Committee's request.⁴

The Committee of Both Kingdoms also wrote to Massey confirming that the Gloucester Committee at Westminster had 'been ever upon all occasions earnest solicitors' for his supply.⁵ It also sought to reassure him that the Committee had praised his 'faithfulness and industry' as Governor of Gloucester.⁶ It seems that such assurances were designed to allay doubts on Massey's behalf, concerning both the Gloucester Committee's efficiency, and its loyalty to him.⁷

In Gloucestershire, on 6 June, a detachment of Massey's forces, commanded by the recently arrived Major Robert Hammond, successfully took Tewkesbury,⁸ which remained in Parliamentary hands for the rest of the war, securing the northern approaches of the county from the Royalists at Worcester. The Royalist cause

(1) CJ, iii.3; BG, p.337; E 50(17); BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.300.

(2) SP, 21/7, f.76.

(3) SP, 21/18, ff.104-5.

(4) Bodl. Tanner Mss.61, f.106.

(5) SP, 21/18, f.104; SP, 21/7, f.78.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

(8) Corbet, pp.100-2; Rushworth, v.740; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.303; DNB, viii.1132.

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in the county was further undermined by forces under the command of Sir William Waller, which now began operating in the eastern hundreds of the shire.¹ These had long been under Royalist control. Many, sensing that the crown's grip on the county was weakening, presented themselves at Waller's headquarters and compounded for their delinquency.²

Waller was now able to consider an offensive against Sudeley castle, the most important Royalist garrison left in the region, requesting and receiving help from Massey in the operation.³ The stronghold, and the Royal sheriff Sir William Moreton, surrendered to Waller and Massey on 10 June.⁴ George Massey, Edward's younger brother, was installed as Sudeley's new Governor, presumably with Waller's consent.⁵ With the fall of Sudeley, Royalist influence in eastern Gloucestershire shrank, and it became confined to the borders of Warwickshire and Oxfordshire. It marked the collapse of Royalist strategy for the county's conquest and control; no concerted operations were possible, now that so little territory within the county remained in the King's hands.

Two other pockets of Royalism remained. Winter still controlled half the Forest division from his house at Lydney, and the King's garrisons at Berkeley and Bristol secured the extreme South West of the county. But Massey had succeeded in reducing the majority of the shire 'into a reasonable condition of ease and security'.⁶

(1) SP, 21/16, f.22..

(2) E 50(35): The Parliament Scout, June 6-13, p.408.

(3) SP, 21/16, f.21-2; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.72; ORN, iii.114: Mercurius Aulicus 24 1644; Corbet, p.103.

(4) SP, 21/16, ff.26-7; Rushworth, v.740; Corbet, p.104.

(5) Washbourne, p.90.

(6) Corbet, pp.103-5.

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At the same time, however, relations between the military and civil authorities at Gloucester worsened. As the strategic situation became more secure, officers felt more able to air their various resentments, the new civilian authorities became more determined to establish their right to participate in the conduct of the war, and Massey sought to retain his great authority, accumulated during Gloucester's months of trial.

By early June the newly established County Committee was criticising certain officers of Massey's administration, including Captain Blaney the military treasurer, perhaps finding them too subservient to the Governor.¹ Massey, as the only military officer on the Committee, must have been aware of the resentment and assertiveness of its civilian members. He was sufficiently worried by such problems to be eager to confront the Commons with them in person. But the houses ruled against his being allowed to travel up to London to argue his case.²

The Parliament's regional military fortunes worsened sharply in late June. Waller was defeated by the King's Oxford army at Cropredy bridge. The Royal forces, anxious not to burden loyal Oxfordshire unduly, then retreated into the eastern fringes of Gloucestershire.³ With the King's army suddenly commanding the field, Gloucestershire once more stood in 'danger of ruin'.⁴ However, on receiving at Evesham the news of Marston Moor, Charles decided to march West in the hope of trapping Essex.⁵ This removal of the main Royalist field army meant that the balance of forces resulting from the May and June campaigns remained favourable

(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.40.

(2) CJ, iii.525; Washbourne, p.88.

(3) SP, 21/16, f.94; Carte, vi.199; Adair, pp.163-65; BL, Add.Mss.17,062, f.39b; Walker, p.35; Warburton, ii.473; Dugdale, p.71.

(4) SP, 21/16, ff.98-99; Corbet, pp.106-7.

(5) Walker, p.37; Clarendon, iii.371-2,385.

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to the King's opponents. Massey had consolidated his position in Gloucestershire, confirming Parliament's supremacy there. A Royalist, lamenting that 'Gloucestershire is lost totally', was exaggerating, but only slightly.¹

In Gloucester, however, discord was growing amongst Massey's officers, who seem to have resented his authoritarian style of command. This had been adopted during the crisis of 1643, and never subsequently abandoned, despite its increasing inappropriateness now the emergency had passed, the scope and complexity of the command had enormously expanded. Obviously this changed situation meant that a broader base of decision-making was both possible and necessary. Massey himself was an obstacle to this. Contemporaries ranked vanity and jealousy high amongst his failings.² Even Corbet thought him 'jealous of honour'.³

Others saw the Governor's envy expressed in spiteful behaviour towards his more able subordinates.⁴ Despite the high local status of Massey's position as Governor, he had attained only the comparatively modest military rank of Colonel. [Perhaps his failure to achieve the rank of Major General, like Richard Browne at Abingdon, derived from his superiors' belief that he commanded too few men to merit such an exalted rank.⁵] Securing unquestioned obedience may not, therefore, always have been easy. This may be the reason why Massey posted the only other commissioned Colonel in his command, Nicholas Devereux, far away from Gloucester as soon as the opportunity presented itself. Massey could also exercise favouritism and nepotism, making his brother George Governor of Sudeley.

(1) Carte, vi.152.

(2) Washbourne, p.95; CCSP, ii.177.

(3) Corbet, p.96.

(4) BL, Loan, 29/174, f.85.

(5) DNB, iii.54.

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Officers of the Earl of Stamford's regiment, Massey's initial power base, were becoming increasingly frustrated at his behaviour. Edward Grey, as its Major, carried all the responsibility of running his kinsman's regiment, but gained little prestige. It was probably he who led his officers to complain in writing to the authorities at Westminster about Massey's conduct.¹

Massey must have regarded this as disloyal and unwarranted.² But his record of military success proved to be his salvation.³ The Committee of Both Kingdoms thought that Grey and his supporters had done Massey an injustice in even petitioning the Lord General against him.⁴ Grey's case was further weakened by divisions amongst the officers of his regiment as to what allegations they should forward to London. Some of the more outspoken criticisms against the Governor was later disclaimed by them in writing.⁵

The contesting factions were warned that Gloucester could be put in danger by such internal distractions. Rather optimistically it was hoped that all concerned would forget the past and work together in the future.⁶ The Committee of Both Kingdoms thought that a 'private grudge or emulation' was behind the divisions at Gloucester.⁷ There can be little doubt that Major Grey's challenge to the monopoly which Massey had established over the garrison's command structure was related to the frustration of his own career prospects. But Massey's pragmatism and lack of ideological commitment to the Parliamentary cause may also have become obvious to those who served under him.

(1) SP, 21/18, f.212; CJ, iii.549.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid, f.213.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid, ff.212-13.

(7) Ibid, f.213.

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In early August, troops under Colonel Thomas Stephens, long since appointed sheriff by Parliament, and Colonel Edward Harley, arrived to reinforce the garrison at Gloucester.¹ The new sheriff was the eldest son of Edward Stephens of Little Sodbury, and a rising member of the shire's most consistent and prominent Parliamentary family.² Edward Harley, the eldest son of Sir Robert Harley, had recently been commissioned to raise a regiment of foot in Gloucestershire.³

Upon his arrival in Gloucestershire Thomas Stephens began to recruit his own cavalry regiment rather than Massey's mounted forces.⁴ This breached an earlier agreement that ~~that~~ no new cavalry troops should be raised until Massey's regiment had been completed,⁵ and helps explain Massey's resentment.⁶ The urgency with which Stephens raised his new troops reflected the County Committee's desire for a force under the command of a local Parliamentary gentleman rather than a professional soldier and outsider.

The cavalry brought to Gloucester by Stephens and Harley certainly strengthened Massey's position in the field.⁷ His reinforcement was timely, since Mynne had resolved to advance on Gloucester, ordering for the purpose a general rendezvous of the Herefordshire and Worcestershire forces at Corselawn.⁸ Massey called a Council of War at his lodgings, to plan the repulse of Mynne's offensive.

It was at this critical juncture that the long-repressed rivalries and frustrations within the Gloucester command boiled

(1) Corbet, p.108; BL, Loan 29/174, f.44; Webb, i.66.

(2) T.Fitz-Roy, ed., p.176; GNQ, v.36-7.

(3) BL, Loan 29/174, f.44; DNB, viii.1276; Corbet, p.105.

(4) SP, 21/16, f.209.

(5) BG, pp.336-7; E 50(17); CJ, iii.511.

(6) SP, 21/16, f.209.

(7) Rushworth, v.740.

(8) Corbet, p.109; Webb, ii.66.

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over into violence. At the meeting, Major Hammond, a strong supporter of Massey, antagonised Major Grey. The dispute continued, with swords, in the street, and Grey received a wound in the neck, which proved fatal.¹

This incident caused widespread disorder throughout the garrison.² Corbet recorded that certain officers of Stamford's regiment used Grey's death to further their 'own discontent' and 'fell off the hinges'.³ Whether political differences lay behind this crisis must remain a matter of speculation. Perhaps Grey no longer believed in the sincerity of Massey's attachment to the cause of Parliament. It is possible that those closest to the Governor knew of his attempt to surrender the city in August 1643.

At any rate, it was in this dangerous situation that Massey had to lead an expedition from Gloucester to meet the advance of Mynne. It seems that the majority of the foot were not prepared to leave the city.⁴ But the bulk of the horse were prepared to follow Massey. Even so his position was precarious: a military victory was more urgently needed than ever before.⁵ It materialised in spectacular style, when Massey's mounted forces almost annihilated Mynne's foot regiment at Redmarley. Mynne, Massey's most persistent and professional adversary, was killed and most of his officers and men were captured.⁶ The only significant Parliamentary casualty was Edward Harley who received a wound in the shoulder.⁷

(1) Bodl., Tanner Mss.61, f.106; SP, 21/16, ff.148-9; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.329b; Corbet, p.109; Rushworth, v.740.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Corbet, p.110.

(4) SP, 21/16, ff.149-50; Corbet, p.111.

(5) Ibid, f.150.


(6) Bodl., Tanner Mss.61, f.106; SP, 21/16, f.150; Corbet, pp.110-11; CJ, iii.583; E 4(28): Mercurius Civicus, no.63, Aug 1-8, p.598.

(7) Bodl. Tanner Mss.61, f.106.

MAP 15.

THE BATTLE OF REDMARLEY, August 3 1644.

The exact location of the battle of Redmarley is open to speculation. The representation here is based on all the available evidence.



KEY

Main roads

Country lanes

Hedgerows (conjectural)



Parliamentary troops

Royalist troops

Massey's advance from Eldersfield

Massey's attack on Mynne's position



The rout of Mynne's forces

This defeat was a heavy blow against the Royalist cause locally.¹ Southern Herefordshire and Worcestershire now lay practically undefended: Massey could raid them almost at will.² The improved military situation strengthened his hand against the remaining discontented officers. But Massey's authority now faced a new challenge - from the County Committee. In early August Thomas Pury and other absent members reached Gloucester from London.³ Their arrival signalled a new clash of wills.

The County Committee was able to use its influence in the Commons to persuade the house to pass, on 7 August, a series of instructions which, if implemented, would re-introduce the mechanisms of civilian control over the Gloucester garrison.⁴ When Massey's civilian rivals on the County Committee attempted to deny his joint authority to command the troops of the garrison, he decided to act. He boldly appended to the instructions a clause excluding himself from its provisions.⁵ He was able also to persuade Parliament to uphold his sole right to hold Colonelcies at Gloucester in both foot and horse regiments, which tended to strengthen his position in relation to individuals such as Stephens.⁶

But the core problem had not been resolved and continued to trouble Massey's sensitivities. He was eventually driven to confront the Parliament in person. On 14 August the Commons was surprised to hear that its Governor of Gloucester was at the door of the house. He was called in twice and on the second

(1) Corbet, p.112; Webb, ii.69-70.

(2) E 6(32): The Weekly Account, no.51, Aug 14-21, p.258; Hutton, p.149.

(3) CJ, iii.575; E 4(23): The Weekly Account, no.49, July 31-Aug 7, p.237; E 6(32): The Weekly Account, no.51, Aug 14-15, p.258.

(4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.61, f.41; CJ, iii.583-4.

(5) Ibid. This may have been linked to Major Grey's earlier and ill fated pretensions.

(6) CJ, iii.584.

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occasion his 'great valour and fidelity' were acknowledged 'in the whole course of his Government in that place'.¹ But Massey was also promised the 'favour and protection of the Parliament' which was probably the objective of his journey.²

The Parliament was keen that he return as quickly as possible to his responsibilities.³ Yet Massey stayed in the capital for two weeks, and was supported by the London newsheets against the claims of Major Grey.⁴ Only towards the end of August, satisfied of the failure of further attempts to discredit him in the eyes of the Parliament, did Massey undertake the return journey to his garrison.⁵

Back in Gloucester, Massey became increasingly exasperated with the independent attitude of the County Committee.⁶ He had long been used to wield unchallenged power in the military affairs of the county, and threatened, rather theatrically, to resign rather than tolerate civilian intrusion into this jurisdiction.⁷ There were also policy differences. The County Committee was reluctant to finance military operations far from Gloucester, and even began to describe Massey's professional officer corp as being 'unnecessary to the service'.⁸ Massey's response was to urge the Committee of Both Kingdoms to restrain this interference into the running of his military Government.⁹

(1) BL, Harleian Mss.166, ff.106b-107; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.155; CJ, iii.589.

(2) E 6(28): The London Post, no.2, Aug 20, p.7.

(3) CJ, iii.589.

(4) E 4(23): The Weekly Account, no.49, July 31-Aug 7, p.237.

(5) E 7(13): The Weekly Account, no.52, Aug 28-Sept 4, p.421.

(6) SP, 21/16, ff.209-10.

(7) Ibid, f.209.

(8) Ibid, f.212.

(9) Ibid.

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Eventually, Parliament's war executive Committee reminded Pury, Stephens and Bromwich that Massey was commander in chief of all their forces. The Gloucestershire County Committee was also warned to comply with its Governor, a 'person of whose judgement and fidelity to the public the commonwealth has received ample testimony'.¹ But having gained control of the Gloucester finances, the County Committee began to deny funds to Massey's cavalry forces, which led to increased rates of desertion.² Committee control of the general expenses account led to similar problems among the local scout forces and the spy and intelligence network which it financed.³ Massey perceived that this financial policy was shaped by the Committee's 'resolution not to support a strength above the constant number required by these garrisons'.⁴ Corbet confirmed that the Committee had no interest in sustaining the military strength necessary to provide for a marching brigade.⁵

What was the thinking behind the County Committee's new defensive strategy? It was precisely that of the deputy lieutenants of 1642 and early 1643. The Committee saw its chief function as protecting the city and the shire, an objective largely achieved by the ring of out garrisons created during the spring and summer of 1644. Unlike Massey, the Committee members did not see Gloucester as a spring board for offensive operations against the enemy in surrounding shires. They may have feared the success of such forays as much as their failure. For while failure risked all that had been won, success threatened the reimposition of military preponderance in local government.

- (1) SP, 21/19, f.22.
- (2) SP, 21/16, f.244; Corbet, p.115.
- (3) Ibid, ff.245-6; Corbet, p.115.
- (4) Ibid, f.245.
- (5) Corbet, p.116.

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In mid-September Massey was informed that the remnants of Langdale's northern horse, under Colonel Tuke, had decided to join Rupert at Bristol via the Beachley and Aust ferry.¹ The ferry had taken on a new and vital strategic significance for the Royalists, since their opponents now controlled all the Severn crossing points from Tewkesbury to Newnham.² Rupert shipped across the estuary to Beachley a party of 5-600 horse and foot, to support Sir John Winter's forest forces and those at Chepstow.³ Beachley was easy to fortify because it lay on a narrow spit of land between the estuaries of the Severn and the Wye.⁴ But Massey could hardly allow such a bridgehead to be established and was determined to destroy it at all costs.⁵ He set off for Beachley, and was joined on the way by Major Robert Harley, whose elder brother, Colonel Edward Harley was unable to appear, having left for London to have his wound treated.

Colonel Stephens's horse troops, upon which Massey had been depending, failed to arrive, delaying the operation.⁶ Massey had ordered Stephens to join his forces in the Forest of Dean. The sheriff, with astonishing boldness, denied that his men were under Massey's command at all, basing this upon the ordinance passed by the Parliament on 15 August 1642 'concerning the power given to the deputy lieutenants of the county at that time'.⁷ This amounted to a reassertion of civilian control of the local war effort

- (1) SP, 21/16, f.245; Corbet, p.116; Rushworth, v.741; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.270.
- (2) Corbet, p.103; VCH, x.56; Webb, ii.75-6.
- (3) SP, 21/16, f.246; Corbet, p.116; Rushworth, v.741; Philips, i.257.
- (4) Ibid; E 10(17): The True Informer, no.47, Sept 21-28, pp.349,351.
- (5) SP, 21/16, f.246; Corbet, p.116; Rushworth, v.741.
- (6) BL, Loan 29/174, ff.67,74; DNB, viii.1276.
- (7) SP, 21/16, f.268; BL, Loan 29/174, f.74.

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through the deputy lieutenants, as if their dramatic eclipse after the debacle of Cirencester in February 1643 had never occurred.

Massey angrily wrote to the Parliament, protesting that Thomas Stephens was not even a deputy lieutenant in 1642, and that the ordinance in question only applied to the period of time before the 'county came under the Government of the soldiery'.¹ His letter was swiftly conveyed to London by one of the Committee of Both Kingdom's own dispatch riders.²

Massey became convinced that Stephens was acting in the interests of a 'party or faction in our Committee', who were keen 'to set up some who are abetted by them to contest my authority'.³ With command of his own regiment of horse, Thomas Stephens was certainly the most important military champion of the reassertion of civilian rule within the county. He tried hard to keep his own forces strictly separate from those of the Governor. Massey complained that Stephens's officers were never allowed near him to 'receive orders as was fitting'.⁴ It seems clear that the civilian establishment in the county was attempting to raise an alternative force as a counterweight to those of the professional military.

On 19 September, Massey appeared before the narrow isthmus of the Beachley peninsular.⁵ Despite the lack of Stephens's cavalry he successfully stormed the Royalist bridgehead and routed Rupert and Winter. Many Royalist soldiers drowned or captured and at least two pieces of ordnance came into Massey's possession.⁶ Colonel Tuke and the northern horse were at a loss to know what

(1) SP, 21/16, f.268.

(2) E 10(5): The London Post, no.3, Sept 24, p.5.


(3) SP, 21/16, f.267.

(4) Ibid, f.268.

(5) E 10(17): The True Informer, no.47, Sept 21-28, p.349.

(6) E 10(22): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.74, Sept 24-Oct 1, pp.591-2; Corbet, p.117; Rushworth, v.741-2; CJ, iii.641; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.327b.

MASSEY'S STORMINGS OF THE BEACHLEY PENINSULAR, September 20 and October 13 1644.



KEY

Main roads

Tidal ditch (half dug)

Hedge and ditch

Parliamentary troops

Royalist troops

The rout of Winter's forces

Royalist war ships

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to do next.¹

Soon after his triumph at Beachley, Massey received substantial reinforcements, eleven troops of horse and 400 foot, from the Earl of Denbigh.² Having effectively confined Tuke and Winter to Chepstow, he decided to march North to Monmouth, a strategic crossing point on the Wye.³ There, the second in command of the Royalist garrison was none other than Robert Kyrle, who now found it expedient to change sides once more.⁴ Kyrle's relations conveyed to Massey his offer to betray Monmouth to the Parliament.⁵ Massey may have risked accepting this offer partly because of pressure brought to bear on him by opponents, probably including County Committee members, who criticised 'slackness' in his operations.⁶ He was looking for a dramatic victory to bolster his position against antagonists at Gloucester. Kyrle's duplicity proved decisive in the capture of Monmouth. He helped arrange the admittance into the town of a detachment of Massey's men, which in turn was able to secure the gate through which the rest could pass.⁷

The great Royalist Herbert family of Raglan mobilised all available local resources to win back the town.⁸ Sir William Blaxton, a Royalist officer, launched a formidable attack against Massey's newly created garrison at Wonastow, a large house two miles South West of Monmouth.⁹ But the threatened strong point was rapidly reinforced by troops led by the newly

(1) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, ff.178-9; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.257.

(2) SP, 21/16, f.267; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.180.

(3) SP, 21/17, f.33.

(4) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.259-9b; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.180; Rushworth, v.742; E 10(22), p.595; Webb, ii.95-6.

(5) SP, 21/16, f.268; SP, 21/17, f.33; Corbet, p.117.


(6) Ibid.

(7) SP, 21/17, ff.33-4; Corbet, pp.118-9; Rushworth, v.742; Webb, ii.99-100.

(8) Ibid.

(9) SP, 21/17, ff.35; Corbet, p.120; Rushworth, v.742.

MASSEY'S CAPTURE OF MONMOUTH AND HIS BREACHING OF THE LINE OF THE WYE, September 1644.



promoted Major Backhouse, and the Royalist forces were completely routed.¹

These fresh victories strengthened Massey's hand against the Gloucester Committee. The Lords expressed the opinion that 'Massey had not only been valient and careful but successful also'.² One London news-sheet reported that the County Committee had been ordered 'to take care of the man, that he be valient and faithful', that there was still 'the need of such, because the enemies game is played most that way'.³

In late September, the Commons nudged the Committee of Both Kingdoms towards intervening in the dispute between Massey and the County Committee. The Committee of Both Kingdoms seems to have been tentative in its attempts to to reconcile their differences.⁴ Eventually, at its session on 8 October, it was resolved that a sub-committee of the Parliament's war executive should be created to deal with the situation at Gloucester.⁵

The atmosphere remained highly charged. On 11 October, Massey complained that the Gloucester Committee was levelling 'false and scandalous complaints' against him.⁶ Sir Samuel Luke informed Essex from Newport Pagnell that Massey 'hath had bitter articles put up against (him), wherewith he is so discontented that he is again returned to Monmouth, having sent a gent on purpose by here, to the Parliament to crave that right might be done him, before he will return'.⁷ Massey's was especially aggrieved, because no one on the Committee was now prepared

- (1) E 12(23): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.76, Oct 8-15, p.610; Corbet, p.120; SP, 21/17, f.35; BL, Stow Mss.190, ff.7; Rushworth, v.742.
- (2) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.130; LJ, vii.20.
- (3) E 10(31): The Parliament Scout, no.67, Sept 26-Oct 3, p.538.
- (4) CJ, iii.641; SP, 21/7, f.216.
- (5) SP, 21/7, f.44.
- (6) SP, 21/17, f.44.
- (7) BL, Stow Mss.190, f.323.

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to defend him openly. He resented strongly his opponents growing dominance in the city and county government. 'I am something afflicted that such strange vagarys to my traducement should pass amongst them of the Committee', he wrote 'without one gentle correcting hand in the same'.¹ At the heart of this protracted dispute was the County Committee's drive to assert its supremacy, even in military matters.²

Meanwhile, the Royalists had again begun to fortify Beachley, in a second attempt to ship Tuke's cavalry across the Severn estuary.³ Since a refortified Beachley posed a serious threat to his local garrisons, Massey again concentrated against it all the forces available to him.⁴ On 12 October he successfully repeated the storming of the peninsula⁵, though it was more heavily fortified than before.⁶

Massey was less successful in subduing his civilian protagonists. By the 18th the Gloucester Committee was arguing that to provide its Governor with a regular income was illegal, since no Parliamentary ordinance provided for such an outlay.⁶ Massey's position rested formally upon his commission to the post of Governor by the Lord General in June 1643.⁷ But Essex's political and military fortunes had suffered a severe setback at Lostwith⁸, and some Committee-men sensed the opportunity to dispute the validity of that appointment. In response, Massey demanded that his command of all the Gloucestershire forces be confirmed by Parliamentary ordinance.⁸ It seems that he also

(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.79.

(2) SP, 21/16, f.270.

(3) SP, 21/17, f.55; Corbet, p.122; Webb, ii.102; Walker, p.103; C.Firth, ed., EHR (1898), p.737.

(4) Corbet, p.122; Rushworth, v.743; Webb, ii.102.

(5) Ibid, pp.122-3; Vicars, pp.66-7; E 13(18): The London Post, no.10, Oct 23, p.5.

(6) SP, 21/17, f.68.

(7) Corbet, p.37.

(8) SP, 21/17, f.68.

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entertained hopes of promotion to the position of Major General, and therefore clear authority over the Committee's military champion, Colonel Edward Stephens.¹

Massey understood that his differences with the local Committee were rooted in their opposed conceptions of the strategy appropriate for Gloucester and its garrison. He considered that the town was 'situated upon so great a pass' that it should be 'furnished with a brigade not only for securing the smaller garrisons but for hindering the enemy's march, contributions, levies and recruits'.² When Thomas Pury left for London in early November, Massey hoped he would never return to Gloucester.³ The Governor's relations with the Committee had reached an all-time low. He worried increasingly what men like Pury were saying about him in London. 'I know there are some of the Committee', Massey wrote 'whose passions, envy or malice cause them to be more troublesome in their complaints than either reason or good affection would prompt'.⁴

Meanwhile, Massey was ordered to advance into Oxfordshire to help the main Parliamentary armies against the King.⁵ The Royalist presence across the Cotswolds effectively denied the Parliament accurate knowledge of the strength and capacities of Massey's command.⁶ Massey obeyed the order, though he was unhappy about it.⁷ It would have been inadvisable, given his political isolation in Gloucester, to ignore the wishes of the Committee of Both Kingdoms. But Massey was concerned that his strength was being

(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.89.

(2) SP, 21/17, f.69.

(3) BL, Stow Mss.190, f.54.

(4) SP, 21/17, f.121.

(5) SP, 21/19, f.121; Corbet, pp.125-6; Rushworth, v.743.

(6) Corbet, p.125.

(7) SP, 21/17, f.119; Corbet p.126.

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dramatically over-estimated in London, and that the weakened or half recruited regiments remaining in Gloucestershire would be too thinly spread around the shire's large circle of out garrisons, including a force positioned at Tidenham to watch the decimated Beachley peninsula. Militarily Massey had 'too many irons in the fire'.¹ He asked the Parliament flippantly if he should abandon these important posts in order to fulfil its marching orders.²

It seems that it was at this point that Massey was called upon to refute the persistent allegations of disloyalty reported to the Parliament by some of the County Committee.³ This whispering campaign had been going on since at least June 1644. Corbet insinuated that some of Massey's civilian rivals were jealous of his continuing success and authority over the armed forces in the county.⁴ But Massey's essential pragmatism, his lack of ideological commitment and his contemplated treachery in 1643 must have been hard to conceal completely. Certain members of the County Committee may have tried to undermine Massey's command over the military forces in the shire simply because they did not trust him to use them effectively against the enemy. Political and personal differences complemented each other in the factional infighting which beset Massey's command.

The Parliamentary garrison at Monmouth was now dangerously depleted, and fell to a surprise attack by Royalist forces from Raglan at dawn on 19 November.⁵ The fledgling Committee,

- (1) Corbet, p.126.
- (2) SP, 21/17, f.119.
- (3) Ibid, ff.120-1.
- (4) Corbet, p.126.
- (5) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.324; Bodl., Firth Mss.C6, f.265; C7, f.234b; Corbet, pp.127-8b; Rushworth, v.744.


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established there by Massey, was captured with all its papers. Many prisoners and substantial stores of ammunition were also seized by the victorious Herberts.¹ Massey returned from Burford as quickly as he could but could do little to salvage the situation.²

The Royalist commander Sir Jacob Astley was assigned to quarter in eastern Gloucestershire in late November. Writing from Farfington on the 26th, Astley admitted the necessity of a strong garrison to secure the vital route between the Royal capital and Bristol because 'Massey from Gloucester and the country by him hath power sufficient to give us hinderance and affront'.³ Astley contemplated establishing such a force at Cricklade, but eventually decided upon Cirencester.⁴

For Massey, these military setbacks were counterbalanced by a significant personal success. The attempts to discredit him in the Commons had clearly failed, and the London press lent its customary support to the Governor of Gloucester.⁵ His heroic stand in 1643 and its effect in averting the Royalist threat to London were not quickly forgotten in the city. The Gloucester Committee lamely tried to dissociate itself from the failed campaign against Massey, and from the County Committee's past complaints.⁶ Massey's antagonists, fearing that the Committee of Both Kingdoms was about to rule against them, now hastened to hide behind those members of the County Committee who had remained quietly well disposed to the Governor after their eclipse during the autumn. The Committee now disowned its earlier attempt to undermine Massey's position as

- (1) ORN, iii.371-2: Mercurius Aulicus 47 1644; Corbet, p.128; Rushworth, v.744; CJ, iii.685; LJ, vi.48; Webb, ii.114.
- (2) Ibid; Philips, i.272-3.
- (3) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.241.
- (4) J.Waylen, Devizes, p.206; Harrison, pp.325-6.
- (5) E 18(16): The Weekly Account, no.65, Nov 20-6, Nov 22.
- (6) BL, Loan 29/174, f.87. The two committees had many members in common.



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Governor and audaciously denied that any real quarrel had existed at all!¹

The loss of a single garrison at Monmouth gave rise to the need to replace it with many garrisons in the forest: more resources had to be deployed in the region.² Royalist garrisons at Monmouth, Hereford and Lydney were countered by new Parliamentary strongholds at Highmeadow, Ruardean and Nast respectively. But Massey's many commitments elsewhere prevented him from fully protecting all of the forest communities.³ In early December he decided to abandon a garrison he had established at Yate court near Bristol. The local Royalists quickly burned down the manor house so that it could not be garrisoned again.⁴

In the East, too, Massey's problems continued to escalate. Astley had installed large forces at Cirencester, comprising three brigades of foot and several crack regiments of horse. Corbet thought Astley's design was to 'destroy the country and live upon the ruins thereof'.⁵ The many Royalist garrisons, quartered in the region for the winter, were severely to strain its resources. They also changed the military balance of forces in the county, where Royalism was once more in the ascendant.⁶ 'These parts were born down by the main bulk of the King's army' recorded Corbet.⁷

Massey placed new garrisons at Stroud, and at Lypiatt Park house, just to its East. Ideally placed to impede Astley's

(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.87.

(2) Corbet, p.129.

(3) Ibid; Webb, ii.123.

(4) Ibid, pp.129-30; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.282; BL, Add.Ms.37,343, f.347b; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.332-2b; Bodl., Firth Ms.C7, f.250.

(5) Corbet, p.130; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.251.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

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foraging operations from Cirencester,¹ these were also well situated to protect the nearby communities of weavers and their mills. Massey's Gloucester horse successfully skirmished with some of Astley's forces at Hampton Road, South East of Stroud.²

But the position of Massey's command was highly dangerous, and this must have created fresh impetus for a resolution of its internal problems at Westminster.³ Significantly Major Hammond was released from custody on 3 December and cleared of the blame for Grey's death. It was resolved that he had 'slew in his own self defence'.⁴ This was both a vindication of one of Massey's most prominent supporters, and a condemnation of the conduct of Grey, formerly one of his most formidable opponents.

On 12 December, however, the Committee of Both Kingdoms expressed the hope that both sides would 'let those things die which may hinder the good agreement desired between the Committee and the Governor'.⁵ Massey's indignant demands that his 'honour may be vindicated' were simply ignored.⁶ A compromise was imposed. Essex's appointment of Massey to the post of Governor was reconfirmed, but his hopes of promotion to the rank of Major General were disappointed. The Westminster authorities agreed that Massey should be paid for the many Colonelcies within his command, a sum of between £8 and £9 a day. It was ordered that such an amount should be paid to him by the local Committee 'in respect of his being Governor'.⁷ But Massey's position as supreme commander-in-chief was not clarified. It was decided to confirm the

- (1) Corbet, p.131; VCH, x.103.
- (2) Ibid; Bodl. Firth Mss.C7, f.259.
- (3) SP, 21/8, f.31.
- (4) Ibid, f.33.
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) Ibid.
- (7) SP, 21/8, f.33.

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provisions laid down in Parliament's ordinance of association of 10 May.¹ This specified that the garrison of Gloucester and the 'other forces' were under Massey's command, but also envisaged the Governor and the Committee working together in harmony to administer the local war effort.²

Massey, therefore, did not obtain everything he had hoped from Parliament's mediation. He may have chafed especially at the failure of the Committee of Both Kingdoms' to declare his complete innocence of the allegations against him. But the Committee did offer its broad support against civilian encroachment into the purely military aspects of his command.³ This was not surprising. Massey's willingness to see Gloucester as a base for offensive operations coincided with Parliament's own strategic views, which, like his own, were increasingly impatient of the more provincial defensive position taken by the County Committee. The trend was reflected in the New modelling of the Parliament's armies along national lines.

The Committee of Both Kingdoms communicated to the Committee at Gloucester its hope that both sides there would 'hold all good correspondence' amongst themselves, so that the 'public service be not prejudiced for the want thereof'.⁴ It also pointed out that if Gloucester stood in any danger as a result of such divisions they would be the 'first and deepest losers'.⁵ The hope was also expressed that all former antagonisms 'will be happily and permanently be buried'.⁶ The London authorities

(1) SP, 21/8, f.33a.

(2) A&O, i.428-31; E 47(12).

(3) SP, 21/8, f.33a.

(4) SP, 21/19, f.161.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

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did not want to antagonise the Governor or his opponents by meeting the claims of either side in full. But their expectation that such a bitter and protracted quarrel could be so easily forgotten, was naive to say the least.

Massey's political position at Gloucester was further strengthened at this time by the city's military weakness resulting from the concentration of Royalist winter quarters within and around its boundaries. Just as in the siege of winter 1643-4, the professional military were now able to set the agenda. This probably exerted more pressure towards unity than any arbitration from London could have done.

During this period the two Massey brothers, Edward and George, were joined in Gloucestershire by a third. 'Captain Robert Massey of London' arrived 'with a good troop of horse, he being a valient man as well as the rest'.¹ Robert Massey was certainly well established in London. Described as a citizen of that city, he had married Jane a native of Shoreditch.² But the tragedy of the Civil War split the Massey family, as it did many others. The younger generation served the Parliament, but their father remained stubbornly Royalist. By August 1643 John Massey, then sixty years of age, was a prisoner of Parliament's forces in Cheshire.³ Despite his age it seems that he had actually taken up arms for the crown. In August 1644, John Massey was imprisoned in Manchester. Edward Massey tried to exert what influence he could to obtain his father's release. 'Yet', reported a Royalist newsheet, 'his father was to loyal to receive it (as he said) at the hands of such a rebel'.⁴ John Massey's sons must have disappointed him as much as he embarrassed them.

Intelligence reports forwarded by Samuel Luke confirm the extent to which Massey's command was again encircled by strong

(1) E 28(18): The London Post, no.18, Jan 17, p.4.

(2) Ormerod, ii.399.

(3) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.104; Warburton, ii.278.

(4) ORN, iii.235, Mercurius Aulicus 35 1644.

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Royalist forces. Luke noted that 'the enemy lies now...between Cirencester, Evesham and Gloucester, so that they will so straighten those parts, that if Colonel Massey have not relief, tis thought he cannot subsist long'.¹ The strategic situation was once more similar to that of winter 1643-44, but with two important differences. First, Massey now possessed a wider ring of out garrisons, so his supplies were more secure. Second, the King's commanders were principally concerned to secure decent winter quarters for their troops rather than to mount a concerted assault on the city. Their skirmishes with Massey's forces therefore lacked coordination and an offensive goal.²

Both the civil and military aspects of Gloucester's Government had confronted great dangers, and now, the future was again uncertain. A heightened sense of danger may have helped to overcome the legacy of misunderstanding and jealousy. Massey had made friends as well as enemies and even his foes recognised that his services were once more indispensable. Major Wise spoke for many when he acknowledged the 'vigilancy, valour and fidelity of your Governor and the soldiery'.³

During 1644, Gloucester had emerged from its encirclement to become a centre of offensive operations. But military success and subsequent over-extension had stimulated internal conflicts over its proper strategic purpose, and led to new military reverses. Massey lacked the men and resources to hold his temporary conquests. It proved impossible for a single county like Gloucestershire to support and sustain a large association of Parliamentary counties around itself.

Massey's autocratic style of command had outlived its usefulness, antagonising both officers and an increasingly assertive civilian group. Continuing military success ensured Massey's survival. Yet at the end of 1644, he could feel no more secure than he had at the start of the year.

(1) BL, Stow Mss.190, f.242.

(2) Washbourne, p.99.

(3) Dorney, p.8.

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CHAPTER 6.

THE LAST MONTHS AT GLOUCESTER, JANUARY-JUNE 1645.

Nationally, by early 1645, Royalism was losing ground. Only in the near West, where the bulk of the King's Oxford forces were concentrated for the winter, did it retain a rather artificial ascendancy.¹ Astley's forces continued to skirmish with those of Massey in the Stroud area.² During these operations, Astley stormed Lypiatt Park house, firing it to prevent reoccupation by his opponents.³

Once more, the Parliamentary forces at Gloucester faced close confinement, and a consequent fiscal crisis. Free quarter again became the rule, and conditions were poor. Increasingly, Massey and his officers had to devote their energies to preventing a general mutiny amongst their rank and file.⁴

One Parliamentary newsheet wondered how the West was to be reconquered 'considering how the enemy fortifies in every corner'.⁵ One such garrison was at Devizes, which Colonel Charles Lloyd spent the months of December and January strengthening.⁶ Prince Maurice fortified Evesham, so that it could contain George Massey's garrison at Sudeley and secure a direct line of communication between Oxford and Worcester. Once again the Royalists attempted to exploit to the full the raw material

- (1) E 23(10): The Parliament Scout, no.80, Dec 26-Jan 2, p.644; Harrison, p.330.
- (2) SP, 21/17, f.166; ORN, iii.377-8: Mercurius Aulicus, Dec 29-Jan 5, 1644-5.
- (3) Corbet, p.131; ORN, iii.377-8; SP, 21/17, f.166; CCC, i.82; VCH, x.103.
- (4) SP, 21/17, f.166.
- (5) E 23(10): The Parliament Scout, no.80, Dec 26-Jan 2, p.644.
- (6) BL, Add.Mss.18,982, f.7; E 25(18): The Parliament Scout, no.83, Jan 16-23, Jan 17; Corbet, p.134.

THE SITUATION SOUTH OF GLOUCESTER, December-January 1644/5.



KEY

Main roads



Castle or fortified house



Scene of fighting



Royalist garrisons



Parliamentary garrisons



Parliamentary garrison captured by the Royalists but not manned by them




Garrison abandoned by the Parliamentarians and subsequently fired by the Royalists



Parliamentary garrison stormed by the Royalists and fired by them



Astley's foraging and revenue collecting operations from Cirencester



reserves in the Forest of Dean.¹

Colonel Sir Henry Bard was ordered by Rupert to establish a garrison at Chipping Campden, and given three of Astley's foot regiments for that purpose.² From here the Royalists were able to bring a large part of Kifsgate hundred under their fiscal control. This initiative complemented Maurice's activity at Evesham and fitted the Royalists general strategy in the region.³

In Gloucester, tensions arising from the prolonged financial dearth reached the surface. Arrears of pay led, as in 1643, to disorders among the foot. The infantry officers came to their Governor as one man and laid their commissions down before him. They expressed their determination to leave Gloucester, and enlist in the Parliament's service in a place where, it was hoped, their loyalty would be better rewarded.⁴ It seems that some of the rank and file in the garrison refused duty over their arrears of pay.⁵ Massey blamed such discontent on the Gloucester Committee, which had promised the soldiers substantial increases in pay. He thought his opponents, such as Pury, intended to form 'a party with them', undermining his own authority over the garrison.⁶

Massey pleaded with his officers to remain at their posts, and penned another impassioned plea to the Parliament.⁷ He rightly argued that whilst isolation made finance and supply especially hard, it was strategically vital to the broader Parliamentary

- (1) HMC, Hastings Mss. ii.135; Dugdale, p.77; Warburton, iii.53; BL, Add.Mss.18,982, f.16; BL, Harleian Mss.6802, f.1.
- (2) Bodl., Firth Mss.C6, ff.307-8; Hutton, p.167.
- (3) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.356.
- (4) SP, 21/17, ff.184-5.
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) Ibid, f.185.
- (7) Ibid, ff.185-6.

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cause. Massey also felt able to complain bitterly that he was the 'most miserable officer in this county, knowing no way any longer how to subsist in this condition'.¹

Massey had certainly been disillusioned at the abandonment of Gloucester by some of the County Committee as the military situation deteriorated.² They had deserted their posts once before in the difficult period after the city's relief in 1643. The rump of the Committee granted him full powers to levy contributions, but the collectors had little success in the face of the strong Royalist presence.³ Things got so bad that Massey feared a violent and general mutiny amongst the troops.⁴

In these trying circumstances relations between the Governor and the Committee broke down completely. Massey wrote that he was not prepared to confide any of his knowledge of the garrison's finances 'to the ignorance of some of the Committee of Gloucester'.⁵ Further concessions to the civilian amateurs would be the ruin all the Parliamentarians at Gloucester. It is clear that the garrison's acute difficulties had suddenly given Massey a new ascendancy in the county. He used it to the full to embarrass the local Committee and to vindicate his past behaviour. His methods had become as unscrupulous as those of his civilian protagonists.⁶

Sheriff Stephens's reputation was somewhat tarnished by the desertion, with fifteen troopers, of the Major of his horse regiment.⁷ It seems that the champion of the County Committee

- (1) SP, 21/17, f.187.
- (2) Ibid, f.88.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) SP, 21/17, f.190.
- (7) SP, 16/506, f.49.

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had no more success than Massey in controlling his forces.

Since late 1644, Massey's dominance in the Forest of Dean had been disputed by the forces of Winter and the Herberts. In early February, Prince Maurice and his troops set off from Evesham for the North Welsh marches; but this was a mixed blessing for his opponents.¹ For the Prince left behind a regiment of horse, under the command of Winter, in the hope that thus reinforced, Winter and the Herberts could drive Massey from the forest entirely.² In response, Massey decided to blockade Winter's fortified mansion at Lydney with a ring of outposts. The occupying forces were effectively contained after heavy skirrimishing around the White Cross.³ On the other side of the Severn, however, strong Royalist detachments, probably from Cirencester, came within five miles of Gloucester and 'did much hurt to the country'.⁴

Meanwhile, it seems that the behaviour of certain members of the Gloucester Committee had finally exhausted the patience of the Committee of Both Kingdoms. It now praised Massey's continuing defence of his command, in the face of obstruction by the 'want of those who should preserve it'.⁵ The abandonment of Gloucester by some of the County Committee would have been very hard for the central Parliamentary authorities to condone.⁶ A separate letter of reassurance was addressed to Massey's disgruntled officer corps.⁷ In December 1644, Parliament's war executive had refused to take sides between the Governor and the local Committee, hoping

- (1) SP, 21/17, f.205.
- (2) Corbet, p.133; Webb, ii.124.
- (3) Ibid; E 269(13): Perfect Passages, no.16, Feb 5-12, pp.126-7; BL, Loan 29/175, f.24.
- (4) E 269(13), p.126.
- (5) SP, 21/19, f.201.
- (6) SP, 21/17, f.188.
- (7) SP, 21/19, ff.202-3.

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to reconcile them. Now it swung decisively behind Massey. The gravity of the crisis, which threatened to engulf his command from without and from within, probably convinced the Committee of Both Kingdoms that such a decision was unavoidable.

Meanwhile, the military situation in the exposed area near the border with Wiltshire became more dangerous. The Royalist Governor of Devizes, Colonel Lloyd, laid siege to Rowdon House, one of Colonel Devereux's out garrisons just South of Chippenham, occupied by 200 or 300 men.¹ There were Parliamentary forces available for the relief of Rowdon, at Malmesbury under Devereux and at Beverstone castle. Here the new governor, recently appointed by Massey, was none other than Sheriff Thomas Stephens.² Stephens's hopes of establishing County Committee control over Massey had collapsed, but at Beverstone he had scope for independent action, and did not delay to use it. Without consulting Massey, Stephens marched to Rowdon's relief, collecting troops from Malmesbury on the way.³

Stephens was successful in breaking through the Royalist lines, but then found himself besieged along with the garrison that he had come to help.⁴ The King's commanders then mobilised a formidable concentration of troops against Rowdon. Astley brought thousands of soldiers from Cirencester and ordnance came from Bristol.⁵ The Royalists sought to lure Massey into sending a relief force, in the belief that, distant from Gloucester and its

- (1) ORN, iii.427: Mercurius Aulicus, Feb 9-16, 1645; E 270(5): Perfect Passages, no.17, Feb 12-19, p.133; Corbet, p.134.
- (2) BL, Stow Mss.190, f.156; Corbet, p.134.
- (3) SP, 21/17, ff.216-7; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.198; Corbet, p.134.
- (4) Ibid, f.217; Corbet, pp.134-5; ORN, iii.427-8.
- (5) Ibid; ORN, iii.428.

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out garrisons, it could easily be cut off and destroyed.¹ Massey immediately wrote to the Committee of Both Kingdoms explaining that Stephens had acted on his own initiative and that his own response to the crisis was bound to be inadequate.² But he also took the opportunity to ask that the military command of the region should be settled once and for all 'for independent officers (as I may call them) promise not advantage but destruction'.³

A relief operation organised by Colonel Devereux failed to extricate the encircled Parliamentarians.⁴ Massey was sensitive to charges that his failure to organise more effective assistance was the result of past differences with Stephens. Unable to do more he put the onus squarely on the Parliamentary authorities in London to organise the relief of Rowdon.⁵ They, however, could do little. Eventually, on 15 February, his position hopeless, Sheriff Stephens surrendered the garrison and his own forces at Rowdon. Between 300 and 400 men were captured.⁶ Thomas Stephens's apparent incompetence was soon loudly broadcast abroad.⁷ The eclipse of Massey's rival for the military command of the county could not have been more complete. Massey was not directly responsible for the loss of Rowdon, and he was not held accountable for it.⁸

Meanwhile, some of Winter's cavalry had managed to break

- (1) Corbet, p.135.
- (2) SP, 21/17, ff.217-8; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.130; Corbet, p.135.
- (3) Ibid, f.218.
- (4) Ibid, ff.223-4; Corbet, pp.135-6.
- (5) SP, 21/17, f.225.
- (6) ORN, iii.427-8: Mercurius Aulicus, Feb 9-16, 1645; Corbet, p.136; BL, Stow Mss.190, ff.198,202; Harrison, pp.344-5.
- (7) BL, Stow Mss.190, f.198.
- (8) SP, 21/19, f.239.

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ROWDEN HOUSE, February 1645.



KEY	Main roads	Castle or fortified house	Royalist garrison
Parliamentary garrison		The withdrawal of the Parliamentary garrison at Lacock to Rowden	
Colonel Stephens's route to relieve the garrison at Rowden		The convergence of Royalist forces to besiege Rowden	
Colonel Devereux's failure to extricate the Parliamentary forces at Rowden		Parliamentary garrison reduced and fired by the Royalists	Garrison abandoned by the Parliamentarians and occupied by the Royalists

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
through Massey's encircling blockade at Lydney. Sir John posted these, together with some reinforcements from Chepstow, at Lancaut.¹ This small village was enclosed on three sides by a meander of the river Wye, and was thus easy to fortify. Winter hoped to turn it into a bridgehead on the river's East bank, from which to launch offensives against the tightening blockade around his house.²

Like the similarly configured position at Beachley, Lancaut threatened to disrupt seriously Massey's operations in the forest. He decided to attack it immediately and stormed the neck of the meander during 22 February.³ Winter's force was all but destroyed, and Sir John himself was lucky to escape by swimming to one of his ships which lay close by.⁴ This victory marked an extremely welcome break in a run of reverses. Massey could hardly conceal his satisfaction in reporting the triumph to Colonel Edward Harley. 'Thus has God been good to us', he wrote, 'in giving us some victories by such as will be commanded by me'.⁵ This came very close to claiming that divine favour lay with him rather than Stephens or the Committee!

But, as Massey was acutely aware, attempts to discredit him continued. He wrote to Edward Harley in London that he had been informed of 'mischief preparing against him' there, and 'the same promoting here also'.⁶ Massey asked his old comrade in arms to pass any information he had on to his brother George,

- (1) Corbet, p.136; E 271(13): Perfect Passages, no.18, Feb 26-March 5, p.150; Webb, ii.124.
- (2) Corbet, pp.136-7; E 271(18): The Scottish Dove, no.72, Feb 28-March 7, p.563; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.156.
- (3) Ibid; BL, Loan 29/175, ff.28-9.
- (4) Ibid; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, ff.370-71b; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.196b; SP, 21/20, f.6.
- (5) BL, Loan 29/175, ff.28-9.
- (6) Ibid.

THE BATTLE OF LANCANT, February 22 1645.



KEY

Main roads

River cliffs



Fortifications constructed by Winter at the neck of the Lancant meander



Parliamentary troops



Royalist troops



The rout of Winter's forces



Winter's frigate



who was also in the capital, so that he could be forwarned about such developments. Certainly the Committee of Both Kingdoms was investigating allegations made by Issac Bromwich against Massey.¹

The onset of spring and the campaigning season were very welcome to Massey, especially because Astley's forces, which had wintered at Cirencester, were finally obliged to abandon the high wold country and march to reinforce the King's field forces.² There was a further, and unexpected, favourable development, in the growing club agitation in Herefordshire. Barnabus Scudamore, the Royalist Governor of Hereford, thought that Massey was the guiding force behind it.³ This was a gross exaggeration, though Massey must certainly have recognised the benefits offered by such unrest to the Parliamentary cause.⁴

In the absence of the imprisoned Sheriff Stephens, William Shepard and the double turncoat Kyrle now assumed the role of opposition leaders on the County Committee.⁵ Massey noted that Pury and Bromwich were 'their guides at a distance' but hoped that the Parliament would have nothing to do with their 'hocus pocus jugglings'.⁶ It is clear however that this faction had lost the initiative it had enjoyed from October to December 1644. Kyrle and Shepard were forced ^{to} abandon the idea of controlling the County Committee, and attempted to boycott it instead. Massey suspected that they hoped to 'erect some new structure of their own fancy'.⁷

(1) SP, 21/8, f.127.

(2) E 273(2): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.90, March 4-11, p.722; Corbet, p.137.

(3) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.342; Hutton, pp.162-3.

(4) Corbet, p.138.

(5) BL, Loan 29/175, f.34.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

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Massey thought, optimistically, that the maladministration of the snire by the opposition faction during its period of ascendancy had permanently undermined its credibility, and that his own position was now unassailable.¹ This view owed much to wishful thinking. Most of Gloucestershire's Parliamentary supporters found subordination to the professional military extremely irksome, and accepted it only when circumstances gave them no other choice.

It is perhaps significant that Massey felt obliged to reassure Edward Harley that the treatment he had received from the more vociferous members of the County Committee had not undermined his loyalty to the cause of Parliament as a whole,² though as events had proved, such loyalty could be swayed by the changing fortunes of war.

These, however, were moving Parliament's way. In Hereford, Scudamore had been effectively besieged by several thousand club men.³ It was rumoured in London that the club leaders had sent to Massey for 'some horse for their better assistance'.⁴ Corbet certainly confirms that Massey advanced to Ledbury to take advantage of this widespread uprising against the Royalist military authorities.⁵ Certain club leaders even informed him of their proposals and 'engagements'.⁶ The relationship was not an easy one: Massey was quickly disappointed and perplexed by the club leaders' declarations of neutrality. He regarded their stance as an elaborate sham: sooner or later, they would be forced by circumstances to take sides.

Initially, however, Massey recognised in the movement a

(1) BL, Loan 29/175, f.34.

(2) Ibid.

(3) BL, Add.Mss.11,043, ff.19-20; Corbet, p.138; Hutton, p.163.

(4) E 274(26): Mercurius Civicus, no.96, March 20-7, p.868.

(5) Corbet, p.138; BL, Egerton Ms.787, f.93.

(6) Ibid; Webb, ii.153-4.

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great opportunity, a substantial force which might be harnessed in the interests of the Parliament, though he was unsure how far to go in attempting to win the club leaders over.¹ He sent a list of their demands to London, so that the authorities might better assess the mood of movement.² Massey did realise however that numerical weakness made sending military aid to the club men difficult, even if it was deemed advisable, and he therefore also requested reinforcements.³

When Scudamore's garrison opened fire on his besiegers, some of their leaders sent dispatches to Massey at Ledbury calling for his assistance.⁴ By way of reply, Massey asked them to declare for the Parliament before Rupert arrived in the county, when, as he shrewdly warned, 'they would be utterly ruined although they stood neutrals'.⁵ Some club leaders were swayed by such arguments, but most of their followers could not be convinced.⁶ The negotiations at Ledbury, therefore, were inconclusive.⁷ Massey then withdrew to Ross-on-Wye, perhaps hoping that such a move would force the club leaders' hand. Corbet seems to have thought that they were convinced Massey's cavalry was not strong enough for him to provide the effective protection he had promised.⁸

Scudamore had been assured that Rupert would move South in his support. The Royalist authorities at Oxford encouraged him,

(1) BL, Loan 29/175, f.35; BL, Egerton Ms.787, f.93.

(2) BL, Egerton Ms.787, f.93.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid; E 274(26), p.868; Corbet, pp.139-40; Webb, ii.154.

(5) E 274(26), p.869.

(6) E 274(29): The Scottish Dove, no.75, March 21-28, p.592; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.375; Corbet, p.139; E 274(26), p.869.

(7) E 274(26), p.869.

(8) Corbet, p.141.

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in the meantime, to give 'discreet answers' to the club leaders.¹ Scudamore therefore successfully offered small concessions to the irregular forces surrounding his garrison.² By late March it was reported that the 'multitude of the county of Hereford ... are vanished as it were come to nothing'.³

On 3 April, dispatches from Massey were read to the Commons, in which he related the sudden and dangerous exposure of his command to the converging forces of Rupert, Maurice and Gerard. Against these he had barely 300 horse to take the field. Massey asked that the thirteen garrisons of the county be reinforced with 500 horse.⁴ In reply, the Commons reassured him of its concern for his 'honour and reputation', promising to 'vindicate the same against all false aspersions and unworthy traducements'.⁵ The house was clearly aware that the interminable campaign against him might lead its Governor of Gloucester to abandon the cause altogether.

Meanwhile Rupert's forces had entered Herefordshire and were sweeping aside the remnants of the once formidable club association.⁶ This intelligence prompted Massey to return to the southern fringes of that county. There, some club men joined him, but continuing lack of cavalry made it impossible to protect from Rupert's vengeance the many friends and relations that they had had to leave behind.⁷

- (1) BL, Add.Ms.11,043, f.21.
- (2) E 275(3): The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, no.93, March 25-April 1, pp.745-6; Webb, ii.157.
- (3) E 276(15): The Scottish Dove, no.76, March 28-April 4, p.597.
- (4) CJ, iv.99; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.202b.
- (5) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.59.
- (6) Corbet, p.142; BL, Add.Ms.37,343, ff.377-8b; E 277(14): The Moderate Intelligencer, no.6, April 3-10, p.42; Hutton, p.170.
- (7) Corbet, p.142; E 277(9): The Weekly Account, April 2-9, April 4th.

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
Soon the whole Forest of Dean faced imminent invasion by Royalist forces.¹ Massey was forced to draw out yet more powerful detachments from Gloucester and its out-garrisons to contain the threat. In all he managed to scrape together 1,500 men.² But the concentration of Royalist forces directed against him were very formidable in both numbers and quality.³ Massey wished above all to prevent the relief of Winter's long blockaded garrison at Lydney.⁴

On 4 April, Rupert launched his superior forces on a full scale invasion of the forest. By 8 April, the County Committee was complaining of 'great oppressions, cruel plunders and continual marches and inroads of the enemy lying near and heavy upon us on every side; our county was so extremely exhausted and miserably destroyed that it was even ready to give up the ghost'.⁵ Massey had to abandon all his garrisons to the West of Newnham: the Royalists were able to relieve Winter's mansion.⁶ Rupert's and Winter's troops then began to lay waste many forest communities, whose inhabitants, they believed, were mostly 'notorious ... rebels', having long subsisted under Massey's protection.⁷

Massey could not hope to engage 2,000 Royalist horse with a mere 300 of his own. In his plea for reinforcements, he

- (1) E 278(3): Mercurius Britanicus, no.78, April 7-14, p.720; BL, Egerton Mss.787, ff.15-6.
- (2) Ibid; E 277(9), April 4; E 277(14), p.42.
- (3) Corbet, p.142; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.189b; E 277(9), April 4; E 278(19): Mercurius Verdicus, no.1, April 12-9, p.2.
- (4) E 277(14), p.42.
- (5) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.75.
- (6) BL, Harleian Mss.166, ff.189-9b; E 278(19): Mercurius Verdicus, no.1, April 12-9, p.2; ORN, iv.20-1: Mercurius Aulicus, April 13-20, 1645; Corbet, p.143; E 278(14), p.51.
- (7) ORN, iv.20; Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.75.

RUPERT'S INVASION OF THE FOREST OF DEAN, April 1645.



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argued that at least 1,000 cavalry would be needed if he was to successfully confront Rupert.¹ The County Committee warned that the shire, if subjected to further devastation, would no longer be able to sustain the garrison at Gloucester. Ultimately, it thought, Massey's command would 'sink under its own burden'.² Massey struck a similar note in his own dispatches. Only the prompt arrival of substantial reinforcements, especially cavalry, could secure Gloucester and its remaining out garrisons.³

Having relieved the White Cross and plundered what they could, Rupert's forces abandoned most of the Forest by 9 April, and fell back into long-suffering Herefordshire.⁴ The Parliament, meanwhile, began to scrape together detachments of cavalry to send in support of Massey's hard pressed forces.⁵ Winter saw that the withdrawal of the Prince's regiments from the lower parts of the forest had rendered his position untenable; his conclusion was confirmed when Massey returned to Lydney and stormed one of the mansion's outworks, capturing two guns and many prisoners.⁶ Winter burned the White Cross to the ground, rather than suffer its occupation by his arch opponent.⁷ It seems that he, and his remaining forces then

- (1) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.35; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.189b; E 278(19), p.2; Corbet, p.142.
- (2) Bodl. Tanner Mss.60(1), f.75.
- (3) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.189b; E 278(19), p.2.
- (4) Ibid; ORN, iv.21: E 278(8): The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, no.95, April 8-15, p.765.
- (5) SP, 21/20, ff.102,134-5.
- (6) E 279(11): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.97, April 22-9, pp.777-78.
- (7) E 281(5): The Moderate Intelligencer, no.9, April 24-May 1, p.65; E 281(11): Mercurius Veridicus, no.3, April 24-May 3, p.19.

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fell back to Chepstow, presumably to hold the line of the Wye against any further enemy incursions.

Massey had been close by when the White Cross was fired, and arrived in time to save some of the spoils from the flames. Corn, beef and horses were taken.¹ Eight pieces of ordnance were also captured in the earthworks around the ruins of the mansion.² The firing and abandonment of his home was largely a chaotic affair on Winter's part.³ Massey could congratulate himself on defeating his most persistent adversary, but must have been disappointed at the sorry state to which Sir John's estate had been reduced.

Despite his numerical weakness Massey felt compelled to follow the enemy into Herefordshire. Rupert's men had taken many cattle from the forest, and he may have hoped to retrieve some. He was also aware that the Royalists had by their 'oppression and pillage...utterly lost the hearts of the inhabitants of the county'.⁴ Their plundering had indeed been widespread.⁵

Massey reached Ledbury on 21 April, with some 300 to 400 horse and 500 to 600 foot.⁶ Herefordshire had suffered in the past at the hands of Royalist troops, and Massey was disappointed by the lack of support with which he was greeted.⁷ But it seems that several hundred armed countrymen joined his small detachment as it progressed through the South East

- (1) E 281(5), p.66; E 281(11), p.19; F.A.Hyett, TBGAS, (1893-94), p.105.
- (2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.382.
- (3) F.A.Hyett, TBGAS, (1893-94), p.105.
- (4) E 278(29): A Diary or an Exact Journal, no.49, April 17-24, April 21.
- (5) Webb, ii.172-3.
- (6) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.127; E 281(11): Mercurius Verdicus, no.3, April 26-May 3, pp.17-8; Corbet, p.144.
- (7) Webb, ii.176.

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
corner of the county.¹ Perhaps these were the scattered remnants of the club association.

In a surprise manoeuvre, after nightfall on 21 April, Rupert wheeled his forces around, suddenly appearing North of Ledbury on the next morning. Massey engaged the Royalists with his few horse, in order to cover the the rapid and disorderly evacuation of his infantry.² This small band of horse was saved from annihilation in Ledbury, because the bulk of Rupert's forces had circled around the town from the West and East to cut off any escape to Gloucester.³ But Massey's officer corps paid dearly for this desperate exploit. Major Robert Harley sustained sword-cuts in the head and arm, and Backhouse received a serious head wound which ultimately proved mortal. He was captured, as were three Captains, including Blaney, who had previously been seized at Monmouth.⁴ South of Ledbury, with most of Massey's cavalry in flight, the Royalists broke into a column of his foot and took many prisoners.⁵ Perhaps 120 of Massey's troops were killed in the battle. His baggage and ammunition was seized along with hundreds of abandoned weapons.⁶

Despite this defeat Rupert had failed in his original objective of capturing Massey's entire force, since almost all the horse, and over half the foot managed to escape.⁷ In his

- (1) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.127b.
- (2) Ibid, ff.127,132; Corbet, p.144; E 281(11), p.18; Rushworth, vi.23; HMC, 7 Report, p.454; E 281(9): A Copy of Colonel Massey's Letter.
- (3) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), ff.127-27b,132; Corbet, p.144.
- (4) Ibid, ff.127b,132b; Corbet, p.144; E 281(9); ORN, iv.38: Mercurius Aulicus, April 20-7, 1645.
- (5) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), ff.127-7b,132b; ORN, iv.37-8; Corbet, p.144-5; E 281(9); Rushworth, vi.23.
- (6) ORN, iv.38.
- (7) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.127b; Corbet, p.145; E 281(9).

THE BATTLE OF LEDBURY, April 22 1645.



KEY

Main roads

Wood land



Rupert's attack on Massey at Ledbury




Massey's holding action at Ledbury




The withdrawal of Massey's infantry from Ledbury



Rupert's pincer movement to try and encircle Massey's forces at Ledbury



The flight of Massey's horse from Ledbury



reports to the Parliament Massey did his best to play down the seriousness of this reverse, making sure that the disparity in numbers between his forces and those of the enemy were accurately reported.¹ But, as Massey was forced to admit, his defeat left him only about 200 horse, 'ill armed and exceedingly worn out with constant duty'.²

Such problems were, ironically, compounded by the arrival of the Warwick horse. For morale amongst Massey's bedraggled troopers was not improved by the sight of these well clothed and well equipped forces, and the rate of desertion increased as a result.³ By 25 April, cavalry reinforcements from other garrisons had begun arriving at Gloucester.⁴ Many of these, however, had already accumulated large arrears of pay, and soon began to 'complain for want of money'.⁵ Fortunately for Massey, Rupert had decided against any major advance into Gloucestershire; his forces retreated to the region between Hereford and Worcester.⁶

The Royalist press gleefully predicted that Massey could expect a frosty reception from the estranged Committee at Gloucester.⁷ Even one of the Parliamentary news-sheets admitted that there was 'some private difference between Gloucester's Governor and the County Committee'.⁸ The reverse that Massey had suffered at Ledbury had certainly shaken his self-confidence to some extent. He now sought guidance from the Parliament as to

- (1) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.206b.
- (2) Bodl., Tanner Ms.60(1), ff.127b,132b; E 281(9).
- (3) Ibid, f.128.
- (4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.128.
- (5) BL, Egerton Mss.3514, f.91.
- (6) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.132b; Corbet, pp.145-6; Rushworth, vi.23.
- (7) ORN, iv.38.
- (8) E 276(6): The Weekly Account, March 26-April 2, March 29.

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military objectives in the new situation.¹ In requesting further support, he also felt compelled to re-emphasise his unswerving loyalty to the Parliament, probably anticipating that his enemies on the County Committee would seek to make the most out of the Ledbury debacle.²

In late April some of the Gloucester corporation sent a petition to the Commons requesting that Massey be kept on as Governor of the city. Massey's supporters, such as mayor Nurse and aldermen Brewster and Singleton, must have been informed of further attempts to oust him.³ His relations with the city's governing body had always been more harmonious than with some on the County Committee.⁴ According to malicious Royalist speculation of 30 April, Cromwell's brigade of horse was moving towards Gloucester to 'relieve or rather displace Massey'.⁵

On 1 May the Commons heard details of Massey's exploits at Lydney and his later defeat at Ledbury. In the light of his distinguished military record, the house did not hold him personally responsible.⁶ It resolved instead that he should be granted the 'iron works and iron mills, that were Sir John Winter's, to his own use, advantage and benefit'.⁷

Massey, therefore, had finally gained possession of a landed estate. This satisfied a long-standing ambition. But Winter's property was in no condition to yield an immediate income. In May 1644, Massey himself had burnt down three of the surrounding iron mills to prevent their use by the Royalist

- (1) Bodl., Tanner Ms.60(1), f.128b.
- (2) Ibid; ff.132b-33.
- (3) GRO, B 3/2, f.327.
- (4) Dorney, pp.7-8.
- (5) BL, Add.Mss.18,982, f.50b; Warburton, iii.79.
- (6) CJ, iv.127-8; Webb, ii.172; Washbourne, pp.103-4.
- (7) Ibid.

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forces.¹ Much of the rest was destroyed by Sir John when he abandoned it, and Rupert's army fired yet more forest iron mills as it withdrew from Gloucestershire in April 1645.² Still, the Commons also agreed to compensate Massey for his personal losses at Ledbury. A lump sum of £200 in cash was to be sent, with a letter of thanks.³ An ordinance was also passed to secure for Massey a regular income of £1,000. This seems to indicate that an earlier and similar decision had not been implemented.⁴ Neither, apparently, had an ordinance to bestow £2,000 per annum from Winter's estates.⁵

By early May, both Rupert and Maurice had advanced towards Oxford to lift Cromwell's token siege of the Royal capital.⁶ Massey pursued the Princes, though neither he nor Cromwell could prevent the King from joining them for the summer campaign.⁷ Some Royalists speculated that Cromwell and Massey would initiate combined operations in the Oxford area.⁸

In the midst of these developments Massey was distracted by dramatic news from London. As early as 1 May it was rumoured that he was about to be made Commissioner General of horse in the New

- (1) BG, p.329; E 50(17); E 281(5): The Moderate Intelligencer, no.9, April 24-May 1, pp.65-6.
- (2) E 279(11): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.97, April 22-9, p.778.
- (3) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.382; CJ, iv.128.
- (4) CJ, iii.512; iv.128; E 282(3): The Weekly Account, no.18, April 30-May, May 3.
- (5) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, ff.300,382.
- (6) Ibid, f.382b; Corbet, p.146; Sprigge, p.14.
- (7) Warburton, iii.81; Dugdale, p.79; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.382b.
- (8) BL, Add.Mss.18,982, f.55; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.326.

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Model under Cromwell.¹ His continuing bad relations with the County Committee, it was openly admitted, necessitated a change of command. Edward Cooke was seen as a potential replacement at Gloucester. It was thought that the Gloucester Committee could 'better harmonise' with a man of local standing and interests.²

On 5 May it was decided at Westminster that Massey should become Major General of the Western Association.³ It is clear that the Committee for the West was instrumental in this appointment.⁴ Massey's record of almost uninterrupted success at Gloucester impressed many at Westminster and in the Parliamentary high command. No-one could be sure he would accept the post, even though it involved promotion.⁵ For the Western Association by now meant very little. The areas of Parliamentary control in the western peninsular had been virtually wiped out in 1643 and Essex's campaign of 1644 to reverse this situation had been a complete disaster. Parliament retained no field force in the West. It hung on in garrisons, of which the two most important, Plymouth and Taunton, were closely besieged by the Royalists.⁶

On 7 May the King left Oxford with his army, arriving in Stow the next day. Rupert and the other Royalist forces fanned out into eastern Gloucestershire.⁷ This sudden burst of activity prevented the hoped for combined operations between Massey and Cromwell around Oxford. The eastern hundreds of Gloucestershire

(1) E 282(10): The Moderate Intelligencer, no.10, May 1-8, p.74.

(2) Ibid.

(3) SP, 21/8, f.230; E 282(7) Mercurius Civicus, no.102, May 1-8, p.915.

(4) Corbet, p.149; SP, 21/8, f.230.

(5) SP, 21/20, f.189.

(6) J.Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva (1854), xi-xiii; LJ, vii.350.

(7) BL, Harleian Mss.911, ff.6-7; Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.27; Dugdale, p.79; Walker, p.125.

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again suffered at the hands of the King's rampaging troops.¹ Small parties of Royalists were involved in skirmishes with Massey's forces near Campden house.² On his march to Evesham on 9 May, Charles ordered Colonel Henry Bard to abandon the mansion at Campden so that his regiment could be added to the Royal field army. Bard complied and fired the great house to deny Massey its use.³ It would have made an excellent staging post between Warwick and Gloucester.

On 9 May, Luke wrote to Massey congratulating him on his appointment to the command of the Western Association.⁴ The reasons for his acceptance of the post must remain open to speculation. Corbet claimed that Massey was undecided at first.⁵ Contemporaries also doubted whether such a highly successful Governor would care to confront the daunting problems of the western command, and the still powerful enemy forces in the region.⁶ But as a professional soldier, Massey must have found the idea of promotion to Major General very hard to resist. In addition, perhaps crucially, his relations with the local Committee had begun to deteriorate again.⁷ The Royalist forces had withdrawn and Gloucestershire relatively secure: once more the balance of power between the civilian and military personnel shifted towards the former. In the West, by contrast, Parliament was faced with a campaign of reconquest: military commanders might reasonably expect a free hand.

- (1) E 282(12): The Scottish Dove, no.81, May 2-9, p.640; E 282(14): Mercurius Veridicus, no.4, May 3-10, p.28.
- (2) Ibid; E 284(5): The Weekly Account, no.19, May 7-14.
- (3) Clarendon, iv.37-8; Walker, p.126; BL, Harleian Mss.911, f.7b.
- (4) BL, Egerton Mss.3514, f.80.
- (5) Corbet, p.149.
- (6) SP, 21/20, ff.189-90.
- (7) Bodl., Nalson Mss.5(107), f.243.

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By the 9th it was widely known in the Commons that Massey was to be placed in command of the five South western counties.¹ But the Common Council of Gloucester immediately decided that a petition should be sent to the Parliament asking for Massey's continuance as Governor there.² One newsheet perhaps voiced Massey's own motives for leaving. 'It is a pity he should only remain a Governor in a particular garrison, who had rather meet with the enemy in the field, than converse with the Committees in towns'.³

By mid-1645, Massey was indisputably Parliament's most successful commander in the entire western region. Indeed, given that Waller was now prevented by the Self Denying Ordinance from holding command, he was its only successful commander. Massey had proved at Gloucester that he was capable of securing widely scattered garrisons with a relatively small marching brigade. This was exactly what was required by the Parliamentary forces in the western peninsular.

Massey began to give some thought as to who should succeed him as Governor, and recommended Colonel Berrow to Lenthall.⁴ He also warned the Speaker that there was to be a petition presented against him in the Commons. This was probably in response to the pro-Massey petition forwarded by the Gloucester corporation. Massey related that although the new petition was to be presented in the name of the county committee only two of its members, Kyrle and Shepard, had been instrumental in its compilation.⁵

- (1) BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.18b.
- (2) GRO, B 3/2, f.327; E 282(14): Mercurius Verdicus, no.4, May 3-10, p.32.
- (3) E 284(21): Mercurius Britanicus, no.83, May 12-19, p.759.
- (4) Bodl., Nalson Mss.5(107), f.243.
- (5) Ibid.

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On 16 May, the Commons began to consider an ordinance granting to Massey command of all the 'forces of horse and foot, raised, or to be raised, for the western association'.¹ The Committee of the West and the Gloucestershire County Committee were asked to consider how Massey's new appointment 'may not intrench upon any power given to Sir Thomas Fairfax'.² In the midst of these proceedings, the competing factions on the Gloucester Committee introduced into the Commons the pro and anti Massey petitions. But both of these documents were ignored and the house pressed on with its original plan to send Massey into the West.³ It seems certain that the ordinance confirming Massey as Major General of the West was not passed immediately because an amendment was needed stipulating his subordination to Fairfax.⁴ In the centralised New Model, the supreme commander could have no equal.

With the removal of the King's field army Massey was joined at Tewkesbury by Major Buller and the disgruntled remnants of Essex's disbanded cavalry.⁵ With Gloucester now relatively secure Massey and Buller rode on to the Cotswold escarpment at Broadway, towards the northern boundary of Oxfordshire. There they met with Lieutenant General Cromwell who had been helping to contain the Royalist capital's garrison as Fairfax approached from the South.⁶

- (1) CJ, iv.145; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.210b; E 284(19): The True Informer, no.4, May 10-17, p.30.
- (2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.384b; CJ, iv.145.
- (3) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.210; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.384b; CJ, iv.145-6.
- (4) E 284(19): The True Informer, no.4, May 10-17, p.30.
- (5) E 284(22): The Parliament Scout, no.2, May 13-20, p.8; Corbet, p.147.
- (6) E 284(23): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.100, May 13-20, p.805; E 284(22), p.8.

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Massey's natural concern for his principal garrison, however, led him to retreat towards the line of the Severn.¹

The Committee of Both Kingdoms was still keen that Massey should be active in the Gloucester area. It encouraged him to take the strategically situated Royalist garrison on the Avon at Evesham,² which was vulnerable because many of its defenders had been drawn off into the King's field army.³

On May 23 the ordinance confirming Massey as commander-in-chief of the West was passed in the Commons.⁴ He was to command the meagre existing forces of the five South western counties, including Weldon's and Graves's New Model brigade, based at Taunton,⁵ in addition to all other troops which Parliament might send as reinforcements.⁶ The new commander's authority was a little restricted: he was bound to obey instructions issuing from the Parliament or the Committee of Both Kingdoms, and he was not empowered to replace Governors without the consent of the Western Committee.⁷ Massey was urged by both houses to take up his new command with 'all convenient speed'.⁸

He was expected however to treat Fairfax as his superior even within the boundaries of his association.⁹ This provision hardly seemed to compromise Massey's new found authority within the five counties, since Sir Thomas had more pressing business

(1) BL, Egerton Mss.3514, f.22; E 284(23), p.805.

(2) SP, 21/8, f.266.

(3) Ibid; SP, 21/20, f.251; Hutton, pp.173,178.

(4) CJ, iv.152-3; LJ, vii.389,393.

(5) SP, 21/8, f.230; SP, 21/20, f.189.

(6) Bodl. Tanner Mss.60(1), f.160; A&O, i.685; LJ, vii.393.

(7) Ibid.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Ibid.

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
elsewhere, and would probably be entangled with it for some time. The new Major General's powers were compared to those of his nominal superior. Hopes were expressed that he might soon be able to reduce most of the King's western garrisons.¹

Meanwhile, on 26 May, Massey stormed the town of Evesham.² Its capture imperilled Royalist communications between Oxford and Worcester and provided for the exiled Parliamentary County Committee a Worcestershire base from which to operate.³ The Committee of Both Kingdoms was quick to congratulate Massey for implementing its suggestion with such spectacular success. But it was also concerned about the security of the Eastern Association now that the Royal army was on the march. It ordered Massey to Burford, to which Fairfax had just been recalled from the West.⁴

Before leaving for Oxfordshire, Massey returned for the last time to Gloucester, to settle his principal garrison.⁵ There was some discontent there because some of the garrison were 'generally desirous' to accompany their old commander westwards.⁶ On the 29th the civic representatives of the city penned yet another protest but this time they addressed it to the Common Council of the city of London. In it Luke, Brewster, Wise, Webb, Singleton and other

- (1) BL, Egerton Ms.3514, f.61.
- (2) Corbet, p.147; E 286(14) A True Relation...of the Taking... of Evesham, May 31; Walker, p.126.
- (3) Bodl. Nalson Ms.5(109), f.248; BL, Harleian Ms.166, f.166; BL, Add.Ms.31,116, f.212b; BL, Add.Ms.37,343, f.386; BL, Egerton Ms.786, f.35; Corbet, p.148; Clarendon, iv.38; Walker, p.126.
- (4) SP, 21/20, f.288.
- (5) E 286(20) The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.102, May 27-June 3, p.820.
- (6) E 286(32) Mercurius Verdicus, no.8, May 31-June 7, p.60.

MASSEY'S CAPTURE OF EVESHAM, May 26 1645.



KEY

Main roads



Scene of fighting



Castle or fortified house



Royalist garrison




Parliamentary garrison



Garrison fired and abandoned by the Royalists



The route of Massey's march to Evesham



Royalist garrison captured by Massey



Brigade of Parliamentary horse



Chapter 6

Gloucestershire worthies exclaimed that their hearts were sore with 'grief for the removal of Colonel Massey from us whose endeavours amongst us God hath so wonderfully prospered'.¹

By early June the Committee of Both Kingdoms had changed its priorities once more, and it became anxious that Massey should return immediately to the West.² The ex-Governor was allowed to take his newly constituted horse regiment, now incorporating Buller's troopers, to assist him in his new responsibilities.³ The immediate reason for the change of plan was the increasingly sorry plight of Weldon's New Model brigade at Taunton.⁴ The Major General of the West, like Fairfax after the storming of Leicester, was suddenly free to dispose of his forces as he thought fit.⁵ But it is clear that Massey thought the forces available in Gloucester insufficient to make any impression against Goring's army. Above all, he lacked the numerous foot and dragoons essential to engage Goring on equal terms.⁶ Massey therefore pleaded for more reinforcements, and for the authority to recruit more men.⁷

On 7 June the Commons admitted several London aldermen from the Guildhall, who brought to the house's attention a letter sent them by the Gloucester corporation, expressing apprehension at Massey's departure.⁸ But the delegation was merely assured that

- (1) Bodl. Nalson Mss.4(4), f.10.
- (2) SP, 21/8, f.298; CJ, iv.159.
- (3) Ibid, f.298-9; CJ, iv.159.
- (4) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.214b; CJ, iv.159.
- (5) SP, 21/8, f.306; SP, 21/20, f.332.
- (6) E 288(2): The Weekly Account, Week 23, June 4-11, June 4.
- (7) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.387b.
- (8) CJ, iv.168; BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.31.

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Gloucester's security and future military Government had been secured.¹ The same day the city of London was asked to supply troops for Massey's expedition to Taunton.² The Parliamentary leadership did not seriously consider complying with the Gloucester corporation's request. Massey's own determination to leave his old command had seen to that.³

The extent of support, both in the city and county, for Massey's continued presence at Gloucester reflected the respect in which he was generally held.⁴ Corbet declared that the anti-Massey petition was only supported by a small faction on the County Committee.⁵ This is confirmed elsewhere and by Massey himself. The Gloucester corporation complained to the Commons of the 'sinister ends' of this clique.⁶ Massey's most uncompromising opponents such as Bromwich, Shepard, Pury and Edward Stephens, although champions of local civilian rule against military Government, were also vociferous members of the emerging Parliamentary Independent faction at Westminster. Aware of his political and religious indifference, they constantly attempted to undermine Massey's authority.

So Massey's unexpectedly long and eventful tenure at Gloucester came to an end. His experiences there had opened a rift with the more extreme Parliamentarians which future events in the West were to widen. Massey's estrangement from the men of extreme principle was perhaps inevitable. His own stance had never been governed by firm convictions on the great political questions of sovereignty between King and Parliament.

(1) Corbet, p.151; CJ, iv.167; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.387.

(2) CJ, iv.168.

(3) Corbet, pp.151-2.

(4) Ibid; Washbourne, p.107.

(5) Corbet, p.151.

(6) E 286(11): The Scottish Dove, no.84, May 23-30, p.660; Bodl., Nalson Mss.5 (107), f.243.

CHAPTER 7.

THE WESTERN BRIGADE, JUNE 1645-OCTOBER 1646.

In the spring of 1645, the Parliament reappraised the forces to be allocated to the western theatre of operations. Here, its provincial forces were least satisfactorily organised. The result was the Western Brigade.

As Governor of Gloucester, Massey had always opposed the very idea of New Modelling. He foresaw that the creation of a single army would lead to the centralisation of the Parliament's war effort. As a result, isolated provincial forces, such as his own brigade at Gloucester, would be yet more susceptible than before to the problems of ill-provision which had exacerbated its recent sufferings.¹

The great bulk of Massey's newly acquired cavalry had already been deployed in the West without him. Cooke's, Popham's, Fitz-James's and the Plymouth regiments had been placed under the temporary command of Colonel Graves, of the New Model, around Taunton.² After the fall of Evesham the new Major General of the West did not immediately join these troops, as some had hoped.³ He was determined to secure the necessary financial support for his military establishment. Samuel Luke hoped that he would 'do like the wise builder, cast up the charge of your fabric before you undertake it'.⁴ But Massey was also concerned that only horse regiments had so far been assigned to him. He would need foot and dragoons if he was to make any headway against Goring.⁵

(1) SP, 21/17, ff.130-34.

(2) Sprigge, p.16.

(3) E 286(20), p.820.

(4) BL, Egerton Ms.3514, f.79.

(5) E 288(5): A Diary, or an Exact Journal, no.56, June 5-12, June 5.

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Despite assurances of financial support from the Commons Massey travelled to London on his own initiative.¹ He took lodgings at the sign of the George in King Street, Westminster, and from here issued an unusual broadsheet, inviting all officers prepared to serve under him to present themselves at the George for interview.²

London at this time was full of reformado officers displaced from the armies of Essex, Waller and Manchester. Fairfax had sent to the Committee of Both Kingdoms a list of officers he did not intend to employ, and the list was forwarded to the Committee of the West so that it could choose from it officers to serve under Massey.³ Those listed, therefore, had all been recently refused positions in the New Model. Many may have felt deeply humiliated by such treatment, and as a result, harboured a grudge against the new army. Whole troops of unemployed reformados were raised.⁴ Massey must have shared the doubts of his newly recruited officers, especially when he realised how inadequate was his new military establishment.

It is probable that while he was in London, Massey made a special effort to recruit reformados and officers with West country connections. Former officers of Waller's army would have been especially useful. There were a great many of them with little else to do.⁵

- (1) CJ, iv.165; E 262(4): A Perfect Diurnall, no.97, June 2-9, pp.768-9,773.
- (2) E 289(13): Untitled Broadsheet, June 26.
- (3) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60, f.73.
- (4) E 288(32): The Exchange Intelligencer, no.5, June 11-18, pp.34-5.
- (5) SP, 21/8, ff.11-12.

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Eventually, on 19 June, Massey left London to embark upon his western campaign.¹ Once underway his advance was extremely rapid. By 25 June, he had arrived at Broad Chalke just South West of Salisbury. The next day he met with Colonel Popham's forces from Romsey on the downs near Cranborne. Massey then proceeded towards Blandford in Dorset.²

On the 26th, the Committee of Both Kingdoms informed Fairfax that Massey was marching westwards with 2,200 horse and dragoons. It also hinted that if Sir Thomas thought fit to march westward in Massey's support the Parliament would not disapprove.³ Massey must have been aware of the comprehensive nature of the New Model's triumph at Naseby. He may only have embarked upon his western campaign in the hope of substantial reinforcements from Fairfax. Massey wrote to the Commander in Chief of the New Model, with the information that his forces were insufficient to relieve Taunton.⁴ Such a letter must have profoundly influenced Fairfax in the direction of sending reinforcements, and may well have been designed to do so.⁵

This suggests that the independence of Massey's command was already compromised. It was clearly specified in the ordinance creating Massey Major General of the West, that if Sir Thomas and his forces attached themselves to the Western Association he was to treat Fairfax as his superior officer.⁶ Fairfax was not granted direct command of the Western Brigade, but could command it indirectly, through Massey, because of his higher rank. This ambiguous and unsatisfactory arrangement was especially

(1) E 288(46): The True Informer, no.9, June 14-21, p.61.

(2) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.301.

(3) SP, 21/21, ff.36-7.

(4) OPH, xiii.517.

(5) Sprigge, p.59; Rushworth, vi.51; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.222; OPH, xiii.517.

(6) A&O, i.685.

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troublesome because Massey had become accustomed to military independence at Gloucester, where interference from leading Parliamentary Generals was rare and usually short lived. He was 'naturally jealous of honour', noted Corbet.¹

Unlike the Western Brigade, the New Model was certainly allocated state resources from a monthly contribution derived from all the counties under the Parliament's undisputed control. Money was shipped from Portsmouth to Lyme for Sir Thomas's army though none was sent from the Parliament's central treasuries to Massey.² The western regiments were expected to raise revenue within their own association, but the New Model, for the moment, was being regularly paid out of the nationally raised revenues which had been specifically set aside for it.³ Fairfax himself called upon the authorities in London to supply Massey with adequate amounts of money so that his troopers could also pay for their quarters amongst the country people.⁴

The link-up between Massey's and Fairfax's forces East of Blandford in early July made possible the relief of Taunton.⁵ Massey's horse and dragoons seem to have been regarded by the Parliamentarian leaders as reinforcements for Fairfax rather than *visà versa*.⁶ As the Major General of the West soon noted, New Model troops were paid more regularly than his own. Fearing the discontent that this could cause Massey called for an end to such anomalies.⁷

(1) Corbet, p.96.

(2) SP, 21/21, ff.57-8.

(3) M.A.Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army (1979), pp.67-8.

(4) OPH, xiv.12.

(5) BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.63; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.396; Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.301; Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(8), f.18.

(6) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.217; E 292(3): The Moderate Intelligencer, June 26-July 3, July 1.

(7) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.234.

The Western Brigade was reinforced by horse and dragoons from the New Model and with this mixed force Massey inflicted a decisive defeat on a large detachment of Goring's horse at Isle Moor.¹ This paved the way for an easy victory at Langport for Fairfax's forces on the following day.² Massey suspected, once more, that his regiment's contribution to the campaign in the West was not being properly acknowledged in London.³

The immediate problem confronting Fairfax and Massey after Langport was the seizure of the Royalist stronghold of Bridgwater.⁴ Massey was accused of not doing his best to bring about the reduction of that town.⁵ But Massey had actually been ordered by Fairfax himself to stand down from offensive action.⁶ Nevertheless, such rumours of his incompetence soon gained credence in London and found their way into Whitelocke's memorials.⁷ One news-sheet hinted at poisoned relations between the Parliamentary high commands. 'Colonel Massey, for his better accommodation &c made Governor of Bridgwater. And to speak the truth he had need to be accommodated, and Colonel Cooke ... but no more of that'.⁸

The Royalists were only too well aware of such divisions. In a letter to Lord Digby Anthony Langston claimed to have seen a captured dispatch, addressed to a close friend by the Major

- (1) Sprigge, pp.70-1; Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.301b; Clarendon, iv.62; Rushworth, vi.55.
- (2) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 25/(1931), f.44; Warburton, iii.137; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.239b; Vicars, pp.68-9.
- (3) Rushworth, vii.766; D.Holles, Memoirs of Denzil Lord Holles, (1696), p.70.
- (4) R.Bell, ed. Memorials of the Civil War: Comprising the Correspondence of the Fairfax Family (1849), i.239.
- (5) E 293(34): A Further Relation From Bridgwater; E 262(33): A Perfect Diurnall, no.104, July 21-28, p.828.
- (6) Sprigge, p.79; Rushworth, vi.57.
- (7) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.408.
- (8) E 295(7): The Moderate Intelligencer, July 31-Aug 7.

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General of the West, in which Massey complained that he was 'ill-used that he was at Bridgwater, that he had but 2,000 horse and few foot, that he was offered any conditions that he would be of the Independent faction, which he professteth to oppose'.¹ It seems that political and religious differences had combined with tension between rival military jurisdictions, to estrange further relations between the two forces officers.

After the fall of Bridgwater, the New Model marched eastward, taking the key Royalist garrisons of Sherborne, Bath and Bristol. Massey's brigade was successfully deployed in Somerset to prevent Goring breaking out of the western peninsula.² These successes did not, however, ameliorate Massey's sense of ill-usage at the hands of his own side. On 9 August, from Lyme Regis, he wrote to the Parliament about his troubled state of mind, calling for a 'speedy determination' of his rights concerning the Winter properties in the Forest of Dean.³ But Massey also told of the 'great evil of the unequal payments of the soldiers'.⁴ Above all, he was frustrated at the lack of military action now the New Model had been withdrawn to the East.

The Western Brigade's strength had already been reduced to some 2,000 horse.⁵ Massey complained that he was not 'found so useful' by 'the great army ... though western parts do need us'.⁶ He had been forced to recognise the relative weakness of his brigade, and its dependence upon an army whose strategic priorities were very different from his own. If the Western Brigade was financially worse off than the New Model, it had an advantage over Fairfax in that its officer corps consisted of

(1) SP, 16/510, f.230.

(2) Bell, i.248; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, ff.409-10; E 262(37): A Perfect Diurnall, no.105, July 28-Aug 4, pp.834,836.

(3) Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(25), f.52.

(4) Ibid.

(5) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.5.

(6) Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(25), f.52.

men well known and well respected locally. It seems that the Popnam brothers, especially Alexander, were active in building close links between the brigade and the local club movements.¹

Massey, meanwhile, was quartered near the borders of West Somerset and East Devon, a terrain of enclosed fields unsuitable for his mounted brigade. He felt keenly his lack of foot and dragoons.² According to Humphrey Willis, the leader of the mid-Somerset club men, Massey frankly admitted that the assistance he received from such civilian auxiliaries was invaluable.³ He was certainly wary of the still formidable military power of the Royalists in the peninsula. On 30 August, Massey reported from Bridgwater to Speaker Lenthall, an ominous concentration of Goring's troops in East Devon around Exeter. He complained that his various proposals for preventing such a dangerous situation had been inadvisedly 'rejected'.⁴ This was part of a larger pattern in which the region's needs immediate were being neglected by the New Model. The Commons was soon informed of Massey's forthright views.⁵

In his efforts to secure reinforcements from Fairfax, Massey cleverly manipulated London's popular press.⁶ He must soon have realised that his anxieties were still not being taken seriously at Westminster, and therefore issued a public plea to the Commons

- (1) SP, 16/511, f.39; SP, 21/22, f.31.
- (2) Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(78), f.164.
- (3) E 345(3): The Power of the Committee of ... Somerset, July 18.
- (4) HMC, 13 Report (1-2), p.262.
- (5) CJ, iv.261; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.257.
- (6) E 246(8): A Diary, or an Exact Journal, no.68, Aug 28-Sept 4, p.2.

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'that by a timely order to the General that he may not be wholly engaged with the army in other parts but may advance westward if the honourable house shall think fit'.¹ Such a public appeal for a revised strategy could hardly have pleased Fairfax or his staff.

After the fall of Bristol, Sir Thomas did dispatch some reinforcements to Massey,² though this did not placate him. Massey declared that his desire for a speedy end to the war could not be achieved 'so long as we suffer a marching army to act its own desires without impeachment'.³ Massey may well have suspected that he and his men had been exposed for so long to the danger of annihilation by a Royalist counter attack because of the political, religious and personal differences between himself and the command of the New Model. Waller had had similar suspicions when similarly endangered during the spring of 1645.⁴

Massey's achievement had been great, if unspectacular. He had prevented the advance of Goring towards Bristol with a horse brigade less than a quarter of the strength of the western Royalists. He had also cultivated close and fruitful relations with the various club movements in Devon and Somerset. Assisted by divisions among the western Royalists, he had been able to consolidate his position in the borderlands of those counties.

While Sir Thomas began to invest Exeter, Massey was dispatched North to take the town of Tiverton.⁵ The Major General's cavalry and Weldon's New Model foot were fortunate

- (1) Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(78), f.164.
- (2) E 302(9): The True Informer, Sept 14-20, Sept 19; E 301(7): The Weekly Account, Sept 11-17, Sept 13.
- (3) Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(78), f.164.
- (4) Sir.W.Waller, Vindication of the Character and Conduct of Sir William Waller, Knight, Written by Himself (1797), p.18.
- (5) E 306(1): The Taking of Tiverton...; OPH, xiv.91; Rushworth, vi.94; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.21; Clarendon, iv.98.

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in their successful seizure of Tiverton castle.¹ But, as usual, in London, Fairfax and his army received all the glory.²

Both sides began to settle down into their winter quarters. But soon, a new crisis of confidence broke out within the Parliamentary high command. In mid-November Massey wrote from Tiverton to a friend in London, regretting that his 'business' in the capital was 'much retarded', and that he had not 'obtained that happy issue' which he had been led to expect.³ In a mood of growing of hopelessness and isolation, Massey eventually left for London.

The proximate cause of his departure was the issue of the Governorship of Bristol. This was offered to Major General Skippon, Fairfax's commander of foot, as a reward for his role in the capture of Bristol, which had been effected entirely by New Model troops.⁴ In the euphoria of victory it was overlooked that the city was technically under Massey's command.⁵ This was only realised after Skippon had taken up his new command.⁶ Massey, therefore, had suddenly been robbed of the most prestigious Governorship in the West, and had not even been consulted about its fate. But perhaps what angered him most was the fact that Skippon was also to be granted an independent military and financial establishment within the Western Association.⁷

- (1) Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(131), f.271; Sprigge, p.155; OPH, xiv.91-2; Rushworth, vi.94-5; Vicars, p.69.
- (2) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.239; BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.148b.
- (3) E 311(12): A Copy of a Letter From Major General Massey.
- (4) CJ, iv.319.
- (5) A&O, i.489.
- (6) E 311(10): The True Informer, Nov 30-Dec 6, Dec 12.
- (7) A&O, i.811.

This arrangement, designed to enable Skippon to finance his new garrison, was to syphon off resources badly needed for Massey's brigade. But it seems that attempts were made in the Lords to secure for Massey the Governorship of Bristol, even before his arrival in the capital,¹ though the ordinance confirming Skippon as Governor was passed while he was still bound for London.² By mid-December Massey had reached the capital, although there were some doubts as to his whereabouts.³ Popular newspapers openly supported the stated objective of his visit - to secure the supply of his forces.⁴

Massey could also count on allies in the Lords, who objected to the way that his rights with regard to the city of Bristol had been pushed aside.⁵ In the following weeks the pro-Massey lobby in the Lords devised an ambitious plan for the virtual reconstruction of the Western Brigade. Doubtless Massey was consulted about these proposals, which involved such a large scale expansion as to convert the brigade into an army, a counterweight to the New Model. Five new infantry regiments, each 1,200 strong were to be raised, and other plans were made for the recruitment of dragoons and the formation of a powerful artillery train.⁶ There were many who had become apprehensive about the indispensability of the New Model within the Parliamentary war effort.⁷ Massey's continued advocacy of decentralisation (as at Gloucester), fitted well with the politics of the Presbyterian faction which was becoming increasingly dubious about the New Model's Independent sympathies.

(1) E 311(10): The True Informer, Nov 30-Dec 6, Dec 2.

(2) A&O, i.811; LJ, viii.23.

(3) ORN, iv. 352: Mercurius Academicus, Dec 22-7, 1645; E 311(30): The Kingdoms Scout, Dec 9-16.

(4) E 313(2): The Weekly Account, Dec 10-17, Dec 10.

(5) LJ, viii.17.

(6) *Ibid*, 113-5.

(7) Holles, p.37.

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In the capital, Massey did not lack personal friends and contacts upon whom he could call for assistance. Two of his brothers, Robert and Jonathan, were citizens of London.¹ Both were merchants, with links to the city's civic and commercial institutions.² On 20 January 1646, the leather sellers of the city invited Massey to a ceremonial dinner, at which they admitted him to full membership of their company.³ The bestowal of such an honour upon the former runaway apprentice told of Massey's continuing popularity in London, where his defence of Gloucester had been seen as the capital's salvation in 1643. And it was the London trained bands which had made possible the relief of his garrison. This mutual bond of obligation was to be vitally important in the future.

Despite Massey's early cultivation of various city interests there was not the remotest chance of the new western military establishment being approved by the Commons. The Royalists had all but been cleared from the peninsula.⁴ This created an opportunity for the various Parliamentary forces to be deployed elsewhere. The remaining military presence in the West were required only for security purposes and could be reduced.⁵ Hence the Commons referred the expansionist plans for the brigade back to the Committee of the West.⁶ The Lower House was able to point to provisions relating to the raising of new regiments for the Western Brigade in which the Lords had impinged upon their exclusive, and jealously guarded, right to table bills

(1) Ormerod, ii.399; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.31; E 23(18), p.5.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Gentlemans Magazine, (1833) Pt.2, ciii.304-5.

(4) Sprigge, pp.226-30; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, ff.258b,259-60; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.44.

(5) Lady.E.Drake, The Family and Heirs of Sir Francis Drake (1911), i.350.

(6) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.258b.

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concerning the raising of revenue.¹ Massey was unable to win the breadth of support in the Commons necessary to advance the troop and revenue raising proposals; his allies did not extend beyond a small group in the Lords and some members of the Committee of the West.² His failure to win the majority on the latter may have had to do with the stance of its chairman, Edmund Prideaux MP. Prideaux was an inflexible member of the emerging Independent faction, by now closely associated with the New Model.³ Anyway, the efforts of Massey and his supporters to create a new framework for the Western Brigade had received a severe, and as it proved, permanent set back.

Meanwhile Massey's ramshackle collection of horse regiments had come under the overall control of Fairfax's high command, and now functioned as an auxiliary cavalry brigade assigned to the New Model. Even the flagging Royalist propaganda machine noted Massey's continuing absence from his forces and their diminishing strength.⁴ No doubt he had intended to return to the West at the beginning of the new campaigning season. But Massey's London activities necessitated a more protracted absence. The lack of his energy, prestige and self importance accelerated the decline of the brigade's strength and its capacity to assert its independence from the New Model. Thus, it was said of Colonel Cooke, Massey's

(1) CJ, iv.467; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.43.

(2) E 506(15): A Perfect Diurnall, no.136, March 2-9, p.1093; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.43.

(3) D.Underdown, Prides Purge (1985), p.69; Keeler, pp.315-6.

(4) ORN, iv.437, Mercurius Academicus, Feb 23-8, 1646.

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second in command, that he 'always readily and punctually observed his orders' from Fairfax.¹ Massey's prolonged absence inspired the popular press to rename his brigade 'Colonel Cooke's'.² But the Major General of the West chose to remain in London, at St Lawrence's lane.³

In the meantime Massey's troopers became increasingly undisciplined. Rumours of impending payments from London for the brigade's regiments had proved unfounded.⁴ Exasperated, some troopers began to demonstrate their contempt for Fairfax's authority. On 21 March Parliament ordered the Committee of the West to investigate an incident in which soldiers of Colonel Fitz-James's regiment 'robbed and offered other great outrages and violence to, diverse persons in the company of Mr Peters, who had the Generals passport for their quiet and safe passage'.⁵ In early March 1646 Fitz-James described frankly to Massey the deteriorating condition of the brigade. 'Your ragged, poor, yet faithful officers and soldiers expect you', he wrote 'they must have either your own self, or money speedily, or their hearts will break. Truly sir I never saw such dejected spirits in my life'.⁶

(1) Sprigge, p.194.

(2) E 322(25): The True Informer, Feb 7-14; E 322(36): A Diary, or an Exact Journal, Feb 12-18.

(3) BL, Microfilm 330, Alnwick Mss.547, f.35.

(4) Ibid, f.26b.

(5) CJ, iv.483.

(6) BL, Microfilm 330, Alnwick Mss.547, ff.20-20b.

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In London a day of thanksgiving was announced for the Parliament's decisive triumph in the West. The city corporation soon became involved in its organisation.¹ It was duly held on 2 April, when the two houses, the Scottish Commissioners, the Lord Mayor, and the Common Council attended service at Christ Church. Afterwards they attended a banquet at Grocers' Hall. Massey was a prominent guest at these proceedings in his capacity as Major General of the West.²

Despite Massey's continuing presence in the capital the political climate had turned against his brigade. The Commons asked the Committee of the West 'whether any forces, and if any what forces for the field are fit to be kept in the West'.³ The House was also careful to stress that the western military establishment had to be reassessed with 'regard to the public charge'.⁴ It was inevitable, given the absence of any Royalist field army which might justify a large military establishment, that Parliament would seek reductions.⁵ On 24 April it was agreed in the Commons that 'upon the reducement of the western counties ... a standing body, consisting of horse or foot, shall not be kept in the Western Association'.⁶ Massey's troops, months in arrears, were to receive only six weeks pay in settlement.

It was now easy for Massey to interpret the Commons earlier refusal to vote an adequate supply for his brigade as a part of an Independent plan first to deny it the means to subsist and then to do away with it altogether. The financial terms were derisory.

- (1) CLRO, Common Council Journal 40, f.175b.
- (2) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.70; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.263; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.45b-46.
- (3) CJ, iv.467.
- (4) Ibid; E 506(15): A Perfect Diurnall, no.136, March 2-9, p.1093.
- (5) D.Lang, ed. The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie 1637-62 (1841-42), ii.364.
- (6) CJ, iv.521.

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But having outflanked the Presbyterian attempt to expand the brigade, the Independent faction was unwilling to sacrifice the initiative by conceding larger payments, which would prolong the existence of a force whose leadership was hostile to them. The growing need to cut military expenditure helped lend credibility to this position.

Meanwhile, Massey's brigade had been marched towards Oxford to help in its encirclement.¹ It seems, however, that the Royalists, though their position was deteriorating, were able to inflict some sharp reverses on his forces.² Such defeats and the continuing shortage of pay must have sapped the morale of Massey's men. When, after Oxford had come to terms, Fairfax ordered the western regiments to Worcester to help blockade that city, they mutinied and refused to go. One news-sheet reported 'Major General Massey's men will not go out of their association until their Major General comes to them'.³ Such behaviour shows that rank and file discipline had crumbled rapidly in the last months.

It seems that the brigade then set off for home territory; a string of disorders in Somerset, Dorset, and especially Wiltshire were attributed to its troops. Fairfax had to dispatch New Model regiments to Worcester instead.⁴ The New Model high command was coming to see Massey's brigade as a liability; its sullen and mutinous attitude was setting a bad example to the rest of the army.

- (1) BL, Add.Mss.18,979, f.225; Bell, i.289; Rushworth, vi.266; E 332(3): The Moderate Intelligencer, April 2-9, April 2.
- (2) E 337(18): The Moderate Intelligencer, May 7-14, May 7; E 337(22) Perfect Occurrences, May 9-15, May 9.
- (3) E 337(18), May 7.
- (4) E 337(17): The Weekly Account, May 6-13, May 7; Rushworth, vi.285-86.

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By early May, the disbandment of the Western Brigade was being openly discussed in the Commons.¹ Massey, who had been resident in London for six months, must have been frustrated with his own political impotence and consequent failure to secure supplies and support for his brigade. During this period he began to become involved in the in-fighting between Presbyterians and Independents at Westminster, and he may have related such political and theological differences to the crisis in his relations with the New Model and to a lesser extent in his troubled relations with the Gloucester Committee.

Massey's opponents continued to report unfavourably upon his behaviour to the Parliament. On 1 May, the Commons was informed that Massey had tried to persuade members of his mother's family, the Grosvenors, to delay compounding for the delinquency because easier terms would soon be available. This accusation was taken so seriously that the house appointed some of their number to investigate it and 'other rumours of like nature'.²

At about this time, Massey decided to seek election to the Commons. Theoretically, such a move would, under the terms of the Self Denying Ordinance, debar him from holding simultaneously any military command, so it seems reasonable to believe that he had already concluded that the Western Brigade could not be saved from disbandment. It is difficult to see why he would otherwise relinquish a Major Generalship.

Massey's opportunity to enter the political arena in an official capacity came with the recruiter election at the small Wiltshire market town of Wootton Bassett. He owed his seat to the influence in this pocket borough of the Poole and Hungerford

(1) BL, Add.Ms.37,344, f.50.

(2) BL, Add.Ms.10,114, f.14b.

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families. Another long established patron in the county was the volatile Earl of Pembroke.¹ All had cause to be thankful to Massey. During the course of the war such leading civilians came to be bound up by many mutual favours to top military figures such as Massey. The Pooles and Hungerfords had vested interests in Gloucestershire as well as Wiltshire. Their social and political influence was most pervasive within a triangle bounded by Cirencester, Malmesbury and Marlborough.² In Wootton Bassett, at its centre, the electors reliably returned Parliamentary candidates nominated by their aristocratic and gentile overlords.³

Massey was elected as MP for Wootton Bassett on 18 June,⁴ and took his seat in the Commons on 9 July.⁵ Speaker Lenthall was ordered by the house to thank Massey for his 'great and faithful service done to this Parliament ... and the whole Kingdom'.⁶ By this time, however, the disbandment of his brigade had been under discussion at Westminster for three months, amidst an ever louder chorus of complaints at its behaviour. The Commons was keen to persuade Fairfax of the need for disbandment.⁷ The problem of indiscipline was well described by one newsheet: 'Major General

- (1) D.Underdown, 'Party Recruitment in the Recruiter Elections 1645-48', EHR (1968), p.243; D.Brunton and D.H.Pennington, Members of the Long Parliament, (1954), p.136; Harrison, pp.14-15; LJ, vii.19-20.
- (2) J.Waylen, Devizes, p.138; J.Waylen, Marlborough, p.157; Keeler, pp.309-10; D.Brunton and D.H.Pennington, pp.136,138-39; Williams, Parliamentary History of Gloucester, pp.156-7.
- (3) D.Underdown, EHR (1968), p.243.
- (4) B.D.Henning, ed., The Commons 1660-90 (1983), iii.29.
- (5) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.57b; E 511(20): A Perfect Diurnall, no.154, July 6-13, p.1236.
- (6) CJ, iv.610.
- (7) E 341(16): The Moderate Intelligencer, June 18-25, June 19.

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Massey's forces have little to do, nor little to spend'.¹ Whitelocke was forced to admit that 'idleness causeth the isolency of soldiers'.²

There were various suggestions as to how the disbandment should be organised. Parliament wanted the Committees of Ireland and of the West to 'confer together and consider how those soldiers might be reduced and sent into Ireland'.³ But Fairfax was reluctant to proceed, because no money had been sent to pay off Massey's regiments.⁴ No doubt Fairfax feared the consequences of attempting to disband the brigade without even a reduction of its huge arrears: he was well aware of the numerous outrages already committed by Massey's men.⁵ Deprived of supply by legal means, they had 'become their own takers'.⁶

The forces of law and order did what they could. Massey's officers held several courts martial in Dorset. Soldiers found guilty of various crimes were surrendered to the civilian courts for sentencing and punishment. In late July both officers and troopers were tried at the local assizes for murder and highway robbery.⁷ Other crimes included horse-stealing and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. Some, convicted of sacrilegious language, had their tongues bored.⁸

(1) E 342(11): The Scottish Dove, June 24-July 1.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.55.

(3) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.274b.

(4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.59(1), f.330.

(5) Ibid.

(6) E 342(11): The Scottish Dove, June 24-July 1.

(7) E 349(18): Truth Discovered From the West..., Aug 8; A.R.Bayley, The Civil War in Dorset (1910), pp.313-5; CJ, iv.638.

(8) Ibid.

Massey was aware of the importance of Fairfax in the process of his brigade's disbandment. He wrote to the General, expressing the hope that he could influence Parliament to provide a 'despatch of some suitable satisfaction and pay for their past service'.¹ But the temperamental Massey also enclosed a copy of the Parliamentary ordinance which had made him Major General of the West and told Fairfax that his commission had yet to be retracted by the Commons.² Clearly he had come to resent the growing ascendancy of the New Model.

Fairfax forwarded Massey's correspondence to the Commons, which now, on 15 June, resolved that the Committee of Ireland could choose what part of Massey's forces to send across St Georges Channel. The remainder, however, were to be disbanded.³ Two days later the Lords voted down the Commons motion. Rather impractically, the upper house resolved that an extra 1,500 horse and 5,000 foot should be raised to undertake the Irish service.⁴ At this time, the Commons was determined to disband its provincial forces, even if its arrears could be only in 'some measure satisfied'.⁵ This flowed not only from a desire to save money, but also from the political balance of forces. With the coming of peace the Parliamentary coalition created by the war began to fall apart.⁶ In an increasingly unstable situation, Presbyterians and Independents jockeyed for position in the

(1) Bodl., Tanner Mss.59(1), f.292.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid, f.330; CJ, iv.577.

(4) LJ, viii.380.

(5) CJ, iv.577.

(6) D.Underdown, Prides Purge, pp.7-8; Kishlansky, p.76.

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Commons.1

Some radical Independents feared that an alliance between the King, Scots, Presbyterians and the city of London would exclude them from shaping the coming national settlement in politics and religion.² Through the disbandment of provincial land forces, they sought to increase the dependence of Parliament upon the New Model which was becoming more sympathetic to them and their religious beliefs.³ Denzil Holles, the emerging Presbyterian leader, lamented the way in which war heroes like Massey were treated through the selective reduction of the Parliament's various brigades and regiments.⁴

To some Presbyterians in Parliament, Massey's anti-Independent sentiments were a key reason to try to keep his brigade in existence.⁵ Even in July 1646 the Parliament still had more men under arms in its provincial brigades and garrisons than in Fairfax's New Model. And there were other commanders, such as Major General Poyntz of the Northern Brigade, who like Massey, was sympathetic to the Presbyterian concept of post-war England.⁶

At the end of July, there occurred a crucial clash between the two Parliamentary factions over the future composition of the military establishment in England. Some Presbyterians suggested that 5,000 New Model soldiers should be sent to Ireland in place of Massey's regiments.⁷ This proposal was only defeated by one vote in the Commons.⁸ Fears about Scottish intentions were compounded by their capture of the King, and convinced many MP's

(1) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.53-3b; OPH, xv.5; Kishlansky, p.107.

(2) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.87.

(3) R.Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae (1696), p.59.

(4) Holles, p.45.

(5) J.Morrill, P&P, (1972), p.54.

(6) Ibid, pp.49-50.

(7) BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.16b; Kishlansky, pp.114-5.

(8) CJ, iv.631-2; BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.16b.

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that Fairfax's army should be kept together until some settlement was reached.¹ It is significant that behind the initiative so narrowly defeated in the Commons was the influence of Denzil Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton, the principal leaders of the Presbyterian faction.² The Independents saw their proposal as an attempt to break the coherence and unity of the New Model and disband it piecemeal. They were bound to resist this: the New Model was fast becoming a bastion of Independency outside Parliament.³

The failure of the Presbyterians to carry the Commons meant that Irish expedition would now be composed of various provincial forces, rather than the proposed six New Model regiments. Edmund Ludlow observed that the 'Commonwealth party taking advantage of the arguments used in the house for the relief of Ireland, and ease of the people of England, procured an order for the disbanding of Colonel Massey's brigade'.⁴ This order was another blow in the factional battle. Each sides primary aim was to preserve the strength and cohesion of military units and commanders broadly sympathetic to its own point of view. The use of force to settle political and religious disputes within the Parliamentary camp seemed increasingly possible.⁵ As early as June 1646 certain Presbyterians in London were afraid that the New Model would appear before the capital in support of the political claims of its Independent allies at Westminster.⁶

- (1) BL, Add.Ms.31,116, ff.279-79b; Ludlow, i.141.
- (2) BL, Add.Ms.10,114, f.16b; DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.85.
- (3) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.85; Ludlow, i.141; Carte, vi.351-2.
- (4) Ludlow, i.141.
- (5) D.Underdown, Pride's Purge, pp.73-4; J.Morrill, P&P, (1972), p.72.
- (6) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.83.

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The Independents were probably assisted by the outrageous behaviour of Massey's men in the West. The majority of moderate members, who may have supported the Presbyterian bid to retain the Western Brigade, must have been horrified by the various reports concerning such behaviour, and now voted to be rid of Massey's regiments, by one means or another, as quickly as possible.¹ If the Independents' reluctance to vote adequate revenues for the brigade had been designed to make its long term future untenable their policy had ultimately worked. Holles accused them of employing such unscrupulous tactics against the Earl of Essex and his army.²

As early as mid-July the Committees of the West and of Ireland had met to decide the fate of Massey's troops after disbandment. The Irish Committee was informed that the western horse still contained some 2,500 men. Colonel Cooke promised to supply more accurate figures, both of the total and of those who were prepared to volunteer for Ireland.³ In August the Parliament designated Bristol and Liverpool as rendezvous and embarkation points for the brigade. It was, optimistically, hoped that significant numbers of cavalry would be ready to embark by 20 August and shipping was made ready.⁴ But the defiant attitude of Massey's men was soon to bring about a dramatic change in these plans, and prefigured the more serious army mutinies among Fairfax's men eight months later. The New Model was to learn, as had the Western Brigade, that the Parliament could not force a large military contingent across the Irish sea if its rank and file were determined not to go.

(1) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.55.

(2) Holles, p.22.

(3) SP, 63/261, f.166b.

(4) E 350(5): The Scottish Dove, Aug 5-12.

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The demoralised condition of Massey's 'forlorn brigade' continued into August, his officers doing their utmost to defend its tarnished reputation.¹ Colonel Fitz-James believed that a deliberate campaign of misinformation was being orchestrated in London to disaffect and antagonise Massey's regiments yet further.²

One officer saw the 'scandalous reports' circulated in London as a means of discrediting the regiment, to 'make them odious both in the city and country'.³ He reported the troopers awareness of the factional and political strife which their brigade, and its conditions of service, had been caught up in.⁴ The six weeks pay offered were a 'poor pittance for fourteen months hard service'.⁵ He was also sure that 'none in this Kingdom ever received so hard a measure as we have done'.⁶ Finally he claimed that the troops were content for the present to be 'kept alive with such fare as the country grudgingly affords them'.⁷

Massey began to act as a unofficial recruiter election campaign manager for the Presbyterians, in the counties where he possessed prestige and influence. He wrote to prominent Herefordshire citizens recommending Colonel Edward Harley as a knight of the shire and his brother, Major Robert Harley, as the member for the city of Hereford itself.⁸ The Harley family were supporters of the Holles and Stapleton group in the Commons, they had also been close associates of Massey during 1644-45. In a letter to Edward Harley, Massey disclosed his hopes for an

(1) BL, Microfilm 330, Alnwick Mss.547, f.42.

(2) Ibid, ff.42-42b.

(3) E 349(18), Aug 8.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

(8) E 353(24): Perfect Occurences, Sept 5-11; BL, Loan 29/175, f.41.

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agreement between the King and the Parliamentary commissioners at Newcastle.¹ His concept of a desirable peace settlement was thus broadly in line with Holles's aims. If the King, Scots and Presbyterians could settle their differences the Independents could be effectively excluded from any share of power.²

Massey also informed Edward Harley that certain factions at Westminster were trying to prevent any agreement with the King and the Scots. 'But the more faithful to the Kingdom' he wrote, 'hope still the contrary and diligent men in the house to set things straight. God direct us to that way which may make most for his glory and his poor Kingdoms good'.³ It is clear that Massey's initial indifference to the Parliamentary cause, his disillusion with radicalism and centralisation, both at Gloucester, and in relation to the New Model and the Western Brigade, form a pattern of which his anti-Independent stance in this period is a continuation.

By this time, Fairfax too was eager that the Brigade be disbanded. Certain of Massey's forces, which Fairfax had somehow managed to get to Worcester ran amock upon the surrender of its Royalist garrison.⁴ But Fairfax also received complaints from other western parts, which he duly passed on to the Parliament.⁵ This prompted a debate in the Commons on 6 August. Massey entered the chamber himself to defend his long suffering troopers.⁶ On 25 September Massey's arrears were discussed in the Commons.⁷ It was discovered that he was forced to spend £944-06-02d of his own

(1) BL, Loan 29/175, f.41.

(2) Holles, pp.59,64,60-72; Kishlansky, pp.140-42.

(3) BL, Loan 29/175, f.41.

(4) Bodl. Tanner Mss.59(2), f.444.

(5) CJ, iv.638.

(6) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.279b; BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.17.

(7) E 513(13): Perfect Occurrences, week 40, Sept 25-Oct 3, Sept 25.

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money in sustaining his regiments during the western campaign alone. The House introduced an ordinance reimbursing its Major General, with interest, from the excise revenues.¹ His substantial arrears of pay, of course, remained unaltered.

In mid-September, with the death of the Earl of Essex, the Presbyterians lost their highest commander and acknowledged leader in the Lords, and Massey a valuable patron and friend.² Both Essex and Massey, according to a recent rumour, were both involved in a Presbyterian bid for undisputed power. The London Independent, Thomas Juxon, related that, had the Earl lived a week longer, the Lords would have attempted to appoint him commander of the New Model in Fairfax's place. Massey's brigade and other cavalry detachments sympathetic to the Presbyterian cause, backed by the Presbyterian London city fathers, would then declare for Essex. In the face of this coalition, the Army and Parliamentary Independents would be forced into a negotiated settlement with the King.³ However ill-founded such gossip, it is clear that Massey was already becoming identified with an extreme wing of the Presbyterian faction, prepared to resort to force. He was certainly to the fore of counter revolutionary initiatives in 1647.

Parliament was anxious, given the mutinous record of Massey's regiments, to enlist the authority of Fairfax in securing their peaceful disbandment.⁴ The Committee of the West appointed special commissioners to help the General in this task,

(1) CJ, iv.675-76; LJ, viii.507,512; BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.19b.

(2) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, ff.88b-89; OPH, xv.97-98; Snow, pp.487-88.

(3) Ibid, f.92.

(4) E 356(10): The Scottish Dove, Sept 30-Oct 8.

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including Massey himself and Alexander Popham.¹ Sir Thomas was persuaded to dispatch Henry Ireton with two regiments of New Model horse to assist in the disbandment.² The commissioners naturally feared that the meagre offer of six weeks pay and the recommendation of the Irish service would create trouble.³ A column of waggons containing £25,000 in minted coin had to be fitted out ready for the journey westward.⁴ Massey left London and met Fairfax and the other commissioners at Cornbury, the Generals head quarters, in Oxfordshire.⁵ They then entered Wiltshire, where the brigade was to be disbanded.⁶ Devizes was finally selected as the regiments' rendezvous.⁷

Colonel Fitz-James, like many other of Massey's officers, was bitter at his own treatment and that of his men. He described his troopers as having been drawn up in the field to 'receive their doom'.⁸ Sprigge attributed the fact that violence was avoided to the 'carefulness and prudence of Major General Massey, Colonel Cooke and the rest of the officers'.⁹ Edmund Ludlow, present in his capacity as one of the Parliamentary commissioners, tried unavailingly to recommend the Irish service.¹⁰ Ireland's reputation for dealing ill with English soldiers dated back to the reign of Elizabeth I. Ludlow found a 'general dislike of the said

- (1) CJ, iv.681.
- (2) Ludlow, i.141-42.
- (3) Ibid; E 258(11) The Scottish Dove, Oct 14-21.
- (4) SP, 28/302, pt.4, f.599.
- (5) E 513(15): A Perfect Diurnall, no.169, Oct 19-26, pp.1351-52.
- (6) SP, 28/302, pt.4, f.599; E 513(15), p.1352.
- (7) E 513(15), p.1352; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.68.
- (8) BL, Microfilm 330, Alnwick Mss.547, f.52.
- (9) Sprigge, pp.314-15.
- (10) Bodl., Tanner Mss.59(2), f.573.

conditions and no possibility of reducing them to that employment'.¹ The New Model troopers witnessed, and no doubt noted, this defiance.

In this highly charged atmosphere, some elements within the ranks 'endeavoured to stir up the brigade to a mutiny'.² But most soldiers seem to have been happy enough to give up soldiering, and to avoid the Irish service. Massey, Ludlow and Fairfax all made speeches to the assembled regiments asking that the Parliament's order and terms for the disbandment be promptly obeyed.³ Sir Thomas praised unstintingly Massey and the majority of his officers who did 'their duty very cheerfully in ordering their men to yield obedience'.⁴ But so few of the 2,500 men remaining volunteered for Ireland that not a single full troop of horse could be raised from them.⁵

Political and factional in-fighting over the brigade was still not at an end. The Lords, infuriated that the Commons had forced through the disbandment, resolved on 14 October that the Commons' instructions concerning the brigade would have to be 'fought out'.⁶ They ordered Fairfax not to disband Massey's regiments without the consent of 'both' houses of Parliament.⁷ But the Commons audaciously countermanded this order and required Fairfax and Massey to proceed as instructed. Fairfax seems to

(1) Bodl., Tanner Mss.59(2), f.566.

(2) Ludlow, i.142.

(3) E 513(21): Perfect Occurrences, week 44, Oct 23-30, Oct 23.

(4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.59(2), f.573.

(5) Ibid; BL, Microfilm 330, Alnwick Mss.547, f.52; Sprigge, p.314.

(6) LJ, viii.521.

(7) Ibid, 530.

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have to ignored the Lords order, and proceeded to disband the regiments, though he defended this by claiming to have started the process before the instruction forbidding it arrived at Devizes.¹

The Presbyterians had so far been outmanoeuvred, having signally failed to control the process of reducing the military forces in England. They lacked the necessary support and organisation to dominate the Commons, and the upper house had proved incapable of shaping the military establishment by itself. Consequently, the New Model remained intact, and provincial forces were disbanded.²

Massey left Devizes quickly, intending to attend the magnificent state funeral of the Earl of Essex on 22 October, though he mistook the date of the ceremony, and arrived a day late.³ At about this time, some Independents began to advocate the re-creation of the once Presbyterian-led Western Brigade, with a new officer corps chosen by its rank and file,⁴ but this politically inspired suggestion was not implemented.

Massey's experience as commander of the Western Association was crucial to the development of his later career. The struggle to ~~to~~ secure the future of his brigade was enmeshed with political faction-fighting; in waging it, Massey found himself catapulted from fiercely contested provincial struggles on to the stage of national politics.

(1) LJ, viii.544.

(2) Baxter, p.59.

(3) E 358(21): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, Oct 22-29, Oct 22.

(4) E 362(8): Propositions for the Western Association, Nov 14.

CHAPTER 8.

PRESBYTERIAN LEADER, NOVEMBER 1646-AUGUST 1647.

Massey's political career was built on the foundations of his achievements as a soldier. His entry into the political arena had originally been intended to defend the interests of his Western Brigade. Its disbandment was a source of Massey's continuing resentment at the dominance of the New Model army, which also reduced sharply his own prospects for employment. For the next ten months, Massey's primary objective was to secure a new military command, but this was to involve him in high political drama and intrigue.

Most informed observers blamed the Independent faction for the disbandment of the Western Brigade. Bellievre, the French ambassador, reported to his master that the Independents had paid off Massey's forces, but that they had nevertheless maintained themselves for 'four or five months in spite of them, which the Presbyterians considered to be of their persuasion'.¹ Holles and others saw Massey's effective dismissal from active service as part of a far wider purge of commanders who were sympathetic to the Presbyterian cause.²

The Earl of Essex's death disrupted tentative efforts to begin negotiations between the moderate Presbyterian leaders

(1) J.G.Fotheringham, ed. Montereul Correspondence 1645-48, Scottish Historical Society (1898), i.317.

(2) Holles, p.175; Bamfield, p.39.

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and certain Royalists.¹ Both Independents and Presbyterians thought Essex's death was the main reason why the latter failed to consolidate their hold on power in 1647.²

Massey's reformados did not disappear after their disbandment at Devizes, but arrived in London determined to pursue their grievances, presenting a petition to the Commons in late November. They wished to serve overseas but hoped to secure the remainder of their arrears before leaving.³ Massey himself confirmed various of his officer's war records so that they could present their accounts for settlement.⁴ Their pressure for rapid action may have prodded the Commons to recommend to the Committee of Accounts on 1 December that Massey's reduced officer corps should be given priority over other petitioners.⁵ Their previous petition for redress showed how well organised the Western Brigade's officers remained even after the dispersal of their regiments.

As an MP Massey was soon nominated to sit on various sub-committees of the house.⁶ On 10 December he was appointed to a sub-committee charged with examining how the arrears of the 'whole soldiery employed by the Parliament' could be satisfied.⁷ It is not known whether Massey was active on this sub-committee, but its members included some of the most prominent members of the house. On new year's eve Massey's name was added to another Commons sub-committee, appointed to investigate lay preaching and to determine

(1) Bamfield, p.15.

(2) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.120; Baillie, i.412,416.

(3) E 365(1): Perfect Occurrences, Nov 27-Dec 4.

(4) SP, 28/41, pt.2, ff.154,156.

(5) CJ, iv.734; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.71b.

(6) CJ, v.3-4.

(7) Ibid, 9.

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how best it might be suppressed.¹ Presbyterians were especially anxious to control unregulated sermons and other religious practices. But known Independents like Cromwell and Pury were also nominated in the interests of balance.²

By early 1647 Massey was trying to put his financial affairs in order, so that he could submit an account of his long overdue arrears.³ The list of Parliamentary sub-committees to which he was appointed grew yet longer, suggesting that he actively sought involvement in day to day political decision making at Westminster.⁴

In the new year, Westminster politics were dominated by the rivalry of the Presbyterian and Independent factions in the Commons. Holles's success in negotiating the peaceful withdrawal of the Scots had established a political ascendancy in the Commons for the Presbyterians.⁵ Independent opposition through conventional Parliamentary channels was now futile, and the faction began to boycott the Commons.⁶ As at Westminster, the political tide amongst the elite of the city flowed strongly in the direction of Presbyterianism.⁷ Indeed, the city fathers were in some respects more vehemently Presbyterian than were Holles and his colleagues.⁸

(1) CJ, v.35.

(2) Ibid.

(3) SP, 16/515, pt.1, ff.37-38.

(4) CJ, v.47.

(5) Kishlansky, pp.140-41.

(6) Holles, pp.69-72; P.Crawford, Denzil, First Lord Holles 1598-1680 (1979), p.140; Montereul, i.390; Ludlow, i.135-6; Kishlansky, pp.108-09.

(7) R.Brenner, 'The Civil War Politics of Londons Merchant Community', P&P (1973), pp.85-88.

(8) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 29/(2420), f.72.

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The progress achieved by Massey's senior officers in securing their arrears was not shared by most of their junior colleagues. In mid-January a large crowd of them, some accompanied by their wives, demonstrated in Westminster Hall. They were so 'insolent and injurious in language, that a commotion was feared'.¹ By early February it was agreed that £1,000 should be set aside to pay Massey's reduced officers.² This was scarcely adequate, and it was also stressed that it represented a one-off payment, evidently designed to avoid further disturbances at Westminster.³ Some 700 of Massey's former troops had again demonstrated outside the Commons chamber in a 'tumultuous manner'. The house warned that if this recurred they would be 'exemplarily punished'.⁴ But the treatment of Massey's reformados suggests that their demonstrations had been particularly vocal and well organised.

What part Massey played in the lobbying campaign is open to speculation. But he did experience grave difficulties in getting his own arrears settled. Many of his papers had been lost and the informal system of payments at Gloucester did not lend itself to accurate accounting.⁵ Massey's sensitive ego was also offended by the strict auditing procedures employed by the Committee of Accounts. He complained that never had an officer of his 'quality' been obliged to render such a detailed account of his income and expenditure.⁶ Massey estimated that £7,735-09-10½d was

(1) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 29/(2420), f.72.

(2) CJ, v.75.

(3) CJ, v.75; Kishlansky, p.152.

(4) BL, Add.Ms.31,116, f.300b.

(5) SP, 16/515, pt.1, f.37; GRO, MF 285, Barwick Ms.f.2.

(6) SP, 16/515, pt.1, f.38.

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still owed him in arrears, which was probably generous: some of the financial presumptions on which this figure was based were very vague.¹ Hostile commentators claimed he had enriched himself during the war by abusing his position as Governor of Gloucester.² But similar accusations were levelled at many other commanders.

Now that the Scots had peacefully evacuated the North, and the Irish situation was growing more urgent, the debate over the New Model could no longer be postponed. It was eventually agreed to retain part of it as a security force for England, and to send the remainder to subdue the Catholic revolt in Ireland.³ The Independents did their best to oppose these measures, but such was Holles's dominance in the Commons that they were passed with large majorities.⁴ On 5 March Fairfax was confirmed, by a very narrow margin in the Commons, as supreme commander of the Parliament's land forces in England.⁵ The day before, the Lords had refused to continue the national assessment scheme which had financed the New Model since 1645.⁶ It was generally believed that the peaceful disbandment or splitting up of the Army was inevitable.

On 13 March Massey acted as a teller in a division in the Commons for the first time. He and Waller defeated a bid on behalf of the remaining town Governors which would have enabled them to retain their commands of the few garrisons that continued to

- (1) SP, 16/515, pt.1, ff.37-8.
- (2) CP, ii.159.
- (3) CJ, v.90-1; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.79b; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.302d; Waller, p.42; Ludlow, i.147.
- (4) Montereul, ii.18; Clarendon, iv.218.
- (5) CJ, v.106-7; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, ff.303b-04; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.80b.
- (6) LJ, ix.57.

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exist in England.¹ As a result, those Governors to whom the Presbyterians objected could be removed. Others, such as Poyntz, who enjoyed Holles's confidence, found themselves allocated new responsibilities, such as the command of Clifford's tower at York.²

The Derby House Committee, which administered all relief bound for Ireland, was now dominated by Holles and his Presbyterian lieutenants. It was decided that a delegation from the Committee, which included Waller and Sir John Clotworthy, should travel to Saffron Walden to consult with Fairfax about the forces that were to be sent to Ireland.³ They soon discovered a general reluctance to undertake such service.⁴ The experience of the Western Brigade had taught the Parliament nothing.

Some have seen the Parliament's treatment of the New Model as being unnecessarily tactless.⁵ Others have argued that the army was treated as fairly as possible in the military and financial circumstances.⁶ It is true that Fairfax's regiments were being treated no differently from other, now expendable military units. The Western Brigade and other provincial forces had disbanded peaceably, partly under the threat of forcible action by detachments of the New Model.⁷ The latter, however, could not easily be divided against itself, and Parliament had no other substantial forces to police the disbandment of Fairfax's regiments.

Massey continued to reside in London. The events surrounding the demise of the Western Brigade had convinced him of the

(1) CJ, v.111.

(2) Ibid.

(3) SP, 21/23, ff.155-6.

(4) Waller, pp.44-47; LJ, ix.112-3; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.81b; E 515(5): A Perfect Diurnall, no.192, March 22-29, pp.1528-9.

(5) A.Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen (1987), p.30.

(6) Kishlansky, pp.156-8.

(7) SP, 21/23, ff.119,121.

futility of military command without political influence: he was by now closely associated with the group around Holles. Massey had apparently continued to stay at St. Lawrence's Lane throughout 1646, and may still have been resident there.¹ He had brought from the West, and presumably retained, some few servants and his personal secretary.²

Massey seems to have lived in some style. He ran up 'large expenses', maintaining 'many servants and horses'.³ This does not appear to have diminished his resentment at what he considered Parliament's lack of understanding and generosity in the matter of his arrears.⁴ It is probable that the only full length portrait of Massey by Lely was painted during this stay in London.⁵ Massey would have been around forty three years old in 1647. Lely's painting portrays a professional soldier in early middle age, conscious of his prestige and personal influence.

His membership of a large number of Commons sub-committees suggests that Massey was a fairly regular attender of the lower house.⁶ The fact that he acted as a teller in Commons votes alongside such men as Waller and Holles in the spring and summer of 1647 told of his growing prominence in Presbyterian circles.⁷ But it is unlikely that Massey tried to cultivate a new career in politics: he sought political patronage in the hope of

(1) BL, MF 330, Alnwick Mss.547, ff.34b,35.

(2) Gentlemans Magazine, ciii, (1833), pt.2, pp.304-5.

(3) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30.

(4) Ibid; SP, 16/515, pt.1, ff.37-8.

(5) See frontispiece.

(6) CJ, v.6,9,10,35,47,75.

(7) Ibid, 111,132,179.

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re-launching his military career.

On 1 April, a proposal that Waller should command the expeditionary force to Ireland was comfortably defeated in the Commons.¹ Sir William had made it clear that he did not relish such a challenging responsibility.² A suggestion that Massey should accompany him as Lieutenant General of the horse was not put to the vote.³ Next day the veteran New Model commander of foot, Philip Skippon, was chosen to lead the Irish expedition.⁴ It was hoped that this popular soldier would make the service more acceptable to Fairfax's rank and file.⁵ Far more controversial was Massey's appointment as Skippon's Lieutenant General of horse and effective second in command. He had had no previous connection with the army and had indeed been highly critical of it. But he was also widely known to be a strong supporter of Holles and the Presbyterian faction.⁶ Holles must have been keen to replace the radical Independent Cromwell as head of the New Model's cavalry. Massey was one of the few young and able ex-commanders who was both politically sympathetic, and eager to do further military service.⁷

Massey's appointment was certainly opposed in the Commons by some leading Independents, including Henry Ireton, Cromwell's son-in-law. Exchanges between Ireton and Holles became so heated that the Presbyterian leader challenged his adversary to a duel. The

(1) CJ, v.131; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.82b; Rushworth, vi.444.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.306b.

(3) E 383(22): The Moderate Intelligencer, April 1-8, April 1.

(4) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.307; BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.22b.

(5) CJ, v.133; Rushworth, vi.446; Holles, p.82; Waller, p.68; Ludlow, i.147.

(6) Waller, pp.84-5; Clarendon, iv.238; Woolrych, pp.39-40.

(7) Vicars, pp.69-70.

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house was forced to order both men to desist from such behaviour.¹ Massey's nomination as Lieutenant General certainly raised him from the relative obscurity in which he had languished since the disbandment of his brigade.

On 7 April, Massey was added to the Committee of Ireland at Derby House, Holles's Presbyterian cabinet, which was to manage the interrelated tasks of reducing the New Model and reinforcing the English forces in Ireland.² This was the political complement of his recent military promotion. At Massey's first meeting, it was decided that another delegation should be sent to the army's headquarters. Waller was chosen again, and Clotworthy was also picked. Massey too was asked to go: this suggests that it was seen as important that the new Lieutenant General familiarise himself with his new command as soon as possible.³

On 13th the delegation set out for their crucial meeting with the assembled ranks of the New Model's officer corps at Saffron Walden.⁴ Massey's experience in the process of disbandment was confined to his own brigade. Success in relation to the New Model, to which he was a newcomer, depended on winning the respect of Cromwell's officers, and convincing them that the Irish service was important and worthwhile. On 14 April, Massey arrived with the other commissioners at Saffron Walden, and quickly discovered that the agitation against the Irish expedition was being orchestrated by many of the army's senior officers. The opposition seemed concentrated amongst the cavalry regiments, who were campaigning among the infantry for a boycott of the Irish service, designed

(1) BL, Add.Ms.10,114, ff.22b; Clarendon, iv.238.

(2) SP, 21/26, f.34; CJ, v.135.

(3) Ibid.

(4) BL, Add.Ms.37,344, f.84; Rushworth, vi.454; Waller, p.77.

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to maintain the army at its full strength till its grievances relating to pay and indemnity were met.¹

Next day, the Derby House commissioners met with a large group of Army officers at Fairfax's lodgings. When informed that Skippon had been chosen to lead them in Ireland, with Massey as his deputy, some observed that Skippon had already asked to be excused from such an unpopular command.² Waller had been made aware that a whispering campaign was being directed against Massey. It was said that he was a 'profane man', unfit to exercise command over men who were becoming increasingly steeped in Independency and radical religious thought.³

But the ordinary troopers of the New Model also had more practical objections to Massey's appointment. Two of the army's cavalry regiments, Fairfax's and Ireton's, had helped to supervise the disbandment of the Western Brigade seven months previously. But they had identical grievances to Massey's men. They too desired assurance that their arrears would be paid, and a total indemnity for all the illegal acts they had committed during the war before their disbandment or transfer to other services.⁴ Massey was seen as an outsider with no record of defending such rank and file interests.

Waller was also a Presbyterian, and defended Massey as a 'gentleman of a fair and unblamable conversation'.⁵ The New Model also objected against Massey that he was 'not of the faction'

(1) Waller, pp.78-9.

(2) Rushworth, vi.458; Waller, pp.83-4.

(3) Waller, p.84.

(4) Ibid, 83.

(5) Ibid, 84.

(ie the Independents) 'which they called the army'.¹ This was later celebrated in verse;

'Ere they tread Irish ground for Cromwell they will cry
Skippon content them cannot nor Massey
The reason is they are not of their sect
Which makes the army wholly them reject'.²

Several officers demanded to be accompanied by their old commanders: 'Fairfax and Cromwell and we all go'.³ This must have been very unnerving for Massey because it showed that most officers remained loyal their old Lieutenant General. Massey was resented as a Presbyterian intruder, appointed to break up the army's cavalry regiments on terms highly unfavourable to them. Disappointed by the reluctance of Cromwell's horse, Massey and the other commissioners concentrated their efforts to recruit for the Irish expedition upon the New Model infantry.⁴ Even here, some of their efforts were ill judged,⁵ and Massey's involvement may have confirmed the soldiers in their distrust.⁶

On 23 April, Massey and the other commissioners arrived back in London from what had been a humiliating debacle. They hastened to report, the next day, to a meeting of the Derby House Committee, where it was decided that those few soldiers who agreed to leave the New Model should be granted money immediately so

(1) Waller, p.84.

(2) E 399(36): Works of Darkness Brought to Light..., July 23.

(3) Rushworth, vi.458; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.84b.

(4) SP, 16/515, pt.1, f.89a; Rushworth, vi.463; E 515(9): A Perfect Diurnall, no.195, April 19-26, p.1565.

(5) Rushworth, vi.463; E 515(9), p.1565; Woolrych, p.49.

(6) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.11.

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that they could discharge their quarters.¹ The disappointingly short lists of army officers prepared to undertake the Irish service were presented to the Commons.² Only 681 troopers were prepared to break ranks and put themselves at Massey's disposal. This left 5,380 horse with the army. It had proved impossible to draw off a complete troop from any regiment. The total number of recruits from the New Model was less than a troop more than a single one of its cavalry regiments.³

On 29 April, Derby House Committee asked Massey to go down to Goldsmiths Hall to borrow £4,000 so that the forces that were ready to leave for Ireland could be transported immediately.⁴ This illustrates the respect in which Massey was held in the city and how the Committee hoped to exploit it.

In the growing confrontation between the Presbyterian dominated Parliament and the army, many soldiers began to identify with the Independent faction. The strength of religious Independency in Fairfax's regiments may have been exaggerated, but there can be no doubt that it was better regarded than Presbyterianism.⁵ To some extent the convergence between the increasingly mutinous army and the Independents was an alliance of convenience.⁶ Independency found itself increasingly isolated in the Commons. In early May the house agreed to the thirty one names selected by the Common Council of the city of London to make up its new Militia Committee. A Parliamentary ordinance confirming

(1) SP, 21/26, f.49.

(2) Rushworth, vi.464-5; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.85.

(3) HPMF, Clarke Ms.41, f.16.

(4) SP, 21/26, f.51.

(5) Baxter, p.50.

(6) Kishlansky, p.178.

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them as such was passed on 4 May.¹ So extensive was the purge of Independents that only ten members from the original Militia Committee remained.² The high Presbyterian composition of the new Committee was much commented upon by contemporaries.³ And the city Government was becoming increasingly intolerant of Independents in its midst.⁴

Massey continued to attend the Derby House Committee. There he concerned himself with the raising of revenues so that more forces could be dispatched to Ireland.⁵ But Massey only attended meetings at which Holles and leading supporters such as Waller were present, and missed thinly attended sittings of the Committee, such as those on 12 and 13 May.⁶ This confirms his status as an inner member of the Holles clique, an important man with commitments elsewhere, probably in the city.

It was at this time that the Presbyterian dominated Commons at last decided to try to dissolve the New Model, although no agreement had been reached as to the terms of its disbandment.⁷ Perhaps it was hoped that Fairfax's regiments were too seriously divided to resist a determined effort to disband them.

Massey, meanwhile, undertook to recruit a full regiment of horse for Ireland.⁸ Perhaps this rather optimistic venture was

(1) A&O, i.928; Sharpe, ii.241-2; CJ, v.160-1.

(2) BL, Add.Ms.10,114, f.24.

(3) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 29/(2505), f.204; Clarendon, iv.241.

(4) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, ff.107b-8; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.309.

(5) SP, 21/26, ff.55,57.

(6) Ibid, f.57.

(7) CJ, v.176-77; BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.24; BL, Add.Mss. 31,116, f.310; Rushworth, vi.487; Waller, pp.124-5; Bell, i.342.

(8) CJ, v.176; Kishlansky, p.174.

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designed to make amends for his dismal failure to recruit sufficient numbers from Cromwell's regiments. Massey probably intended to base this force upon the former officers of his own regiments, many of whom were present in and around London.

A rumour reached the army that Massey had travelled down to Gloucester to secure it against the New Model.¹ These reports were certainly false: on May 19 Massey was present at Derby House along with the other leading Presbyterians.² However the fact that the New Model had seriously entertained and was apprehensive about, such a report showed that it recognised Massey as one of its most active and dangerous opponents. On 20 May, Massey joined with Holles in a vote branding as 'insolent and seditious', a petition sympathetic to the Independents.³ Army opinion increasingly attacked the Presbyterian leaders as tyrants.⁴ On the 24th the Derby House Committee decided that the Parliamentary votes regarding the reduction of the New Model should now be implemented.⁵

There was little doubt that the city would support the Parliament in any political confrontation with the army. But its readiness to defend itself from attack was highly suspect. Sir Lewis Dyve, imprisoned in the Tower, noted growing fear and confusion in the capital and increasing reluctance to become involved in any violent action against the New Model.⁶

- (1) HPMF, Clarke Ms.41, ff.132,133.
- (2) SP, 21/26, ff.58,60-1; SP, 16/539, pt.3, f.53.
- (3) CJ, v.179; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.87b; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.310; DrWL, Juxon Mss. 24*50, f.109.
- (4) HPMF, Clarke Ms.41, f.133.
- (5) SP, 21/26, f.62; Waller, pp.126-7.
- (6) H.G.Tibbut, ed. The Tower of London Letter Book of Sir Lewis Dyve 1646-47, Bedfordshire Historical Society (1958), p.58.

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Whitelocke suggested that many former officers had only supported Holles from jealousy of the New Model's successful record. But, as he also noted, its monopoly position denied to them all hope of further military appointments.¹ Such motives were important in forming Massey's own commitment to the Presbyterians and their policies.

On 27 May, Massey missed another meeting of the Derby House Committee.² The same day he was given leave by the Commons 'to go into the country'.³ This decision would have required the permission of Massey's political sponsors. The purpose of his journey is unknown, but it must have been of some importance. Meanwhile the army's Council of War convened at Bury St Edmunds, Fairfax's new head quarters, and defied the Parliament's call for disbandment by massive majorities.⁴ The General informed Speaker Lenthall of his regiment's near unanimous opposition, but expressed the hope that the conflict could be peacefully resolved if diplomatically handled.⁵

On the eve of the crisis, Massey was certainly in London at Holles's side. On 30 May he attended a meeting of the Derby House Committee,⁶ so the leave of absence from London granted on 27th had not resulted in any prolonged departure.⁷ Massey may not even have left London at all. Perhaps the original plan was superceded by the pace of events in the army, convincing Holles that Massey was of more use in the capital. He was certainly present at Derby

(1) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.88b.

(2) SP, 21/26, ff.66-7.

(3) CJ, v.188.

(4) CP, i.108-11; Holles, p.94.

(5) Bodl., Tanner Mss.58(1), f.118; Rushworth, vi.499; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.89b-90; Waller, pp.128-9; LJ, ix.226.

(6) SP, 21/26, f.71.

(7) CJ, v.188.

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House again on the 31st, when the Committee ordered the New Model's ordnance train, based at Oxford and Wallingford, to be removed to the Tower of London.¹ He was also a party to its decision, next day, to recall the Parliamentary commissioners because of the violent opposition created in the army to the disbandment proposals.²

Holles began to suspect many of Fairfax's officers of complicity in the unrest which accompanied this opposition.³ Army resistance created confusion, fear and uncertainty amongst the Holles group, which had temporarily lost the initiative.⁴ Some of the bolder Presbyterians sought to sound out opinion, in the city and at Westminster, on the merits of a forcible challenge to the New Model. But little support could be found for such extreme measures.⁵

On 3 June, the Commons began a series of spectacular climb downs which demonstrated its demoralisation to all observers. Even the Declaration of Dislike, penned by Holles on 30 March, was struck from its journals.⁶ Whitelocke thought it was at this point that the 'Parliament began to surrender themselves and their power into the hands of their own army'.⁷ Royalist sentiments were also beginning to manifest themselves more strongly in the city. On the Prince of Wales's birthday, 30 May, 'his highnesses colours were so much worn, as no more ribbons of those colours

(1) SP, 21/26, ff.72-3; CP, i.114-5.

(2) Ibid, f.74.

(3) Holles, pp.95-6.

(4) Waller, pp.141-2; Holles, p.108; CP, i.116.

(5) HPMF, Clarke Ms.41, f.54.

(6) BL, Add.Ms.31,116, f.311b; BL, Add.Ms.10,114, f.25; Rushworth, vi.502; CJ, v.197,199; Holles, p.107.

(7) BL, Add.Ms.37,344, f.90.

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was to be bought in the exchange'.¹ The Parliament's promise to pay all the New Model's arrears excited the resentment of impoverished ex-officers who had served under Massey, Waller or Essex. At the start of June, violent demonstrations took place in Westminster Hall, and reached the very doors of the Commons.²

Soon after this the house was shocked by the news that a detachment from the army had removed the King from Holmby.³ Leading Presbyterians did not hesitate to implicate senior army officers such as Cromwell and Ireton in the planning of this operation.⁴ Some officers who supported Holles now began to leave the New Model. Massey, amongst others, wrote to Fairfax expressing the hope that such an action would not prejudice their standing with the army.⁵ On 4 June the new Militia Committee of the capital 'sat ... very close'.⁶ Earlier that morning Cromwell and other prominent Independents left London for the army.⁷

The Presbyterians were quick to provide money for the soldiers who had broken ranks with Fairfax's regiments. Holles, Stapleton and Massey were central in organising the finance.⁸ The Presbyterians were also anxious to enlist the support of the numerous reformados in London. On the 6th the Commons appointed a Committee to meet them in the Court of Requests. Holles,

(1) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 29/(2522), f.229.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.25; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, ff.311b-12.

(3) Rushworth, vi.502-3; LJ, ix.236-7; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.90-90b; Bodl., Tanner Mss. 58(1), f.136; Holles, p.97.

(4) Waller, pp.136-9; Holles, p.97.

(5) HPMF, Clarke Ms.41, f.55b.

(6) Rushworth, vi.504.

(7) A.Fraser, Cromwell Our Chief of Men (1973), p.195.

(8) SP, 16/539, pt.4 ff.55,58,60-1,64.

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Stapleton, and Massey were its principal members.¹ After an impassioned speech by Holles the reformados vowed that they would all 'live and die with the Parliament'.²

Later that day Massey travelled through the city streets in his coach. Leaning out of the window, he called upon the citizens to 'defend themselves against the mad men in the army', and exclaimed to passers-by that 'Cromwell had betrayed them all and was fled from London without license or order'.³ Clearly Massey was active in the policy of confrontation with the New Model. But success depended upon the corporation's Militia Committee and its trained band regiments.

Parliament was torn between the radical Independency of the army and the conservative Presbyterianism of the city.⁴ On the 7th Massey was appointed to a committee formed to placate the reformados, who were clamouring at Westminster for payment of at least some of their arrears.⁵ The Parliament was being subjected to ever greater pressures. But it soon became apparent that the city authorities, at least, had come to favour an accommodation with the army.⁶ For their part, the commanders of the New Model, now massing at Cambridge, promised to restrain the troops - if the city would cooperate. The Common Council was warned not to continue alligning itself with the Holles group.⁷

- (1) E 391(12): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, June 1-8, June 6.
- (2) Ibid.
- (3) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 29/(2528), f.236.
- (4) Kishlansky, p.225.
- (5) CJ, v.201; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.91b.
- (6) CLRO, LCCJB, 40, f.218b; E 391(6): The Humble Petition of the Lord Mayor, June 8; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.91; LJ, ix.252.
- (7) SP, 26/515, pt.2, ff.24-24b; Waller, p.124.

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During 11-12 June, Holles and his allies tried to persuade the Presbyterian dominated city corporation to put the city into a 'posture of defence'.¹ It was proposed to create a new Committee of Safety, comprising delegates from Westminster and from the London Militia Committee.² The new structure was designed, ostensibly, to maintain law and order, but it is clear that its real purpose was to mobilise the city against the New Model. This objective won enthusiastic support amongst some city high Presbyterians.³ Presumably, they, and their counterparts at Westminster, hoped that outrage at the army's behaviour was sufficiently widespread amongst the citizens to create a groundswell of opinion in favour of forcible resistance. They were to be greatly disappointed.⁴

The city's trained bands were ordered to muster on the 12th.⁵ Many former officers re-enlisted for military service at Derby House.⁶ Massey's involvement in these proceedings is not known, though his conduct on the 6th and the prominent role in the attempted counter revolution of July and August, suggest that he must have played an important part.⁷ Few members of the trained bands responded to the call. Soon the attempted rising was collapsing through the lack of spontaneous support, which may

(1) CJ, v.207; Rushworth, vi.553; Sharpe, ii.244.

(2) Ibid; LJ, ix.258.

(3) Holles, pp.108-09; Waller, pp.148-9.

(4) Waller, p.149; Kishlansky, pp.239-40.

(5) HPMF, Clarke Ms.41, ff.79; Rushworth, vi.556; Clarendon, iv.277; BL, Add.Ms.37,344, ff.92-2b; Kishlansky, p.240.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 29/(2528), f.236.

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well have reflected widespread confusion as to its purpose.¹ The measures of the 11th and 12th had been ordered by the capital's ultra Presbyterian Militia Committee, but the all powerful Common Council had stood aloof.² It soon became clear that the more extreme Presbyterian elements both at Westminster and in the Guildhall had tried to force the majority of the corporation into an armed confrontation it did not wish to undertake.³

Now the attempted coup had lost momentum, the corporation wrote a reassuring letter to the army at St Albans.⁴ The authorities at the Guildhall were trying to avoid confrontation between the Parliament and its army, and hoped to act as a mediator between them.⁵ Militarily, the Parliament was now defenceless against the New Model and could not resist its demands.⁶ Yet the Common Council had not perceived its vital interests to be under sufficient threat from Fairfax's forces to sanction a military confrontation with them.⁷

The Commons continued to be threatened by large crowds of

- (1) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.79; Bodl., Clarendon SP, 29/(2531), f.241; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.92-2b; Rushworth, vi.556; Holles, pp.110-11; Clarendon, iv.227; Sharpe, ii.246-47.
- (2) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.110; OPH, xv.439; Woolrych, p.140.
- (3) LJ, ix.256; Holles, p.110; Waller, pp.149-50.
- (4) CLRO, LCCJB, 40, ff.221-21b; Rushworth, vi.556; Waller, p.151.
- (5) E 392(21): The Answer of ... the Lord Mayor, June 14; Sharpe, ii.247-48; Woolrych, p.140.
- (6) Holles, p.111.
- (7) Woolrych, p.140.

reformados, who singled out Independent members especially for abuse and threats.¹ Massey was appointed to a committee charged with the immediate distribution of money to the unemployed officers.² He was often made responsible for tasks involving contact with the reformados in the capital, probably because so many had previously served either with him, or with other Presbyterian commanders, such as Essex or Waller, with whom he had enjoyed good relations.

Massey was still actively involved with the affairs of the Derby House Committee, and concerned himself with the condition of the forces bound for Ireland.³ He was one of those who saw to the billeting of the small detachments that had left the New Model.⁴

In a move to exclude its principal political opponents from the Commons, the army brought a series of allegations against eleven leading Presbyterian MP's, of whom Holles and Stapleton were first and second on the list, and Massey was the seventh.⁵ The New Model was eager to depict Holles and his closest allies as a subversive clique, trying deliberately to poison relations between the army and the Parliament.⁶ On 15 June, commissioners from the Parliament were informed at St Albans that the army expected the eleven members to cease to attend the Commons immediately.⁷ In London, some political tracts began to urge openly that the Parliament and city should raise a new military force, if not as a means of confronting the New Model, at least as a counter-balance to the army's much enhanced capacity to

- (1) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.84.
- (2) CJ, v.210; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.313.
- (3) SP, 21/26, f.79.
- (4) SP, 16/539, pt.4, f.72.
- (5) Rushworth, vi.570; Woolrych, pp.137-8.
- (6) Ibid.
- (7) Rushworth, vi.572.

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enforce its will.¹ The New Model leaders remained sceptical of London's capacity to raise forces in its own defence or that of the Parliament.²

On 16 June, the army's charges against the eleven members were at last presented to the Commons.³ Massey was no doubt targeted by the army because of his involvement in the attempted disbandment of the New Model's regiments. But Fairfax and his officers were well aware that distinguished Presbyterian commanders such as Waller and Massey represented an alternative military leadership, and therefore a threat to their own position, should politicians like Holles have their way.⁴

Each of the eleven members rose in turn to defend himself from the allegations of treason and war mongering. Massey, as one of the more recently elected members, spoke last. He made light of his predicament, and that of his colleagues, in jovial soldierly terms. In what must have been taken as an approving reference to defiant statements just issued by his political mentors, Massey exclaimed that 'although it did fall to his lot to bring up the rear, yet it was a great encouragement to him that there was so much venture in the van'.⁵

Despite the danger in which they were placed, Holles and his circle continued to meet at Derby House,⁶ and to organise the supply both of forces bound for Ireland and of those which had left the New Model.⁷ Those eleven named by the army were able to continue in this way, since the Commons had refused to move

- (1) E 392(22): Eight Queries Upon the Late Declaration, June 15.
- (2) Holles, p.116.
- (3) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.93; CJ, v.214-5.
- (4) Woolrych, p.138.
- (5) E 393(19): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, June 15-22, June 16.
- (6) SP, 21/26, f.80.
- (7) Ibid, ff.81-2; CSPD, 1645-47, p.562.

against them until more precise and substantial charges had been brought.¹ However, by late June, Massey's direct involvement with the Derby House Committee had ceased.² The reason for this remains unclear. Perhaps his efforts among the reformados and in the city were now too time-consuming.

Waller believed that in this period, the Parliament's political ascendancy was fatally undermined by its own policies towards the army. Its procrastination, and its efforts to humour the New Model, he thought, increasingly revealed its weakness and impotence. The army's contempt for its civilian masters grew, and the Parliament's self respect diminished, in equal measure.³ Massey may well have shared these views, which were common amongst the leading Presbyterians.⁴

The army was certainly becoming more impatient, threatening to remove the eleven members by force if they continued to attend the Commons.⁵ The New Model commanders believed that the Presbyterian leadership was still conspiring to bring about a second war in order regain its political ascendancy. Thus, Fairfax's Council of War thought Holles, Stapleton, Waller and Massey were responsible for the gathering of numerous forces around London and the reformado disorders at Westminster.⁶

On 25 June, the eleven members, aware of the army's growing pressure on the Commons, declared their intention to withdraw

(1) Holles, pp.116-17.

(2) SP, 21/26, ff.82-99.

(3) Waller, pp.152-3,164.

(4) Holles, pp.89-91.

(5) Bodl., Tanner Mss.58(1), f.252; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, ff.314b-15; Waller, pp.166-7.

(6) Rushworth, vi.589; E 393(36): A Humble Remonstrance..., June 24.

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voluntarily,¹ though the house declared that not enough evidence had been presented to justify their permanent exclusion.² The Presbyterian press of London continued their vigorous defence.³ Holles and his colleagues must have realised that there was no military means of resisting the army's demands.⁴ They asked leave to retire to the provinces, and this sudden tractability greatly surprised and even moved the house.⁵ It may have been prompted by the belief that an invasion of the capital by the army was imminent.

With the departure of the eleven from Westminster the Derby House Committee all but ceased to function though the Commons felt obliged to ask it to meet on the 28th.⁶ However diplomatic their public utterances, the eleven members were privately outraged at their treatment, and at the fact that they had been obliged to abandon their responsibilities as MP's.⁷ Massey believed he had been unjustly compelled to absent himself from the Commons, and that his good name had been tarnished by malicious allegations so vague that it was impossible to answer them.⁸ The eleven sought to turn such complaints to good effect by submitting to the

- (1) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.315; E 395(5): The Moderate Intelligencer, June 24-July 1, June 25.
- (2) Ibid; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.95; CJ, v.223; Rushworth, vi.592; Waller, p.169.
- (3) E 394(1): IX Queries..., June 25.
- (4) Woolrych, p.144.
- (5) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 29/(2538), f.249.
- (6) CJ, v.225.
- (7) Holles, p.141.
- (8) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30.

Commons, a petition demanding a 'speedy trial'.¹

The Parliament's recent payments to its disbanded officers had compounded, rather than solved, the reformado problem in the capital by encouraging many more impoverished officers to flock to London in search of financial redress. The authorities at the Guildhall greatly feared that this sudden influx could 'very much endanger the peace and safety of the city'.² There were other potential sources of unrest. In the city, popular Presbyterianism noisily demanded that the Parliament reach a religious and political settlement with the King. The Common Council expressed the hope that it would not be long before Charles was restored to his 'just rights and authority'.³

Reports reached the New Model that auxiliaries and horse continued to be raised in the capital under the pretence of policing the city's extensive lines of earthworks. According to the army's informant, it was being openly said in London that 'Colonel Massey's former gallantry will acquit him before the world, and Holles and Stapleton are men beyond your reach to deal withall'.⁴ This is indirect evidence that Massey was already involved in attempts to organise armed resistance against the New Model. His leadership qualities tended to raise his prestige among the Presbyterians in this tense period, especially since the war records of Holles, Stapleton and many others were undistinguished.

(1) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.95b.

(2) CLRO, LCCJB, 40, f.231b; Rushworth, vi.597-8; E 396(15): The Humble Petition of the Lord Mayor..., July 3.

(3) Rushworth, vi.599; E 396(15), July 3.

(4) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.157.

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At last, on the afternoon of 6 July, the New Model's long awaited evidence against the eleven members was presented to the Commons.¹ Some of the accused had been notified in advance, and were called into the chamber immediately after the army delegation had left, though not all could be found.² The army's sweeping allegations were poorly substantiated, partly because it was hard to penetrate the Presbyterians inner counsels.³ Massey and his colleagues, it was charged, had plotted to restore the King on their own and not the Parliament's terms.⁴ Massey himself was also accused of arresting Ensign Nicholas, who had opposed the Irish service in April.⁵ This allegation at least had a basis in fact.

The army charged, unconvincingly, that Holles, Stapleton, Massey and others were instrumental in obstructing the relief of Ireland. But the New Model was justified in its claims that the Presbyterian leadership had deliberately misled the Parliament as to the numbers of Fairfax's soldiers drawn off to undertake the Irish service.⁶ Massey was further accused of being implicated in a rumoured plot of early June, in which three regiments of foot, bound for Ireland, were recalled from Worcestershire to Reading. From here, allegedly, it was planned to deploy them in the defence of London against the New Model.⁷

(1) Waller, p.174; LJ, xi.317.

(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.97.

(3) E 397(10): The Army's Post, July 1-8.

(4) E 397(13): A Continuation of Certain and Remarkable Passages, July 2-9, July 6; E 397(17): A Particular Charge or Impeachment, July 9; Woolrych, p.138.

(5) Ibid.

(6) E 397(17), July 9; E 397(13), July 6; E 397(10), July 1-8.

(7) Ibid.

Of more immediate importance than the trial were the declining relations between the city authorities and the army. It was reported that the Presbyterian dominated London Militia Committee was purging Independently inclined officers from its trained band regiments. The New Model was informed of one such, wide-ranging, purge of the Southwark regiment.¹ This naturally created much apprehension in the army,² which called upon the city authorities to reinstate the dismissed officers.³

On 9 July, the Parliament ordered all reformados to leave the capital by the 15th.⁴ This unusually decisive move may have been provoked by an assault on Thomas Pury's home and family by a violent group of soldiers.⁵ Whether any of Massey's former officers were involved in this attack on the home of his old antagonist at Gloucester is not known.

As these events unfolded, the Presbyterian press was forthright in the defence of Edward Massey. It recalled the events of 1643, offering a comparison between his conduct and that of a leading Independent. In that year, Nathaniel Fiennes had hastily surrendered Bristol to the forces of Prince Rupert; at Gloucester, in sharp contrast, Massey had defied the King for over a month. His stand had proved the 'principal means of saving the Parliament, city, Kingdom from utter ruin and conquest by the cavaliers'.⁶

(1) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, ff.161b-162; Kishlansky, p.257.

(2) Ibid, ff.165-66; Woolrych, p.131.

(3) Ibid, ff.166-67; Kishlansky, p.257.

(4) CJ, v.237-38; A&O, i.986-87; CP, i.157.

(5) E 518(3): A Perfect Diurnall, no.106, July 5-12, p.1601; CJ, v.239.

(6) E 397(8): A Declaration..., July 8.

The embattled Presbyterian leadership could not, by now, hope for military assistance from the provinces. Poyntz was well disposed to Holles, but had been imprisoned by his own troops. The northern regiments had then placed themselves wholly at the disposal of Fairfax and the New Model agitators.¹

On 10 July Massey's petition concerning his long withheld arrears was heard in the Commons. A report from the Committee of Accounts, which related to the money owed to Massey, was considered at the same time.² It was decided that the sum of £2,000 should be awarded to the former Major General of the West.³ Massey's absence on the occasion of this decision shows that he still had powerful friends capable of promoting his interests in the house.

A Parliamentary ordinance was passed empowering the Militia Committee to raise a regiment of horse for the more rapid suppression of violent disorders.⁴ This was specifically aimed at the problem of the reformados, should they fail to leave London voluntarily by the day specified in the earlier ordinance.⁵ But it was very easy to interpret it as, at least equally, a threat to the New Model.⁶ Towards mid-July rival petitions sponsored by Presbyterian and Independent city interests were presented at Westminster.⁷ Even more alarming for the Parliament was the emergence of Royalism in city politics. Another civic petition called for the King's person to be defended, and for the

- (1) H.Cary, ed. Memorials of the Great Civil War (1842), i.293,300-1; CP, i.163; E 518(6): A Perfect Diurnall, no.107, July 12-19, p.1667.
- (2) CJ, v.239; Rushworth, vi.612.
- (3) Ibid; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.98.
- (4) A&O, i.987-89; LJ, ix.325-26; E 397(22): An Ordinance, July 12.
- (5) CJ, v.240; Rushworth, vi.611; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.97b-98.
- (6) Dyve, p.68.
- (7) Rushworth, vi.614-15; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.98.

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re-establishment of his 'just power and greatness'.¹ City politics was becoming increasingly confused and factious. 'Thus each party might frame what matter they pleased into petitions', noted Whitelocke, 'and have hands to them, and multitudes to present them'.²

On the 15th a detailed defence of the eleven members began to circulate in London's streets. This document was the precursor of the answer to the charges against them presented by Holles and others to the Commons.³ For the moment, appealing to public opinion was clearly thought likely to achieve more than a debate in the house. In this appeal, Massey and his fellow accused sought to defend themselves from the army's wide ranging but vague accusations.⁴ Massey was particularly indignant at the charge of impeding the relief of Ireland. He recalled Cromwell's troopers resistance to enlistment, at Saffron Walden,⁵ and later dismissed all the charges as 'frivilous'.⁶

The army had become increasingly determined that the dismissed Independent militia officers in London be restored to their commands.⁷ Fairfax's senior commanders thought the army's negotiations with the houses could not continue until the London militia had been returned to 'safe and confiding hands'.⁸ Meanwhile, the Presbyterians tried to install a sympathetic Governor at Bristol, though this failed,⁹ and several officers

- (1) Rushworth, vi.618; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.98b.
- (2) Ibid.
- (3) E 398(17): A Full Vindication and Answer..., July 15.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) Rushworth, vi.766.
- (6) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30.
- (7) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.185.
- (8) Bell, i.369.
- (9) CSPD, 1645-47, pp.563-64; Bell, i.370-1.

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arrived at York from London shortly after Poyntz's overthrow, who were, so the New Model was informed, 'all creatures of the accused, especially Massey'.¹

Most of the reformados had stubbornly stayed in London and the Parliament was powerless to persuade them to leave.² There were new and dramatic manifestations of Royalist sentiment in the city. This was perhaps a response to the double radical challenge - of Independent politics in the army, and sectarian religion in the capital. A central figure in the rebirth of London Royalism was the Lord Mayor, Sir John Gayre, who had been very active during the attempted coup of 12 June.³

On 19 July, Massey and the other Presbyterian leaders attended the Commons, to present their reply to the charges of the army.⁴ But the house decided to postpone any decision on the matter.⁵ This convinced Holles and his colleagues that the Parliament was intimidated by the army, and would not stand by them. Next day they sought permission to absent themselves from Westminster for six months.⁶ Many of the eleven members must have doubted whether they would ever be allowed to resume their Parliamentary or military careers. Such doubts may well have underlain Massey's request for his arrears to be settled before his departure. On the occasion of the eleven members last

(1) CP, i.163.

(2) CJ, v.249.

(3) R.Brenner, 'The Civil War Politics of London's Merchant Community', P&P, (1973), p.90; V.Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution (1972), pp.301-02; HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.79.

(4) CJ, v.250; Rushworth, vi.627; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.99.

(5) Ibid.

(6) CJ, v.251; Rushworth, vi.628; Woolrych, p.166.

attendance at Parliament, a large crowd seems to have demonstrated outside the chamber in their support.¹

The Parliament was now totally dependent on the city militia to protect it against the New Model.² Colonel Webb, Massey's former colleague in the West, was ordered to attend to the security of the houses.³ On 17 June, Webb had also been appointed 'Major General of all the forces of the city of London', presumably by the corporation's Militia Committee.⁴ A close colleague of Massey was therefore in charge of the London militia during the purge of Independent officers from its ranks. Massey himself may well have been involved. The army's insistence that these officers be reinstated aroused more Presbyterian opposition in the city than had its interference with the Parliament, since it affected the corporation's own rights, of which it was more jealous.⁵ A high Presbyterian petition at Skinner's Hall, which called for the capital's militia to be left as it was, soon began to attract massive support.⁶

Despite this agitation, the Commons favoured conciliating the army, and on 22 July voted by a large margin to reinstate the purged Independent militia officers.⁷ This move antagonised its military protectors at the Guildhall, provoking far more

(1) CJ, v.252; Rushworth, vi.628-29.

(2) Ibid.

(3) BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.37b; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.388b; CJ, v.252; Rushworth, vi.629.

(4) E 393(30): Mercurius Britanicus, June 17-24, June 17.

(5) Woolrych, pp.169-70; Waller, p.182.

(6) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.ff.235b-36; LJ, ix.354; Sharpe, ii.252.

(7) CJ, v.254; Rushworth, vi.632.

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indignation than in early June.¹ In one Presbyterian propaganda tract, an imaginary New Model agitator proclaimed his respect and admiration for the Presbyterian military leaders in the capital, of whom Massey and Waller were named as the most prominent.² Clearly the city was being asked to believe that an armed confrontation with the the New Model could be won, and should be tried.

On the 24th the houses denounced the Skinner's Hall petition, warning that those taking part in further resistance to the proposed changes in the militia might be charged with high treason, and therefore risked death.³ But not even by such dire warnings could the Parliament stem the tide of resentment sweeping through the city. The call for the King to be brought to London, which had originated at Skinner's Hall, now 'went ... through the city like a train of gunpowder'.⁴ The attempted Presbyterian coup of late July and early August 1647 was, in one sense, a genuine popular movement against the New Model's interference in city affairs. But the excluded Presbyterian leaders were quick to exploit it for their own ends.⁵

Some of the eleven members, such as Waller, denied all responsibility for fomenting the unrest,⁶ though London

- (1) Kishlansky, p.264.
- (2) E 399(29): A Copy of a Letter..., July 22.
- (3) A&O, i.991-2; CJ, v.257; Waller, p.182.
- (4) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.33.
- (5) Woolrych, pp.168,172.
- (6) Waller, pp.101-5.

Independents were convinced of their active complicity. Thomas Juxon believed that the eleven began to spend more time in the city upon their removal from the Commons. He also accused them of organising secret meetings with 'all sorts of persons: for to countermine the army'.¹ There can be little doubt that it was the city Presbyterians on the Common Council and Militia Committee who played the leading role in the political coup,² though the Parliamentary Presbyterians must at least have been encouraged by the rising tide of protest and followed it with keen interest.

On the 26th, the storm broke. Large crowds of reformados and citizens marched on Westminster, demanding that the latest militia ordinance be repealed.³ Many of the eleven members knew of this demonstration in advance.⁴ Holles, Stapleton, Waller and Massey were at the Bell tavern in King street close to the unfolding drama around the houses of Parliament. This was more than a coincidence: all were clearly waiting upon events.⁵ The undefended houses were duly invaded by the crowds, and forced to reinstate the old Militia Committee and to call the King to London so that a personal treaty might be agreed.⁶ Independent sympathisers who witnessed these disorderly demonstrations were

- (1) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.112.
- (2) V.Pearl, 'London's Counter Revolution', in G.E.Aylmer, ed. The Interregnum (1982), pp.51,55-6; BL, Add.Ms.37,344, f.100b; Kishlansky, pp.264-5; Holles, p.145.
- (3) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, ff.112b-13; Clarendon, iv.242.
- (4) Waller, p.102; Bamfield, pp.31-2.
- (5) Holles, pp.153-4; Waller, pp.104-06; Pearl, 'London's Counter Revolution', p.52.
- (6) BL, Add.Mss.29,747, ff.15-15b; HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.97; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.100; Waller, pp.183-84; Holles, p.145.

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again convinced of the civic authorities complicity in them.¹ According to Holles, Massey left his colleagues at the inn as soon as the first news arrived of turbulent scenes around St Stephens chapel.² He may well have ventured down to the Palace yard to see for himself what was going on.

Everything now depended on the army's response to these dramatic events. The following day, a delegation of citizens presented a petition to the Common Council, asking that basic defensive measures be taken,³ including the appointment of a commander-in-chief for the militia. Massey's name was chosen because of his 'valour and fidelity' as well as his obvious military ability.⁴ But why did this genuine outburst of public enthusiasm in favour of Massey take place? Occasional absences on business aside, Massey had been a permanent resident of London since late 1645. The London press had long sung his praises as a patriotic and valiant commander, in descriptions which had sometimes verged on hero worship.⁵

The main basis of public esteem was the widely held belief that his prolonged and successful defence of Gloucester in 1643 had saved London. But Massey's relationship with Holles, Stapleton and other prominent Parliamentary Presbyterians, deliberately cultivated in the capital throughout 1646 and early 1647, naturally increased his popularity in the city. And he was seen to be standing up to the New Model, the Independent party and their

- (1) BL, Add.Mss.29,747, ff.15-15b; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.100-100b; CP, i.218.
- (2) Holles, p.154.
- (3) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.f.241.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) E 7(17): The London Post, no.3, Aug 27, p.7.

unwarrantable demands. Massey's war record, far more distinguished than those of his political sponsors, had enabled him to attract to London several able officers desirous of further military service under him.¹ Doubtless these individuals, like John Fitz-James, would form the core of the new Presbyterian high command that Massey endeavoured to create in London.

When news arrived that the New Model was marching against the capital, the city leaders began to raise forces for its defence.² Such was the corporation's affection for Skippon, that the Common Council desired that he command the city's defence forces,³ even though he continued to reside with the New Model and showed no inclination to desert it. The name of James, the fourteen year old Duke of York, was also proposed, doubtless by Royalists prepared to support the Presbyterian coup. The young Duke would have merely been a figurehead, and it is doubtful if he would have allowed himself to be so used unless ordered by his father.⁴

On 30 July, Parliament reassembled without many of its Independent and moderate members. The eleven excluded MPs were called back into the chamber one by one. Massey was again seventh in order of seniority.⁵ He and Waller were added to the Committee of Safety, created on June 11 during the first and abortive Presbyterian coup,⁶ and now hastily reformed, in order to

- (1) BL, MF 330, Alnwick Mss.547, ff.91-92b; SP, 28/47 pt.1, f.28b.
- (2) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.f.243; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.100-00b; Rushworth, vi.646.
- (3) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.114b.
- (4) CSPV, 1647-52, p.10.
- (5) CJ, v.260; Holles, p.157; Rushworth, vi.652; Clarendon, iv.243.
- (6) Ibid; LJ, vi.361; Woolrych, p.173.

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to coordinate the defence of the capital.¹

During the afternoon of the 30th the Militia Committee of the London corporation appointed Massey 'Commander General in Chief' of the existing and projected city forces.² This choice clearly reflected his popularity among the citizenry, and the impracticability of appointing any of his rivals, who were unwilling or unable to serve. But most of all, Massey's record, and especially the famous defence of Gloucester, must have strongly recommended him to the authorities at the Guildhall.³

Next day, Massey was confirmed in his position by both houses of Parliament. The few remaining peers invited delegates from the corporation into the chamber and thanked them for appointing someone who was 'so able' to undertake such a heavy responsibility.⁴ Later Massey was to recall with considerable pride that he had been 'elected...by the Common Council of the famous city of London, to be their commander in chief for defence of the King and Parliament, the Kingdom and the city'.⁵ Massey now assumed the mantle of military leader of the Presbyterian counter-revolution.

- (1) Waller, p.186.
- (2) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.f.244; GRO, MF 285, Barwick Ms.f.33a.
- (3) Rushworth, vi.646; E 518(12): A Perfect Diurnall, no.109, July 26-Aug 2, p.1682.
- (4) LJ, ix.362.
- (5) E 401(12): The Declaration of General Massey..., Aug 9; Rushworth, vii.765.

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Clearly, Massey's personal and political future depended on the successful defence of London. If the New Model could be beaten, he could expect to be made Parliamentary Commander in Chief. As such, he might have been able to play the role later assumed by George Monck, in smoothing the path to a restoration of the King. Massey, Waller and Poyntz, the latter having previously been released by the New Model, began to enlist reformados into auxiliary regiments for the defence of London. According to Juxon, a hostile commentator, 'Massey took upon him the disposing of the guards of the city and great threatenings [of] what to do'.¹

Meanwhile, the New Model's remorseless advance towards the capital continued.² Both the Parliament and the corporation again called upon it to release the King, so that negotiations between Charles, and the Parliamentary and Scottish Commissioners could begin.³ Royalists and Presbyterians could not cooperate effectively against the New Model, since both wanted very different things from the attempted coup.⁴ Each had cause to fear the consequences of a total victory of the crown or the Presbyterian faction over the New Model and the Independents.

On paper, the forces at Massey's disposal were formidable: the trained band and auxiliary regiments, reformados, watermen and apprentices together outnumbered easily the 18,000 men under Fairfax's command.⁵ Neither were there major problems of supply or finance. But it proved very difficult to mobilise these forces. The Presbyterian leaders' political objectives were ill-defined,

- (1) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.115.
- (2) E 518(14), p.204; Rushworth, vi.647.
- (3) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.ff.244b-46; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.101b; Rushworth, vi.648-51; CJ, v.262; LJ, ix.364; Holles, p.158.
- (4) Dyve, p.73; Bodl., Clarendon SP, 30(1) (2565), f.24.
- (5) Pearl, 'London's Counter Revolution', pp.53-4; Waller, pp.188-9; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.101b; Rushworth, vi.647; Baillie, iii.17; GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.33a; Bamfield, p.33.

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and thus their programme of action was also unclear.¹ As the New Model closed in upon the capital, there was confusion, indifference and lethargy in many quarters.²

By 1 August, there were mass resignations of officers from trained band and auxiliary regiments.³ Soon the command structure of the London militia was thrown into chaos.⁵ Parliament had not repudiated New Model clearly, or dismissed Fairfax. Yet it had sanctioned the mobilisation of the civic forces against its own army. It is little wonder that there was confusion as to the houses intentions, or that even Presbyterian sympathisers were filled with forboding and even despair.⁴ As the army moved closer, the mood in the capital turned to fear and panic.⁶ The obvious unity and resolve of the New Model during the crisis must have surprised many.

Many Presbyterian leaders were unwilling to admit, and sought to minimise, the embarrassingly rapid collapse of the coup.⁷ Further, many of the documents generated by the Presbyterian high command have not survived, and may well have been destroyed immediately before the New Model's arrival in London. The nemesis of Massey's command is therefore shrouded in obscurity. But it is certain that he encountered increasingly serious problems in raising sufficient forces. Whole trained band regiments refused orders.⁸ Whatever the initial level of

- (1) Montereul, ii.212; CJ, v.262; Pearl, 'London's Counter Revolution', p.48.
- (2) Dyve, pp.73-4; Montereul, ii.210-12; Baillie, iii.17; Waller, pp.187-88.
- (3) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.115b; Bodl., Clarendon SP, 30(1) (2565), f.24.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) CJ, v.263.
- (6) Baxter, p.60.
- (7) Holles, pp.160-1; Waller, p.366.
- (8) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.116.

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spontaneous enthusiasm, it began to evaporate once the consequences of the events of July 26 became clear.

Soon, organised opposition to the coup and the plans to defend the capital against the army began to emerge in London. A delegation to the city, from the borough of Southwark made clear that it wanted no part in the defence of London against the New Model.¹ Massey continued to brief the Lord mayor on its remorseless advance upon London.² On 2 August, the bearers of a peace petition, together with the Southwark delegates, were attacked by Poyntz and some reformados in the Guildhall yard.³ Massey may well have arrived during this mayhem, but it is unlikely that he joined with Poyntz in what was obviously a disastrous political mistake.⁴ The bloodshed probably helped to convince many Common Councillors that the city was on the verge of anarchy. Such a prospect placed the imminent arrival of the New Model in an entirely new context.⁵ The pragmatists in the corporation now secured an abrupt change of line: accommodation with the army became a priority.⁶

By now, it was clear that the unity essential to resist the New Model had crumbled into faction, intrigue and demoralisation.⁷ This failure stemmed mainly from political factors beyond Massey's

- (1) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.102b; Rushworth, vii.741; HPMF Clarke Mss.41, f.162.
- (2) E 400(39): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, July 27-Aug 3, Aug 2.
- (3) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.102b; Rushworth, vii.741; E 518(15): A Perfect Summery, no.3, Aug 2-9, p.19.
- (4) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, ff.117-17b.
- (5) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.f.247.
- (6) Holles, p.160; Baillie, iii.17; Montereul, ii.221; GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.33a.
- (7) Ibid; Bodl., Clarendon SP.30(1) (2565), f.24; Waller, p.190; Dyve, p.75.

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control.¹ They do not reflect on his military competence.

To the end Massey devoted himself to shoring up the city's disintegrating defences.² Only when the situation was hopeless did he advise the corporation to 'conclude with the army'.³ But by then he was aware that the city fathers had already opened direct negotiations with the New Model commanders. He may well have felt badly let down by the Common Council, and later, together with Poyntz, described the civic leaders as being 'like waves ... beaten with every wind', taking or receiving 'counsels as they fears do prompt them'.⁴ This disrespect was more than justified by events. For Massey was abandoned by the very men he had tried to defend. As Holles remarked, the corporation 'did not so much as provide for Major General Massey, whom they had made their commander-in-chief; but ... bow'd under the burden, betray'd themselves and all that had to do with them'.⁵

In the early morning of 4 August a detachment of the New Model entered Southwark unopposed.⁶ Both Massey and Poyntz, as the military leaders of the coup, feared falling into the hands of the army, and hastened to leave the city for the continent.⁷

Massey, a proud man, must have felt not only betrayed but also humiliated. His disillusion with the Independents at Gloucester and in the West was now matched by resentment at his treatment at the hands of the Presbyterian leadership in London. The events of July-August 1647 accelerated his gradual recoil from the Parliamentary cause. His fall from influence was immediate and dramatic. The powerful military and political leader found himself forced to exchange a highly prestigious position for a ship bound for Holland and an impoverished future.

(1) Rushworth, vii.749; Woolrych, p.168.

(2) E 518(16): A Perfect Diurnall, no.110, Aug 2-9, p.1689.

(3) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.116.

(4) Rushworth, vii.766.

(5) Holles, p.163.

(6) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.103; Rushworth, vii.752.

(7) Rushworth, vii.765-66.

CHAPTER 9.
MASSEY'S LATER CAREER, 1647-1674.

Massey was now reduced for a second time to the position in which he had found himself at the outset of his wartime exploits - that of penniless exile in Holland. Here he embarked on a gradual reconciliation with Royalism. The process was already under way. Just before leaving London, he and Poyntz penned a political justification of their attempt to defy the New Model.¹ Given the circumstances in which it was written it was an immensely complacent document. Massey's last minute escape, though successful, was not without its dangers.² It was immediately rumoured that he had fled to Scotland. Here the Covenanters were indignant at the developments in England and were rumoured (falsely) to be gathering an army.³ The idea of a connection between Massey and the Scottish Presbyterians was not implausible, though some of their divines blamed him for the collapse of the coup in London.⁴

Massey, however, was en route for Amsterdam, where he arrived safely on 9 August.⁵ He soon called upon the Queen of Bohemia at the Hague, where it was reported that he spoke 'much for ye King'.⁶ The transformation from Presbyterian to Royalist was underway. Massey was returning to the loyalties which had prompted his removal from Holland seven years before.

Upon the army's entry into London Massey was lampooned in a satirical broadsheet,⁷ though the Presbyterian press of London

- (1) Rushworth, vii.765-66.
- (2) GRO, MF 285; Barwick Mss.f.33.
- (3) Baillie, iii.16; E 401(20): A Speedy Hue and Cry..., Aug 10; Rushworth, vii.788.
- (4) Baillie, iii.16-17.
- (5) E 404(28): The Moderate Intelligencer, Aug 19-26, Aug 19.
- (6) Bodl., Tanner Mss.58(2), f.471.
- (7) E 401(20).

responded loyally, and Corbet's highly favourable account of his Governorship at Gloucester was again reprinted.¹ Even more encouraging was a declaration of support from the majority of the officers serving with the English forces in Ireland.² It seems that Massey had close personal friends serving in Ireland, which may help explain Parliament's decision to appoint him Lieutenant General of the army that was proposed to campaign there. In October, he shrewdly renewed his connection with these officers by correspondence.³ In late 1647, John Dorney, the town clerk of Gloucester, composed a poem complimenting Massey's abilities, and it is easy to imagine the former Governor being touched and flattered.⁴ There were many to be found who remembered the exiled Massey with respect and affection.

In late January 1648, the eleven members, including Massey were excluded from the Commons, and it was also stated that they would be impeached for high treason.⁵ Massey continued to exchange letters with his officer friends in Ireland, voicing dissatisfaction with the political situation.⁶ England was by now on the brink of the Second Civil War, and some in the New Model believed that Massey and other exiled Presbyterian leaders were actively fomenting it in Scotland.⁷

When the Duke of York managed to escape from Parliamentary custody in May 1648, Massey and Fitz-James were in the

- (1) E 402(22): An Outcry Against the Speedy Hue and Cry..., Aug 18; E 402(23): Virtue and Valour Vindicated..., Aug 19; E 402(4): A True and Impartial Relation..., Aug 14.
- (2) HMC, Egmont Mss.i (1905), p.461.
- (3) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.3.
- (4) GNQ, ii.436-37.
- (5) Whitelocke, ii.266-7.
- (6) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.8.
- (7) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 30(2) (2735), f.310.

welcoming party at Dort. A pleasant sail along the Dutch canals followed.¹ Meanwhile, in England, the New Model was preoccupied by increasing provincial unrest. Friends of Massey and Waller soon began to urge them to return to England.² Massey was also assured by his correspondents in Ireland that they rejected the charges levelled by political opponents against him and pledged themselves to serve him loyally when conditions improved.³

Speculation about Massey's political affiliations obliged him to publish a declaration in London on 13 July. In it he claimed that the exiled Henrietta Maria and the Prince of Wales had offered him the rank of Lieutenant General should he agree to assist in their plan to restore King Charles. Massey was prepared to pledge his loyalty to the Royal family, but felt obliged to refuse the Royalist offer of command.⁴ The proposed invasion was to involve the use of foreign troops, which he could not bring himself to sanction. Massey's Royalism was not yet unconditional.

In summer 1648 the Presbyterian exiles, taking advantage of the New Model's absence from London during the Second Civil War began to return from Europe. Denzil Holles resumed his seat in the Commons on 14 August.⁵ In early August, Fitz-James confirmed that Massey had already arrived back in London,⁶ though he did not

(1) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 31(2772), f.66b.

(2) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.7.

(3) Ibid, f.6.

(4) E 452(20): The Declaration of Major General Massey..., July 13.

(5) Rushworth, vii.1225-6.

(6) BL, MF 330, Alnwick Mss.548, f.20.

appear at Westminster until early September.¹ Perhaps he had been busy renewing his many contacts in the city.

Events were moving quickly. Parliament was increasingly resolved on an agreement with the King at Newport. The New Model was increasingly inclined to block it; and its political weight was enormously increased by resounding military victories. A new crisis of state was inevitable. By early December the army had advanced on London, and prepared once more to impose its will on the houses at Westminster. As soon as the troops entered the capital, leading Presbyterians and known friends of Massey were placed under observation.²

On 6 December, Massey and his Presbyterian colleagues, who must have been aware that Westminster Palace yard was filled with troops, decided to go to Parliament anyway, and were arrested in what became known as Pride's Purge.³ This gesture was designed to draw public attention to the methods by which the army was prepared to implement its political programme. The army recognised that the military ability of Massey, Waller and Browne made their escape especially dangerous, and they were soon separated from the rest and taken to the King's Head in the Strand. Here, on 12 December, they were able to draft a political declaration, protesting that the army had no right to detain them, but declaring their readiness to stand trial in a freely constituted Parliament.⁴ This political declaration was soon printed and circulated in the capital.⁵

- (1) B.D.Henning, ed., The Commons 1660-90 (1983), iii.29; DNB, xiii.3.
- (2) HMC, 14 Report (1-2), p.165.
- (3) Whitelocke, ii.467-8, 470-1; CP, ii.67-8; Rushworth, vii.1353-55; D.Underdown, Prides Purge, (1985), pp.143-4.
- (4) BL, Add.Mss.61,989, f.97.
- (5) E 476(33): A Declaration to the City of London..., Dec 18.

By Christmas day only eighteen members were still imprisoned, of whom five - Waller, Massey, Clotworthy, Browne and Copley, the 'pillars of the Scottish interest' - were now detained at St James's palace.¹ Rumours began to circulate that some of them might be executed by the army.² The New Model sought to undermine Massey's reputation by spreading rumours that as Governor of Gloucester he had been fiscally corrupt.³ During his confinement Massey wrote an impassioned plea to the Prince of Wales, urging that only Scottish forces be employed in any invasion of England. The argument was buttressed by scriptural quotations, something of a departure from the rather secular values of its author.⁴ As the English revolution moved towards its climax, Massey had clearly shifted as far as Presbyterian Royalism.

On the arrival of the captive Charles I at St James's on 18 January 1649, Massey took advantage of the excitement to effect his escape,⁵ audaciously disguising himself as a woman and walking past the guards.⁶ Those of his colleagues who remained awaited long terms of imprisonment.⁷ The next day, the fugitive Massey wrote a political vindication of his conduct. He made no effort to disguise his disillusion with the Parliamentary cause. He defended his earlier commitment to the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, but complained at the Parliament's failure to settle in

(1) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 34(2972), f.17.

(2) Ibid, ff.19b-20.

(3) CP, ii.157-9.

(4) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 34(2993), ff.68-8b.

(5) Whitelocke, ii.498; DNB, xiii.3; Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.195.

(6) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 34(3003), f.86.

(7) Ibid; Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.195; Adair, pp.198-200.

full his arrears. Massey confirmed that the Independents had attempted to recruit him to their faction. But his arrest by the army greatly injured his self esteem and he was also offended by Independent inspired rumours designed to blacken his reputation. Massey deprecated the violence which the army used against both King and Parliament, and looked forward to returning both to their former freedoms when the opportunity presented itself.¹

Massey must have arrived back in Holland around the time of Charles I's execution. Soon after, he and Lord Loughborough were granted an audience by the young Charles II during which Massey was treated with respect.² By mid-1649 he was busy 'preparing fireworks' for the new King's ships.³ Later in 1649, Massey began to be involved in the negotiations between Charles II and the Scots.⁴ He remained convinced that the Covenant with the Scottish Presbyterian leaders was the most realistic means of restoring the monarchy.⁵ Some Royalists found it hard to forgive Massey's record of service for the Parliament, and cast doubt on his new loyalty to the crown.⁶ The Parliament itself now denounced its former Major General as an enemy, and took steps to confiscate the estates it had voted him.⁷

By March 1650, Massey was one of the King's leading negotiators with the Scots at Breda. There he worked closely with

- (1) E 541(7): A Short Declaration by Colonel Massey..., Feb 9.
- (2) BG, p.103.
- (3) CSPD, 1649-50, p.155.
- (4) Baillie, iii.100-1.
- (5) GRO, MF 285; Barwick Mss.f.30.
- (6) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 38, ff.5b-6.
- (7) CCC, ii.2142-3.

two colleagues, Alderman James Bunce of London and Captain Titus, both uncompromising Presbyterians.¹ Later that month Massey led a party of eighty English Royalist officers to Scotland. They landed in the Orkneys, and announced in a declaration their loyalty to the crown, the Covenant, and the Presbyterian form of church Government. They denounced the effective rule of the army in England as an aberration and vowed to destroy it.² This declaration was later printed, and copies were found as far South as Monmouthshire.³

Massey's commitment to the Covenant enabled him to win the favour of the Scottish leaders, a rare achievement amongst English commanders.⁴ His prominence in the coup of 1647 may have convinced them of his sincerity. Certain of Massey's friends were also very close to the King at the time of his arrival in Scotland. Titus became a member of Charles II's bed-chamber.⁵ A Parliamentary intelligence source described Massey, Bunce, Titus and Graves as 'the close treaters'. Their links with the city of London, through such men as Alderman Bunce, were believed to be especially strong.⁶ The King named Massey Lieutenant General of the small English contingent in Scotland, and he accepted, pledging himself to overthrow the military power of the New Model and help establish a Royalist-Presbyterian settlement in England.⁷

- (1) BL, Egerton Mss.1,533, f.47. Alderman Bunce had been closely involved in the attempted Presbyterian counter-revolution of July-August 1647.
- (2) E 597(4): The Declaration of Major General Massey..., March 29.
- (3) Whitelocke, iii.3.
- (4) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30; DNB, xiii.3; Webb, The Governors General, p.37.
- (5) Walker, pp.177,202.
- (6) S.R.Gardiner, ed., Charles II & Scotland in 1650, Scottish Historical Society (1894), p.114.
- (7) E 608(3): The Declaration and Speech of Colonel Massey..., July 22.

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Before the battle of Dunbar, it seems that the Scots were anxious to avoid over-reliance on those English Royalists accompanying Charles II.¹ The distrust was, in at least some cases, mutual. In Holland, Massey had had dealings with a wide variety of English exiles, including even disenchanted Levellers.² After the comprehensive defeat of the Scottish army at Dunbar, however, the Scottish Presbyterians were in a weaker position in relation to their allies, who became more prominent in the Royalist camp.³ In late December, Massey was recommended to take command of a regiment of English and Scots. By early 1651 he had been appointed General Major of horse, and was soon in command of a reserve brigade of cavalry comprising four regiments.⁴ His hit and run raiding earned some successes against Cromwell's forces,⁵ and some Scots came to value his services highly.⁶

In the summer of 1651 Charles II and his supporters risked all in an invasion of England. Massey and his brigade formed the advance guard of the King's army as it progressed through Lancashire and Cheshire.⁷ This was not an ideal choice, since Massey lacked the diplomatic skills necessary to forge a working alliance between the Scottish Presbyterians and the English Royalists.⁸

- (1) Walker, p.194.
- (2) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.14.
- (3) Baillie, iii.107.
- (4) Sir.J.Balfour, ed. Historical Works (1825), iv.221,226,238, 299.
- (5) W.S.Douglas, Cromwell's Scotch Campaigns 1650-1 (1899), pp.260-1,269-70; DNB, xiii.3.
- (6) Baillie, iii.134,136,155.
- (7) Cary, ii.334-6; DNB, xiii.3.
- (8) D.Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England (1960), p.49.

Massey seems to have passed through Worcester and with a strong force, continued southwards as far as Tewkesbury, into what was familiar territory.¹ A few miles away, Parliamentary Gloucester fortified itself against its old Governor.² Massey did not remain in Tewkesbury, but withdrew to Upton on Severn with a strong contingent of Scots. Here, he took possession of the bridge, the first crossing point below Worcester, but was wounded in the head and arm in a skirmish with Colonel General Lambert's forces.³ His injuries prevented his participation in the decisive battle of Worcester a few days later, though it is very unlikely that this materially affected the outcome.

Charles II and his closest supporters were able to escape.⁴ Massey, despite his tenacity and ability to improvise, was hampered by his injuries, and was soon compelled to surrender himself to the Duchess of Stamford, whose husband had commanded him in 1642.⁵ It had already been rumoured that Massey was dead from his wounds.⁶ Shortly after his surrender a satirical pamphlet was published in which his demise was proclaimed and which professed to relate his regret at having abandoned the Parliamentary cause.⁷ Having recovered somewhat, Massey was moved

(1) Whitelocke, iii.340.

(2) Ibid, p.337; Cary, ii.335; GRO, H 2/2, ff.70,74-5,103.

(3) Bund, pp.230-33; Whitelocke, iii.340; Cary, ii.326-7; Bodl., Clarendon SP, 42, f.151b; DNB, xiii.3.

(4) E 641(15): The Declaration of Major General Massey..., Sept 15, p.3.

(5) Whitelocke, iii.349-50; Cary, ii.376-77,381-2.

(6) Cary, ii.357-58.

(7) E 641(15), pp.1-3.

to Warwick castle and then to the Tower. There was talk of him being tried for treason.¹ Some London Presbyterian ministers tried to raise money for Massey's relief, earning the disapproval of the Rump Parliament.²

Throughout early 1652 Massey was held a prisoner in the Tower. Only interrogation sessions enlivened the monotony of daily existence.³ But, in August, assisted by some of the warders, he again managed to escape, accompanied by several other prisoners.⁴ Massey must have left the country almost immediately, though the Government continued for many months to search for him in England.⁵

Sir Edward Hyde recognised Massey's commitment to the Royalist cause, but doubted his usefulness as a servant of the crown.⁶ This could have been because of Massey's support for the alliance with the Scots, which Hyde opposed.⁷ But Charles II's principal advisor also found it hard to take Massey seriously: the latter simulataneously professed his loyalty to the crown and tried to justify his service to the Parliament!⁸

Behind Massey's melancholic temperament there lay a strong streak of self-righteousness. This was the principle means by which he concealed his inherent opportunism. When he escaped from the Tower he was described as having 'brown hair, a

- (1) CCAM, iii.1364; CSPD, 1651, pp.422-3,425,443; CSPD, 1651-2, p.49; E 649(1): The Queen of Denmark's Letter..., Dec 1; E 641(18): The Charge and Articles of High Treason..., Sept 16.
- (2) Baxter, p.67.
- (3) CSPD, 1651-2, pp.138,223; CCAM, iii.1364.
- (4) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30; E 674(26): A New Hue and Cry After Major General Massey..., Sept 6; CSPD, 1651-2, p.387.
- (5) CSPD, 1651-2, p.507.
- (6) CCSP, ii.155.
- (7) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 39, ff.116,119.
- (8) CCSP, ii.50.

middle stature, sanguine complexion'.¹ Hyde thought him 'a wonderfully vain and weak man, but means exceeding well and faithfully to the King, and would serve him without limitations, which few of the rest of the Presbyterians would do'.² But some Royalists continued to doubt his loyalty: like other ex-Parliamentarians, Massey found it difficult to live down his past.³

The outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch war raised Royalist hopes of Dutch cooperation in restoring the monarchy. Massey was to the forefront of such designs.⁴ His health, which had for long been very robust, was no longer reliable, perhaps as a result of the wounds sustained at Upton. Still he was able to work closely with Alderman Bunce, and recommended him to Charles II. By 1653, Massey and Bunce were involved in various schemes to raise funds for their exiled monarch.⁶ In a new association with the Marquess of Ormonde, Massey also tried to turn to the King's advantage the complexities of Baltic diplomacy.⁷ It seems however that Hyde, did not consider Massey to be particularly adept as a Royal diplomatic agent.⁸

During his period of convalescence in Holland, it seems that Massey wrote his memoirs. These, however, were judged so

(1) E 674(26), pp.1-2.

(2) CCSP, ii.177.

(3) NP, ii.4.

(4) E 684(5): A Declaration of the Proceedings of Major General Massey..., Dec 22, pp.3-4.

(5) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 45, ff.4; GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss. ff.22,24.

(6) CCSP, ii.169,172; GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.23.

(7) HMC, Ormonde Ms.(1902), i.268.

(8) CCSP, ii.181.

controversial that their publication was deemed to require sanction by the King.¹ Royal consent was apparently not forthcoming, presumably because Massey had attempted to vindicate his career as a Parliamentarian, and an invaluable source was thus lost to history!

Massey continued to correspond with the King on many subjects.² He was perceived by Charles' closest confidants as a lobbyist for the Presbyterian interest, and it is probable that this soldier adventurer was out of his depth in the complicated diplomacy of the exiled court.³ Ormonde continued to correspond with Massey. In mid-1653, he and the King were enquiring after Massey's health, which had deteriorated again.⁴ The increasing poverty of the court affected all its members. Petty squabbles and jealousies began to multiply, as Royalist fortunes declined and the cause seemed lost.⁵ For Massey, as for other Royalists, exile held some bitterly dark and depressing moments.⁶

In England, the government continued to take an interest in Massey's activities throughout 1653-4. He was rumoured to be involved in gun running operations to Scotland. In early 1654 it was even reported that he had landed there with other Royalist leaders.⁷ Thurloe was also informed that Massey had been seen

(1) CCSP, ii.184.

(2) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 45, ff.265-6; CCSP, ii.198-9.

(3) NP, i.11.

(4) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.16.

(5) CCSP, ii.220,279; GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.17.

(6) Webb, The Governors General, p.37.

(7) C.H.Firth, ed. Scottish Historical Society (1895), pp.288-9,290; C.H.Firth, ed. Scotland and the Protectorate 1654-59, Scottish Historical Society (1899), p.59.

in Gloucestershire.¹ None of these reports was true. Hyde continued to be distrustful of Massey's Presbyterian contacts.² By mid-1654 Massey and Bunce were living at Breda, and engaged themselves, so it seems, in circulating anti-Commonwealth propaganda among the Dutch.³

In 1655, Massey attended a meeting in Cologne, called by the King to discuss his diplomatic relations with the English Protectorate.⁴ Such was Massey's disillusion with his poverty and lack of prospects, that he tried to seek positions elsewhere - notably with the King of Denmark and the Duke of Modena. Such initiatives came to nothing.⁵ Perhaps he demanded too generous terms of employment.

Massey continued to intrigue with exiled Levellers. Such bizarre relationships were a recurrent feature of Royalist conspiracies in Europe.⁶ Massey and Bunce were influential leaders of the Presbyterian faction throughout the 1650's.⁷ Massey was even reported to have acquired a personal following - 'his gang' - with which in late 1655 he was reputed to be in the Hamburg area.⁸ By this time, it seems, he had almost completely recovered from his injuries.⁹ The Protectorate followed the Republic in

- (1) T.Birch, ed. Thurloe's State Papers (1742), iii.165,177.
- (2) CCSP, ii.295,302.
- (3) Thurloe's State Papers, ii.373-4.
- (4) CCSP, iii.35.
- (5) Thurloe's State Papers, i.695; iii.741; iv.103; CSPD, 1655, p.220; CCSP, iii.67.
- (6) NP, iii.76
- (7) CSPD, 1654, pp.235,246.
- (8) Thurloe's State Papers, iii.741.
- (9) NP, iii.44.

regarding Massey as a dangerous and active opponent.¹ He was soon active in plans for a pro-Royalist rising in Gloucestershire.² Long periods of military inactivity were making him restless, and he even considered entering the service of the Elector of Brandenburg.³

It seems that Massey maintained tenuous contacts with the city of London during his exile, which his new masters hoped to exploit.⁴ Massey was also prominent in plans to invade England with Spanish forces from Flanders if the opportunity presented itself.⁵ Clearly his reluctance to use foreign troops as the means to restore the monarchy had by now evaporated. By late 1656 it was rumoured that Massey had infuriated Sir Edward Hyde by undertaking a secret journey to England.⁶ Massey wrote to Charles II concerning the 'Spanish' invasion plans and pledged his loyalty 'to the last drop of his blood'.⁷

In early 1657, Captain Titus, one of Massey's closest colleagues, reported that they were both ready to travel into England to coordinate the activities of the Royalist 'Sealed Knot'.⁸ Massey became closely associated with the plans for uprisings in Gloucestershire.⁹ But once again Massey considered alternative employment because his own and his monarch's prospects seemed so bleak.¹⁰

- (1) J.T.Rutt, ed. The Diary of Thomas Burton Esquire (1828), i.cxxxviii; NP, iii.158,175-6; CSPD, 1655-56, pp.196-97.
- (2) CSPD, 1655-56, p.49.
- (3) Ibid, pp.50-1.
- (4) Ibid, p.237.
- (5) Thurloe's State Papers, i.752, vi.90; CCSP, iv.109.
- (6) Ibid, v.449.
- (7) CCSP, iii.207.
- (8) Ibid, 236-7.
- (9) Ibid, 362.
- (10) CSPD, 1655-56, p.50.

In early 1658, Charles II decided that Massey should leave for England to help organise resistance to the Cromwellian regime in Gloucestershire.¹ In the May of that year the Council of State ordered that Massey, Titus, and others, should be imprisoned and interrogated if caught.² Later in the year Massey was in Antwerp corresponding with Hyde about the extent of Royalist preparations in England.³

Cromwell's death brought renewed Royalist activity on both sides of the Channel. Massey still contemplated service under a foreign Prince, but he was soon busy in plans for a return to England.⁴ In March 1659 Hyde had put Massey in charge of the planned rising for Gloucestershire and Bristol.⁵ Later that month Massey arrived secretly in London under an assumed name, and began to report on the turbulent politics of the capital in the last phase of the Protectorate under Richard Cromwell.⁶

Hyde was concerned that Massey should cooperate as closely as possible with other Royal agents. The Gloucestershire rising aroused great hopes.⁷ Massey sought to persuade old colleagues like Alexander Popham to lend it their support. He continued to reside in London and to gather intelligence despite the dangers involved.⁸ In April 1659, Massey travelled to Gloucestershire, where his pre-eminent role in fomenting the rising there was resented by Royalist agents, who sometimes obstructed his

(1) CCSP, iv.12.

(2) CSPD, 1658-9, p.352.

(3) CCSP, iv.109.

(4) Ibid, 135,136-7,140,141,143,156-8.

(5) Ibid, 166.

(6) BL, Egerton Mss.2,536, f.327.

(7) CCSP, iv.189,190-1,202.

(8) BL, Egerton Mss.2,536, ff.355-6.

activities.¹ Hyde tried hard to reconcile Massey and one of his principal antagonists, Viscount Mordaunt. But, by mid-1659 both Hyde and the King were growing impatient with the delay of the Gloucestershire rising.²

Meanwhile, it seems that Massey was trying to stir up unrest in the Forest of Dean, where there was already much discontent over enclosures.³ Leading local gentlemen, such as Popham, however, proved reluctant to participate.⁴ Even more ominous, the new regime in London had good intelligence about the planned rebellion, and those likely to take part in it.⁵ Massey seems to have returned to the capital in July, probably to coordinate his plans with other Royalist agents.⁶ However, it is clear that the success of the western rising hinged entirely around Massey, who was in charge of its execution.

In late July the two Thomas Purys, father and son both of whom were old antagonists of Massey, took decisive pre-emptive action against the incipient rebellion. Dispatching troops of horse from Gloucester they managed to arrest Massey, a number of his supporters, and 'all his fireworks and other engines of war'.⁷ Yet again, however, Massey managed to make a dramatic escape from his captors, on a dark and blustery night on Nympsfield hill. He sought sanctuary among the well known glades of the Forest of Dean.⁸

- (1) M.Coate, ed. The Letter Book of John Viscount Mordaunt 1658-60, Camden Society (1945), p.13; CCSP, iv.189.
- (2) CCSP, iv.218-9.
- (3) B.Sharp, In Contempt of All Authority (1980), pp.254-5; CCSP, iv.222,270,278; GNQ, v.162-3.
- (4) Ibid, 218-9,259.
- (5) CP, iv.28-9; CCSP, iv.226,273.
- (6) CCSP, iv.291; Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy, p.262.
- (7) Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy, p.263.
- (8) Whitelocke, iv.355; CCSP, iv.313; T.D.Fosbrooke, Fosbrooke's Gloucestershire (1807), i.437.

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The capture of Massey's small assault party led to the collapse of the projected western rising.¹ For one and a half months he disappeared completely, arousing the anxiety of his confederates on the continent. Resourceful as ever, he arrived at last in Rotterdam, disguised as a sailor.² Massey was not held accountable for the failure. His commitment and boldness in 1659 compared favourably to the inactivity of other, longer established supporters of the King.³

Massey had many contacts in Britain, and was the among the first to recognise that the English Republic was slowly disintegrating.⁴ By December there was already talk of his return to Bristol. Massey's absence was sorely missed by his fellow conspirators in London.⁵

Early in 1660 Charles II and Massey apparently met and the King asked him to return to England. On arrival, he would have considerable discretion in determining his course of action.⁶ By March both Massey and Titus were in London, noting the rise of anti-Republican sentiment in the city. They were uneasy about appearing openly, fearing to loose the support which they were winning over.⁷ Massey contemplated the spectacular gesture of forcing an entry into the Parliament at Westminster, but quickly rejected it in favour of a journey to Gloucester, where he could hope to accomplish more.⁸ The city elders welcomed and were eager to ingratiate themselves with him, despite his known Royalism.

(1) Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy, p.264.

(2) CCSP, iv.378.

(3) Ibid, 348.

(4) Ibid, 433.

(5) CSPD, 1659-60, p.280; CCSP, iv.494.

(6) Mordaunt, pp.156-7; CCSP, iv.509.

(7) Thurloe's State Papers, vii.854-56.

(8) Ibid, 865-67,872.

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Some of the garrison took exception to this treatment, however, and Massey had to be rescued by the citizens.¹ But the incident snowed that even in the Parliamentary bulwark of Gloucester there was now strong sentiment in favour of an accommodation with the crown.

Massey's visit led to his selection as a member for Gloucester in the Convention Parliament, called to replace the discredited Rump.² General Monk was vital to that process, but still had to appease Republican sentiments to some extent: on his return to London, Massey was placed in custody.³ This experience was short-lived. As the momentum towards Restoration gathered pace, Massey was able to gain re-admittance to the Commons. By late April he was trailing a pike with the city trained bands during a military parade in Hyde park.⁴ It was Massey who, soon after, moved that the Republican coat of arms be taken down from above the Speaker's chair in the Commons.⁵

Massey became quite active in the Convention Parliament and it was even discussed whether he should accompany the delegation that was to escort the King back to England.⁶ It seems that he was knighted at Canterbury on 27 May, two days after Charles II had landed at Dover.⁷ After the Restoration, Massey's rather specialist talents as a soldier and undercover agent were less in demand. Now in his late fifties, he had largely outlived his

- (1) E 1019(20): A Letter From an Eniment Person in Gloucester..., April 5.
- (2) CCSP, iv.643.
- (3) Ibid, 656,661.
- (4) Ibid, 678.
- (5) CCSP, v.2.
- (6) Henning, The Commons 1660-90, p.30; CCSP, v.11.
- (7) W.A.Shaw, ed. The Knights of England (1971), i.226.

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usefulness. Clearly, he hoped to benefit financially and politically from the Restoration.¹ But so did thousands of others.

Initially Massey had hopes of being granted the iron-works in the Forest of Dean once more. But these were restored to their original owners, the Winter family, whose Royalism had been much more consistent.² Finally, in consideration of his 'faithful service' to the crown, he was awarded a grant of land on a fifty-one year lease, at Abbey Leix in Queens County, Ireland, and with it some measure of financial security.³ It is clear that Ormonde was instrumental in securing this, and that Massey was insufficiently well connected to secure a more desirable estate in England.⁴

Curiously, Massey was also appointed Governor of Jamaica,⁵ perhaps because many of his old officers had been exiled there by Cromwell's regime because they were regarded as politically unreliable.⁶ It seems that the appointment was designed to appease them and that it was not intended that he should take it up. Lord Windsor was soon installed.⁷

The Restoration saw a massive reduction in the military establishment in England. Massey hoped to prolong his military career, and the King tried to help him as far as he was able.⁸ It seems that Massey later tried to raise a regiment of foot

(1) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30.

(2) CSPD, 1660-61, p.171; Hyett, TBGAS (1893-94), p.105.

(3) BL, Egerton Mss.2,551, f.84; BL, Egerton Mss.2,542, ff.447-7b; CSPI, 1660-62, p.72.

(4) CCSP, v.305.

(5) E.S.De Beer, ed. The Diary of John Evelyn (1955), p.257.

(6) C.Firth and G.Davies, Regimental History of Cromwell's Army (1940), ii.707; Webb, The Governor's General, pp.157-58.

(7) F.Cundall, The Governors of Jamaica in the Seventeenth Century (1936), p.10.

(8) CSPI, 1660-62, p.159; W.A.Shaw, ed. Calendar of Treasury Books (1904), i.67.

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himself, but such a task must have been well beyond him financially.¹ Still, £3,000 was voted him in Parliament, and was issued in March 1661.²

Massey was duly elected to the Cavalier Parliament for Gloucester in 1661.³ It seems that he lodged close to houses at Westminster,⁴ and became engaged in the busy social life of the capital.⁵ Massey began to take a close interest in Irish affairs. Charles even enquired if there was a military command available for him in that Kingdom, and on August 7 expressly instructed that he be made a Privy Councillor for Ireland.⁶

Yet even now, Massey could not live down his Parliamentary past. It was idly reported in early 1662 that he was involved in a plot to assassinate the King and seize key strongholds in England.⁷ Clarendon may have regarded Massey's past as an embarrassment which it was convenient to export to Ireland.⁸ Massey's friendship with Ormonde seemed to deepen with time and he was soon engaged in transporting his horses and other goods across the Irish sea.⁹ It seems that Massey was in Ireland between 1663-64 where he doubtless preoccupied himself with his estates at Abbey Leix.¹⁰

Massey did some service during the second Anglo-Dutch war in the prize office at Dover. He was critical of the Medway defences

- (1) C.Dalton, ed. English Army Lists and Commission Registers 1661-1714 (1892), i.66.
- (2) CSPD, 1660-61, p.423; Calendar of Treasury Books, i.231.
- (3) DNB, xiii.3; Henning, The Commons 1660-90, iii.30.
- (4) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss. ff.33-33b.
- (5) R.C.Latham, ed. Samuel Pepys, ii.219.
- (6) CSPI, 1660-62, pp.373,392.
- (7) CSPD, 1661-62, pp.464-65.
- (8) Henning, iii.30.
- (9) CCSP, v.374; CSPI, 1660-62, p.392; Calendar of Treasury Books, i.405,409,415.
- (10) Henning, iii.30

which the Dutch breached with such consummate ease.¹ His presence in Kent during this period can perhaps be explained by the fact that his old colleague Silius Titus was Governor of Deal in 1666 and the Colonel of the eastern regiment of the Cinque ports militia.²

Massey's religious beliefs continued to cause some confusion among his contemporaries. Some thought he would clamp down on the non-conformist community in Dover. But others identified him with the Presbyterians in the Commons.³ Earlier, during the Civil War, Massey's evident religious tolerance had caused some controversy at Gloucester itself.⁴ Massey's Presbyterianism was probably more political than religious in character. He may have kept company with known Presbyterians mainly out of habit or obligation to old associates.

In 1667 Massey attended a meeting of the Irish Privy Council at Kilkenny castle.⁵ But it seems that he travelled regularly to England to attend the court at Whitehall, on one occasion carrying a letter for Ormonde in London.⁶ He certainly concerned himself with Irish related legislation in the Commons.⁷ He also lobbied the Lords of the Treasury on behalf of individuals who had approached him to help secure pensions.⁸

Both Massey and Titus spent much of the late 1660s busily accumulating as much property as they could, from any available

- (1) CSPD, 1665-66, p.225; Henning, iii.30; C.Robins, ed. The Diary of John Millwood (1938), p.220.
- (2) C.Dalton, English Army Lists, p.66.
- (3) D.R.Lacey, Dissent and Parliamentary Politics (1969), pp.421-22.
- (4) E 334(5): A Relation of That Great and Public Consternation Had in Gloucester..., April 24.
- (5) CSPI, 1666-69, pp.449-50.
- (6) Henning, iii.30-31; CSPI, 1666-69, p.462; Carte, v.60.
- (7) Ibid; Robbins, ed. Milward Diary, p.161.
- (8) Calendar of Treasury Books, ii.305.

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source.¹ In 1671 Massey even discovered an interest in naval matters.² A year later he congratulated Arthur Capel, Earl of Essex, on his appointment as the new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.³ Massey was certainly one of those active in warning Parliament against the rise of Popery in Irish local Government and at Whitehall.⁴ Clearly he was no passive courtier in the last years of his life.

Massey was still active in Irish affairs at Westminster during the beginning of 1674.⁵ But by the end of that year he was dead.⁶ His burial at Abbey Leix suggests that he died suddenly whilst visiting his estate.⁷ One of his brothers was appointed executor of the will, which, under pressure from the many with claims on his estate, was quickly proved at Dublin.⁸

Massey's varied career illustrates most clearly how an individual can react with and influence events. He genuinely wished to surrender Gloucester in 1643 and to defend London in 1647. His failure to do either had profound consequences both for himself and for the Kingdom. The many ironies of his life must have crowded around him in his old age.

Politically Massey remains something of an enigma. But opportunism was the most important part of the picture. Massey was a professional soldier who used the political instability of his times to further his career. This led him to desert the Royalists. His success at Gloucester and in the West was that of a mercenary, though he fought perhaps less for money than for rank and the status and responsibility it conferred. Massey's treatment

(1) Calendar of Treasury Books, iii(2), 822.

(2) BL, Add.Ms.38,849, f.63.

(3) BL, Stow Ms.200, f.35.

(4) Henning, iii.31; R.Hutton, Charles II (1989), p.300.

(5) Ibid.

(6) BL, Loan 29/83, Sir Edward Harley's Papers, no foliation.

(7) Ormerod, ii.399; DNB, xiii.3.

(8) BL, Loan 29/83 no foliation; F.A.Hyett, 'Notes on the Portraits of Sir Edward Massey' TBGAS (1921), p.241.

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at the hands of the more vociferous Parliamentarians, some of whom may have understood the cynicism of his attachment to their cause, served to weaken it further.

Massey's association with the Presbyterians was placed under strain by the failure of the coup of July and August 1647. His treatment by the army in 1648 further estranged him from the fringes of the cause for which he had fought. There is no doubt that Massey became a consistent Royalist but he kept close links with his old Presbyterian comrades. Despite rumours to the contrary, Charles II and Clarendon were convinced of his loyalty, and his conduct from 1649 proved them right.

Militarily Massey was very capable indeed. Had he combined political astuteness with martial talent he could have become one of the major figures of the period. His failure was connected to a lack of political motivation and understanding. Massey's evident skill as a military engineer was demonstrated most spectacularly by the defence of Gloucester, but also by many smaller actions elsewhere. At Hereford, Westbury, Malmesbury, Beachley and Evesham, Massey proved his capacity for command and his ability to minimise casualties. Massey mastered the techniques of garrison warfare (during his time at Gloucester) more comprehensively than the wider strategic operations with which he was entrusted. But the fact that his command in the West was competent rather than brilliant was primarily because he was granted such meagre resources. The failure of his greatest military responsibility, the defence of London, was not essentially a military but a political failure. It can be laid at Massey's door only to the extent that he was a member (and not the most senior) of the Holles group.

Certainly Massey possessed physical courage. This is evident not only from his record in innumerable skirmishes, battles and sieges, but also in undercover operations after 1649. Indeed Massey was both notoriously lucky, and impetuous enough to push his luck. His only serious wounds were sustained at Upton and he later became an adept excapologist. However Massey's headstrong temperament and intellect were not really compatible with the

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complicated diplomacy which the exiled royal court had to participate in. After 1660 his talents were largely those of a past age.

Massey's personality was essentially that of a petulant loner. He could be proud, aloof and self-centred to the point of remaining unmarried and childless. It seems that he cultivated very few close friendships and that people tended to respect more than like him. But Massey did demonstrate loyalty to those who served him unquestioningly. Backhouse, Edward Harley, Titus and Bunce knew him as a valiant and trustworthy commander and friend.

If Massey had lived by the sword he did not choose to be ruled by it, nor against the odds did he die by it. The elements of greatness within him were flawed by some very human failings. Having fought for both sides Massey could perhaps afford to be more accommodating and forgiving than most. He experienced the tragedy of the Civil War in all its enormity but always aimed to minimise that tragedy.¹

For Edward Massey, cynicism made the conflict a war without an enemy. This was not because of any inherent tolerance and understanding but because of the shallowness of his personal motives throughout most of the Civil War. The instinctive Royalism which made him return from Holland in 1640 only slowly came to reassert itself as Massey's Parliamentary colleagues came to appreciate his cynical and self-serving attachment to their cause. Ultimately he slowly gravitated back towards the Royalist camp because he had become antagonised against all shades of Parliamentary opinion. Even after 1649 many Royalists, such as Clarendon, although finding some admirable qualities in Massey, found it very difficult to forgive him his past. Like so many other Englishmen throughout the 1640's and 1650's the only real cause that Massey believed in was his own. He transcended the relevance and causes of the war by simply putting his own priorities before all others. If his career is illustrative of

(1) BG, p.100; DNB, xiii.4.

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anything it is how such a self-centred individual can influence great events even when his intentions are far removed from the actual course of action that he ultimately decided to undertake.

Above all Massey is an object lesson in human nature and how his very personal priorities could effect the outcome of far nobler political and constitutional conceptions of law and sovereignty. Civil Wars may often be about profound differences of principle but the individuals who very often fight in them do not always rise to the occasion either ideologically or personally. The individual and human element in such conflicts should never be ignored least of all underestimated.

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 Add.Ms.18,777, Walter Yonge's Journal, September 1642-March 1643.
 Add.Ms.18,778, Walter Yonge's Journal, July-November 1643.
 Add.Ms.18,779, Walter Yonge's Journal, November 1643-May 1644.
 Add.Ms.18,780, Walter Yonge's Journal, April-December 1645.
 Add.Ms.10,114, John Harrington's Diary, 1646-53.
 Add.Ms.31,116, Lawrence Whitacre's Diary, October 1642-July 1647.
 Harleian Ms.164, Sir Simon D'Ewes Journal, February 1641-June
 1643.
 Harleian Ms.165, Sir Simon D'Ewes Journal, June-December 1643.
 Harleian Ms.166, Sir Simon D'Ewes Journal, February 1644-November
 1645.
 Add.Ms.37,343, Whitelocke's Annals, 1640-45.
 Add.Ms.37,344, Whitelocke's Annals, 1645-49.
Public Record Office.
 State Papers Domestic, King Charles I.
 SP, 16/448, March, 1640.
 SP, 16/488, January, 1642.
 SP, 16/489, February-March, 1642.
 SP, 16/490, April-May, 1642.
 SP, 16/491, June-August, 1642.
 SP, 16/492, October-November, 1642.
 SP, 16/493, December and undated, 1642.
 SP, 16/497, January-August, 1643.

SP, 16/498, September-December, 1643.

SP, 16/500, January-February, 1644.

SP, 16/501, March-May, 1644.

SP, 16/502, June-August, 1644.

SP, 16/503, Pt.1.

SP, 16/506, January-March, 1645.

SP, 16/510, July-September, 1645.

SP, 16/511, October-December, 1645.

SP, 16/513, Pt.2.

SP, 16/514, Pt's. 1 and 2.

SP, 16/515, Pt's. 1 and 2.

SP, 16/539, Pt's. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Part 2 contains warrants and petitions signed by Massey. See f.216; f.217, f.218. Part 4 includes warrants signed by Massey in the summer of 1647. See f.53; f.55; f.58; f.60; ff.61-5; f.69; f.72.

Letter Books of the Committee of Both Kingdoms.

SP, 21/4.

SP, 21/7.

SP, 21/8. See ff.33-33b for the Committee of Both Kingdom's mediation between Massey and the Gloucester Committee.

SP, 21/16.

SP, 21/17.

SP, 21/18.

SP, 21/19.

SP, 21/20.

SP, 21/21.

SP, 21/22.

SP, 21/23.

Minute Book of the Committee for Irish Affairs.

SP, 21/26. This volume contains details of the decisions taken by the Irish Committee when Massey's presence was noted. See f.34; f.37; f.39; f.40; ff.49-53; f.55; f.58; ff.60-61; ff.71-80.

State Papers for Ireland, Charles I.

SP, 63/261 (1646). See f.128b; ff.136-37; f.166b; for papers relating to the transportation of Massey's brigade over to Ireland.

SP, 63/262 (1646). See f.84b, f.100; ff.115b-116; f.119; for further documentation on the Western Brigade and Ireland.

Commonwealth Exchequer Papers.

SP, 28/191. Collections for Distressed Protestants in Ireland.

SP, 28/129, Pt.5. Captain Blaney's Account Book. A rich source of material relating to the financing of Massey's principal garrison as well as many other aspects of his command.

SP, 28/154. Gloucester and Hertford Accounts and Scedules. This unfoliated collection of papers contains a list of the Gloucester corporation's accounts for 1642-43.

SP, 28/228, Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Papers relating to Gloucester and Gloucestershire. These volumes contain an impressive collection of documentation relating to a wide variety of features which help illustrate the nature and character of Massey's command. They contain dozens of warrants, petitions and other documents actually signed by him.

SP, 28/229.. Papers of the County Committees of Hereford and Gloucester. No foliation.

SP, 28/261, Pt's. 1 and 2. Papers of the Committee of Safety.

SP, 28/262, Pt's. 1 and 2. Papers of the Committee of Safety.

SP, 28/263, Papers of the Committee of Safety.

SP, 28/264, Papers of the Committee of Safety.

SP, 28/175, Somerset Assessments. This volume contains the Account Book of Brunton hundred.

SP, 28/251. Wales and the Associated Counties. This volume also contains a bundle of papers which relate to the Committee of the West.

SP, 28/187. Westminster Hundred and Worcestershire, Pt's. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

SP, 28/188. Papers Relating to Worcester. No foliation.

SP, 28/30. Army Warrants, May-June 1645. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

SP, 28/31. Army Warrants, July-August 1645. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Pt.5 contains some warrants signed by Massey for his western brigade. See ff.620-6.

SP, 28/32. Army Warrants, September-October 1645. Pt's. 1, 2 and

3.

SP, 28/33. Army Warrants, November-December 1645. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Pt.3 contains Constance Farrer's statement of arrears. See f.351.

SP, 28/36. Army Warrants, January-February 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

SP, 28/37. Army Warrants, March-April 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Pt.2 contains some warrants which relate to Gloucester in 1643. See ff.177-181; f.224.

SP, 28/38. Army Warrants, May-June 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

SP, 28/39. Army Warrants, July-August 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. See Pt.5 f.474 for another Massey document.

SP, 28/40. Army Warrants, September-October 1646. Pt's. 1 and 2.

SP, 28/41. Army Warrants, November-December 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

SP, 28/42. Army Warrants, Miscellaneous 1646-47. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. See Pt. 7, f.912 for Captain Blaney's accounts and arrears.

SP, 28/43. Army Warrants, Miscellaneous 1646-47. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

SP, 28/44. Army Warrants, January-February 1647. Pt's. 1 and 2.

SP, 28/46. Army Warrants, June 1647. Pt's. 1, 2, 3 and 4.

SP, 28/47. Army Warrants, July-August 1647. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

SP, 28/48. Army Warrants, September 1647. Pt's. 1, 2, 3 and 4.

SP, 28/302. Miscellaneous Papers, 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. See Pt. 4, f.599 for the transportation of disbandment money for the Western Brigade.

SP, 28/303. Miscellaneous Papers, 1647. Pt's. 1, 2, 3 and 4.

State Papers of the Committee of Indemnity.

SP, 24/31.

SP, 24/32.

SP, 24/33.

SP, 24/34.

SP, 24/35.

SP, 24/36.
SP, 24/37.
SP, 24/38.
SP, 24/39.
SP, 24/40.
SP, 24/41.
SP, 24/42.
SP, 24/43.
SP, 24/44.
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SP, 24/46.
SP, 24/47.
SP, 24/48.
SP, 24/49.
SP, 24/50.
SP, 24/51.
SP, 24/52.

Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Tanner Ms.66 (1642).
Tanner Ms.63 (1642).
Tanner Ms.64 (1642-3).
Tanner Ms.62(1) (1643).
Tanner Ms.62(2) (1643).
Tanner Ms.61 (1644-5). See f.41 for the Parliament's instructions relating to the garrison of Gloucester.
Tanner Ms.60(1) (1645). See f.160 for Massey's commission to command Parliament's forces in the West.
Tanner Ms.60(2) (1645-6).
Tanner Ms.59(1) (1646). See f.52; f.220; f.247; for the Committee of Gloucester's correspondence to Speaker Lenthall.
Tanner Ms.59(2) (1646-7).
Tanner Ms.58(1) (1647). See f.59; f.68; f.172; for reports by the Parliamentary commissioners from Saffron Walden which were signed by Massey.
Tanner Ms.58(2) (1647-8).
Tanner Ms.59(1) (1648).

Tanner Ms.59(2) (1648).

Tanner Ms.303, Fitz-William Coningsby's defence.

Clarendon State Papers.

Cl.SP, 22 March-November 1643.

Cl.SP, 23 November 1643-January 1644.

Cl.SP, 24 January 1644-June 1645.

Cl.SP, 25 June-October 1645.

Cl.SP, 26 October 1645-January 1646.

Cl.SP, 27 January-May 1646.

Cl.SP, 28 May-December 1646.

Cl.SP, 29 December 1646-July 1647.

Cl.SP, 30(1) July-November 1647.

Cl.SP, 30(2) December 1647-March 1648.

Cl.SP, 31 March-November 1648.

Cl.SP, 34 December 1648-January 1649.

Cl.SP, 38 September-December 1649.

Cl.SP, 39 January-March 1650.

Cl.SP, 42 April 1651-February 1652.

Cl.SP, 45 January-June 1653.

Cl.SP, 47 November 1653-February 1654.

Cl.SP, 50 (1655).

Cl.SP, 51 (1656).

Nalson Manuscripts.

Nalson Ms.2 (1642). See f.138; f.148; f.175; f.197; f.198; ff.221; for a series of letters from the Gloucester corporation.

Nalson Ms.3 (1643-44).

Nalson Ms.4 (1645).

Nalson Ms.5 (1645-46).

Nalson Ms.11 (1643). See ff.188-89; ff.191-2; for dispatches of military operations involving Massey.

Nalson Ms.12 (1645). See f.245; for a letter to the Committee of Gloucester.

Rawlinson Manuscripts.

Rawlinson Ms.A 258. Papers Relating to Ireland 1645-47. This volume contains letters relating to the disbandment of the Western Brigade.

Rawlinson Ms.C 125. Copies of Letters to Western Royalists in 1645.

Rawlinson Ms.D 11. Charles I &.

Rawlinson Ms.D 119. Forest of Dean.

Rawlinson Ms.D 395. Civil War Papers.

Rawlinson Ms.D 918. See ff.144-45b for leaves out of the minute book of the Royalist Committee of Worcestershire.

Rawlinson Ms.D 925. Historical Notes. See ff.147-152 for other pages of the Royalist Committee for Worcester.

Firth Ms.C 6. Victorian transcriptions of the Rupert Correspondence. Some of the originals are now lost. All three volumes contain many letters by the Royalist military commanders against whom Massey fought.

Firth Ms.C 7.

Firth Ms.C 8.

Ms.Eng.Hist. C 53. Journal of Sir Samuel Luke 1643-44. This collection of intelligence reports and letters casts much light on the campaigning in Gloucestershire during the early months of Massey's deputy Governorship.

Fairfax Ms.32, Fairfax Papers 1641-58.

Dugdale Ms.19, Register of Letters Patent 1643-46.

Harvester Press Microfilm.

Clarke Ms.41. Papers of the Council of the Army 1647.

Gloucestershire Record Office.

D 115. Civil War Manuscripts. This volume contains many papers for 1643 which illustrate some little known aspects of the siege of Gloucester.

D 2510. Volumes 1 and 2. The Papers of John Smith (1639-46).

D 2071. A3. Chipping Sodbury Bailiffs Accounts (1641-42).

D 421 A/1/7. Royal Commission to Sir William Vavasour.

D 421 A/1/8. Royal Commission to Sir John Winter.

D 421 A/1/6. Royal Commission to Sir John Winter.

Transcriptions from original documents. TRS; 128; 130; 141; 145; 147; 167; 168.

Gloucestershire Record Office Microfilm 285. The Barwick Manuscripts. See f.2 for Massey's Accounts.

B 3/2 Corporation Minutes 1632-56.

H 2/2 Gloucester Corporation Letters 1619-56.

G3/S04 Sessions Book 1638-47.

F 4/5 Chamberlians Accounts 1635-53.

G 10/2 Hundred Court 1641-53.

London Corporation Record Office.

Corporation of London Record Book 1640-49.

London Common Council Journal Book, volume 40, 1640-49.

Doctor William's Library.

Thomas Juxon's Journal Ms.24*50.

Titled tracts from the Thomason collection in the British Library.

E 133(7) The Humble Petition of the Inhabitants of the County of Gloucester, 1641.

E 133(6) A Letter Sent to a Worthy Member of the Commons Concerning the Lord Chandos..., Aug 22 1642.

E 116(15) Sixteen Propositions Presented at the General Meeting of the Gentry of the City of Gloucester..., 1642.

E 124(4) Exceeding Joyful News From the Earl of Stamford..., Oct 22 1642. A bogus propaganda tract.

E 127(28) True News Out of Herefordshire..., Nov 19 1642. Another bogus account of spectacular victories achieved by Stamford.

E 83(7) True Discovery of the Practices of the Lord Chandos to Betray the City of Gloucester, Dec 1642.

E 85(25) A True Relation of the Late Attempt Made upon the Town of Cirencester in the County of Gloucester, Jan 7 1643.

E 85(33) A Letter to the Earl of Pembroke From Sir Edward Baynton in Gloucester, Jan 22 1643.

E 90(7) A Relation of the Taking of Cirencester in the County of Gloucester, Feb 2 1643.

E 90(4) A Warning Piece to All His Majestys Subjects..., 1643.

E 92(9) The Petition of the Inhabitants of Cirencester..., March 7 1643.

E 94(12) Letter From Waller to Essex..., March 28 1643.

E 94(30) The Copy of a Letter Sent From Bristol..., April 4 1643.

E 101(25) A Letter From an Officer in His Majestys Army to a Gentleman in Gloucestershire..., May 1643.

E 67(31) A Brief and Exact Relation of the Most Material and Remarkable Passages That Happened in the Late Well Formed Siege Before the City of Gloucester, 1643.

E 67(13) A True Relation of the Several Passages Which Have Happened to Our Army Since it Advanced Towards Gloucester..., Sept 4 1643.

E 230(9) Good News From All Quarters of the Kingdom Particularly From Gloucester, Sept 13 1643.

E 70(10) A True Relation of the Late Expedition of His Excellency, Robert Earl of Essex For the Relief of Gloucester..., Oct 7 1643.

E 69(2) Relation of the late Battle Near Newbury..., Sept 26 1643.

E 69(10) The Several Actions of the King's Army Since His Majestys Removing it From Before Gloucester, Sept 27 1643.

E 69(15) A True and Exact Relation of the...Red and Blue Regiments...Who Marched Forth For the Relief of the City of Gloucester, Oct 2 1643.

E 45(12) A True Relation of a Wicked Plot Intended and Still Afoot Against the City of Gloucester to Betray the Same Into the Hands of the Cavaliers..., May 7 1644.

E 47(12) Ordinance of the Lords and Commons For Raising and Maintaining of Horse and Foot For the Garrison of Gloucester..., May 13 1644.

E 50(17) Eben-ezer, A Full and Exact Relation of the Several Remarkable and Victorious Proceedings of the Ever Renowned Colonel Massey, Governor of Gloucester From May 7 to May 25 1644..., June 4 1644.

E 271(1) Two Great Victories One Obtained by Colonel Massey at the Storming of Sir John Winter's House..., March 1 1645. The title of this tract is misleading, it really refers to the battle of Launant.

E 274(1) Four Ordinances of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament..., 13 March 1645. Legislation concerning Gloucester.

E 281(9) A Copy of Colonel Massey's Letter of All the Particulars of the Great Fight Between Him and Prince Rupert at Ledbury..., 2 May 1645.

E 286(7) Two Ordinances of the Lords and Commons Assembled in

Parliament..., 29 May 1645. Legislation referring to Gloucester.

E 286(14) A True Relation of the Manner of the Taking of the Town of Evesham..., 26 May 1645.

E 345(3) The Power of the Committee of Somerset..., July 18 1645.

E 306(8) An Historical Relation of the Military Government of Gloucester From the Beginning of the Civil War Between King and Parliament to the Removal of Colonel Massey From the Government to the Command of the Western Forces, Oct 1645.

E 311(12) A Copy of a Letter From Major General Massey, Nov 1645.

E 316(4) Verses on the Siege of Gloucester and Colonel Massey, Dec 1645.

E 334(5) A Relation of That Great and Public Consternation Had in Gloucester, July 1644, April 24 1646.

E 337(15) A Vindication of the Magistrates and Ministers of the City of Gloucester..., 11 May 1646.

E 349(18) Truth Discovered From the West, Concerning the Carriage of Major General Massey's Brigde There, Aug 8 1646.

E 358(7) Life of Essex, 1646.

E 362(8) Propositions For the Western Association With the Western Intentions For Their Own Preservation, 14 Nov 1646.

E 396(7) The Petition of Members of the House of Commons..., 2 July 1647.

E 397(17) A Particular Charge or Impeachment..., 9 July 1647.

E 398(3) A Brief Justification of the Eleven Accused Members, 15 July 1647.

E 398(17) A Full Vindication and Answer of the Eleven Accused Members, 15 July 1647.

E 399(29) A Copy of a Letter Sent From One of the Agitators..., 22 July 1647.

E 399(30) The Humble Petition of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Commons of the City of London..., 24 July 1647.

E 399(31) A Message From His Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax..., 24 July 1647.

E 399(36) Works of Darkness Brought to Light, 23 July 1647.

E 400(2) An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament..., 23 July 1647.

- E 400(28) An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons in Parliament Assembled..., 31 July 1647.
- E 400(29) A Declaration of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen and Commons of the City of London..., 31 July 1647.
- E 400(32) A Declaration of William Lenthall..., 31 July 1647.
- E 400(34) Several Orders and Votes of Both Houses of Parliament..., 2 Aug 1647.
- E 400(40) A Letter From the Army..., 3 Aug 1647.
- E 401(12) The Declaration of General Massey and Colonel General Poyntz..., 9 Aug 1647.
- E 401(20) A Speedy Hue and Cry After General Massey..., 10 Aug 1647.
- E 402(3) A New Remonstrance of the Eleven Impeached Members..., 14 Aug 1647.
- E 402(4) A True and Impartial Relation of the Military Government of the City of Gloucester..., 14 Aug 1647.
- E 402(22) An Outcry Against the Speedy Hue and Cry, After General Massey..., 18 Aug 1647.
- E 402(23) Virtue and Valour Vindicated, or the Late Hue and Cry Sent After General Massey..., 19 Aug 1647.
- E 404(6) The Araignment and Impeachment of Major General Massey..., 23 Aug 1647.
- E 404(15) General Massey's Bartholomew-Fairings..., 24 Aug 1647.
- E 452(20) The Declaration of Major General Massey Concerning Coming Into England..., 13 July 1648.
- E 476(33) A Declaration to the City and Kingdom From Major General Massey..., 18 Dec 1648.
- E 541(7) A Short Declaration by Colonel Edward Massey..., 2 Feb 1649.
- E 597(4) The Declaration of Major General Massey and Eighty Other English Officers..., 29 March 1650.
- E 608(3) The Declaration and Speech of Colonel Massey: Concerning the Inthroning of the King of Scots, 22 July 1650.
- E 641(15) The Declaration of Major General Massey Upon His Death Bed at Leicester, 15 Sept 1651.
- E 641(18) The Charge and Articles of High Treason...Also the

Parliament's Resolution Concerning Major General Massey, 16 Sept 1651.

E 649(1) The Queen of Denmark's Letter...Together With the Removal of Major General Massey..., Dec 1651.

E 674(26) A New Hue and Cry After Major General Massey..., 6 Sept 1652.

E 684(5) A Declaration of the Proceedings of Major General Massey..., 22 Dec 1652.

E 1019(20) A Letter From an Eminent Person in Gloucester..., 5 April 1660.

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A Perfect Diurnall.

(1642);	E 202(17);	E 202(45);	E 202(46);	E 239(14);
E 240(5);	E 240(14);	E 240(34);	E 242(7);	(1643);
E 244(45);	E 245(16);	E 246(1);	E 246(2);	E 246(12);
E 246(13);	E 246(20);	E 246(42);	E 246(44);	E 247(11);
E 247(18);	E 247(25);	(1645);	E 262(4);	E 262(8);
E 262(11);	E 262(17);	E 262(33);	E 262(37);	E 262(50);
E 264(5);	E 264(10);	E 264(18);	E 266(8);	(1646)
E 506(15);	E 506(20);	E 509(3);	E 509(5);	E 511(23);
E 511(26);	E 511(31);	E 513(11);	E 513(20);	(1647).
E 515(6);	E 515(7);	E 515(8);	E 515(9);	E 515(10);
E 515(11);	E 515(17);	E 515(19);	E 515(21);	E 518(3);
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The Weekly Account.

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(1644);	E 80(6);	E 31(1);	E 33(30);	E 34(22);
E 35(23);	E 37(6);	E 38(8);	E 42(3);	E 43(23);
E 49(9);	E 50(15);	E 51(14);	E 3(8);	E 3(23);
E 4(23);	E 49(9);	E 50(15);	E 51(14);	E 3(8);
E 3(23);	E 4(23);	E 6(32);	E 7(13);	E 8(7);
E 8(29);	E 9(4);	E 10(6);	E 10(28);	E 12(8);
E 13(20);	E 18(2);	E 18(16);	E 250(11);	E 250(13);
(1645);	E 268(4);	E 269(12);	E 270(24);	E 271(14);
E 277(9);	E 278(23);	E 282(3);	E 284(5);	E 286(24);
E 288(2);	E 288(33);	E 289(2);	E 298(10);	E 313(2);

(1646); E 337(17); (1647); E 384(1); E 384(16);
 E 386(3); E 388(9); E 393(24); E 394(16); E 401(1);
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The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer.

(1643); E 84(29); E 85(15); E 88(20); E 91(8);
 E 93(19); E 95(2); E 97(9); E 61(27); E 65(11);
 E 77(29); E 78(14); (1644); E 33(6); E 42(4);
 E 47(19); E 50(9); E 50(26); E 51(9); E 3(6);
 E 10(22); E 12(23); E 13(19); E 16(9); (1645);
 E 273(2); E 274(2); E 274(24); E 276(3); E 276(22);
 E 278(8); E 278(22); E 279(11); E 284(2); E 284(23);
 E 286(1); E 286(20); E 287(7); E 309(21); (1646);
 E 319(4); E 327(18); E 336(1); E 349(4); E 358(21);
 E 365(12); (1647); E 384(15); E 385(6); E 390(13);
 E 391(12); E 392(24); E 393(19); E 398(6); E 400(39);
 E 401(21).

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 E 274(26); E 281(4); E 286(8); E 288(8); E 289(10);
 E 292(1); E 293(7); E 299(7); (1646); E 329(13);
 E 341(18); E 350(7).

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 E 36(6); E 37(24); E 38(19); E 39(22); E 42(16);
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 E 53(2); E 2(19); E 3(3); E 13(11); E 17(8);
 (1645); E 271(18); E 273(10); E 274(29); E 281(10);
 E 282(12); E 284(17); E 285(9); E 286(11); E 292(5);
 E 298(19); E 303(10); E 304(18); (1646); E 342(11);
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(1645); E 276(8); E 277(14); E 278(26); E 281(5);
 E 282(10); E 285(7); E 286(9); E 286(26); E 288(7);

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(1646);	E 332(3);	E 337(18);	E 339(3);	E 341(16);
E 349(12);	E 358(14);	E 359(7);	E 365(16);	(1647);
E 379(3);	E 381(19);	E 383(22);	E 384(3);	E 385(1);
E 385(8);	E 392(7);	E 395(5);	E 404(28).	

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E 33(13);	E 34(4);	E 36(5);	E 37(21);	E 38(18);
E 42(10);	E 46(8);	E 47(26);	E 49(13);	E 50(35);
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E 240(16);	E 240(14);	E 244(4);	E 244(22);	(1643);
E 245(6);	E 245(7);	E 246(8);	E 246(25);	E 247(19);
E 105(15);	E 89(1);	E 89(23);	E 94(18);	E 95(4);
E 96(12);	E 99(24);	E 61(25);	E 65(21);	E 65(33);
(1644);	E 81(15);	E 29(10);	E 33(9);	E 34(21);
E 36(1);	E 37(15);	E 43(12);	E 44(22);	E 47(28);
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E 266(3);	E 266(27);	(1646);	E 511(12);	E 511(14);
E 511(19);	E 511(22);	E 513(13);	E 513(21);	E 518(10);
E 518(14);	E 320(18);	E 322(22);	E 337(22);	E 353(24);
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E 387(5).				

The True Informer.

(1643);	E 75(23);	E 77(22);	(1644);	E 29(18);
E 31(10);	E 33(14);	E 43(17);	E 50(5);	E 53(4);
E 2(3);	E 2(26);	E 4(32);	E 8(15);	E 10(17);
E 13(12);	E 16(8);	E 19(9);	E 21(21);	(1645);

E 26(3); E 27(2); E 284(19); E 286(33); E 288(18);
 E 288(46); E 292(9); E 298(21); E 300(2); E 302(9);
 E 303(36); E 309(17); E 311(10).

A Diary or an Exact Journal.

(1644); E 16(13); (1645); E 23(12); E 24(11);
 E 268(8); E 274(25); E 277(13); E 278(29); E 285(4);
 E 288(5); E 264(24); E 262(35); E 264(8); E 292(19);
 E 311(5); E 311(23); E 313(5); (1646); E 322(18);
 E 400(23).

Special Passages.

(1642); E 113(18); E 118(10); E 118(45); E 119(2);
 E 123(5); E 124(14); E 127(35); E 127(41); E 128(28);
 E 130(10); E 84(6); (1643); E 84(30); E 85(9);
 E 86(39); E 89(17); E 90(12); E 91(5); E 93(7);
 E 94(15); E 96(2); E 97(8); E 99(21); E 105(10);
 E 61(15); E 63(4).

Mercurius Britannicus.

(1643); E 75(38); E 29(11); (1644); E 40(33);
 E 45(11); E 47(15); E 67(8); E 67(26); E 78(17);
 E 22(19); E 51(8); E 52(8); E 53(6); E 12(19);
 E 278(3); E 281(14); E 284(21); E 288(24); (1645);
 E 290(13); E 298(24); E 305(12); E 393(30); E 397(9).

Mercurius Verdicus.

(1643); E 33(23); E 34(17); E 35(20); E 38(6);
 E 39(9); (1644); E 278(19); E 279(1); E 281(11);
 E 282(14); E 284(15); E 285(12); E 286(13); E 286(32);
 E 288(19); E 288(47); (1645); E 292(8); E 296(11);
 E 304(20); E 305(10); E 308(28); E 309(16).

Certain Informations.

(1643); E 105(27); E 85(45); E 86(35); E 90(3);
 E 92(3); E 93(4); E 93(18); E 94(29); E 99(15);
 E 101(2); E 65(8); E 65(24); E 67(22); E 71(32);
 E 79(8); (1644); E 29(20).

Perfect Passages.

(1644); E 17(1); E 21(26); (1645); E 25(17);
 E 26(9); E 268(1); E 269(13); E 270(5); E 270(23);

E 271(13); E 262(6); E 262(12); E 262(15); E 262(27);
E 262(51); E 264(7); E 266(13); E 303(28); (1646);
E 322(27).

The London Post.

(1644); E 6(28); E 8(5); E 10(5); E 10(23);
E 13(4); E 13(18); E 20(3); E 21(24); (1645);
E 23(18); E 27(10); E 269(8); E 271(9).

The Parliaments Post.

(1645); E 284(22); E 285(18); E 287(5); E 290(15);
E 293(2); E 293(20); E 298(29); E 302(22); E 304(6).

The Spy.

(1644); E 33(27); E 47(24); E 49(10).

The Kingdoms Weekly Post.

(1643); E 75(36); (1644); E 81(17); E 8(24);
(1645); E 311(32).

Remarkable Passages.

(1643); E 78(10); E 79(26).

Englands Memorable Accidents.

(1642); E 240(37); E 240(42); E 242(6); E 244(9);
E 244(26).

The City Scout.

(1645); E 298(16); E 304(5); E 304(25); E 305(16).

The Military Scribe.

(1644); E 34(16); E 35(21); E 37(4); E 38(4);
E 40(10).

A Perfect Summary.

(1647); E 518(9); E 518(13); E 518(15).

Everydays Journal in Parliament.

(1647); E 378(8).

Perfect Occurrences of Parliament.

(1645); E 262(3); E 262(7).

The Parliament Scout.

(1644); E 10(13); E 23(10).

Mercurius &c.

(1644); E 27(7); E 31(18).

Occurrences.

(1644); E 34(5); E 40(26).
The Perfect Weekly Account.

(1647); E 399(12); E 400(16).
Weekly Intelligencer.

(1642); E 121(34); E 123(6).
The Court Mercurie.

(1644); E 3(16); E 4(10).
Exact Journal.

(1645); E 307(25).
Special and Remarkable Passages.

(1645); E 303(35).
The Kingdoms Scout.

(1645); E 311(30).
Moderate Messenger.

(1646); E 322(7).
The Complete Intelligencer.

(1643); E 75(32).
The Exchange Intelligencer.

(1645); E 288(32).
Mercurius Anglicus.

(1644); E 31(20).
Special and Remarkable Passages.

(1646); E 303(12).
The Country Messenger.

(1644); E 12(14).
Chief Heads.

(1644); E 47(25).
Some Special Passages.

(1642); E 202(12).
An Exact and True Diurnall.

(1642); E 202(42).
The Country Post.

((1644); E 10(29).
The Latest Remarkable Truthes.

(1642); E 240(23).
The Army's Post.

(1647); E 397(10).

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